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A Case of Enterprise Social Networking Adoption 
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Despite a growing interest in processes of diffusion within organisations and some understanding of the 
social processes of creating and enacting external and internal IT innovations, little empirical research has 
studied potentially relevant intra-organisational diffusion dynamics underlying the movement of 
innovations adopted at an organisational level, into the front-line practices of organisational subunits. 
Furthermore, we know even less about the diffusion processes of non-transactional digital innovations, 
such as enterprise social networking (ESN). ESNs embedded “ideology of openness” and its non-
transactional nature particularly create social tensions that largely run against the grain of organisational 
rationality and efficiency, pervade key organisational processes and lead to wide variations in how 
organisational actors interpret and appropriate ESN features within organisations. The goal of this research 
is to theorize about the institutional mechanisms and processes by which these highly flexible digital 
innovations become misaligned, aligned and diffused at the micro-level of everyday work, as well as the 
enabling and precipitating dynamics that condition and trigger these mechanisms. This theorization 
involved a longitudinal exploration of how different communities of actors in a globally distributed 
technology services firm appropriated an ESN platform over a four year period, and how managerial 
intervention shaped appropriation outcomes. These dynamics can be understood through a rhetorical 
legitimation lens as a process where organisational actors with competing interests use strategic 
communications, to legitimate and enable the generation of collective meanings around distinctly different 
IT features and practices. 
 
Findings indicate that the core internal diffusion process was intra-organisational theorizing around ESN. 
Intra-organisational theorizing was an on-going process of elaborating and refining the organisational 
level theorization for ESN to suit front- line employees in their immediate contexts. In this way, it 
gradually helped to standardize and scale the ESNs features and functions as it was appropriated by 
different communities of actors (infusion). In each infusion, intra-organisational theorizing unfolded in 
three cumulative and relatively sequential phases of legitimation: (1) rationale framing (2) value 
advertising, and (3) motivating engagement, which were instrumental for respectively managing political, 
technical and cultural institutional misalignments, and promoting intra-group meaning making. On the 
other hand, negotiation and inter-group meaning-making was enabled by strategically grafting on other 
intra-organisational theorizations, and co-opting people, ESN functions, and practices from other 
infusions. Further, these legitimation processes unfolded as a sequence of primarily pragmatic pathos and 
logos appeals. In particular, early and on-going logos appeals helped to de-legitimate established, 
competing technologies, and directly enabled legitimation and collective meaning-making around ESN.
1!
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The Internal Diffusion of New Digital Innovations: A 
Case of Enterprise Social Networking Adoption 
!
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Recently organisations have started to devote a lot of time and resources to appropriating consumer-
based digital innovations such as enterprise social networking (ESN) (Harris, Ives and Junglas, 2012; 
Treem et al., 2015). These systems are adopted with the intention to facilitate widespread connections 
between information, people and processes within and across organisational departments, principally 
through the application of discontinuous, mechanistic and uniform notions about relevant technology 
appropriation processes (Ciborra, 2000; Leonardi, 2009). Information systems enquiry cautions us, 
however, that the internal standardization and scaling of technologies across increasingly complex 
organisations is not wholly consistent with mechanistic, uniform and discontinuous principles (Scott, 
1987; van Gestel and Hillebrand, 2011). As these new digital innovations become more strategic and 
continue to extend to more bureaucratic organisations, and across increasingly diverse activities, it is 
vital for practitioners and researchers to understand more about how these systems coevolve with the 
constantly changing and complex organisational contexts into which they are imported. 
If organisations were purely viewed as tightly integrated, mechanistic and purely uniform social 
structures, then perhaps traditional technological appropriation perspectives could well address our 
need to understand how new digital innovations can be standardized and scaled to better connect 
information, people and processes within organisations. However, since the introduction of a new 
digital innovation often capriciously rearranges the local problems that the technology was expected to 
address in the first place (Arnold, 2003; Tilson, Lyytinen and Sørensen, 2010), contemporary 
information systems theory has established that ongoing and concurrent technological and 
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organisational change activities both have substantive effects on how technologies are appropriated in 
contemporary organisations (Karasti, Baker and Millerand, 2010; Leonardi, 2009). Therefore, looking 
at digital innovation development, implementation or use appropriation activities in isolation from each 
other, simply does not enable researchers to capture the uncertainty, and locally emergent, socio-
technical change that is involved in the appropriation of new innovations with the daily activities of 
organisational actors. This view is consistent with the digital innovation literature’s calls for an 
“extended design” approach to the study of technologies like ESN (Pollock and Williams, 2010). 
Studies which have not adopted this “extended- design” perspective have had to make necessarily 
reified compromises. These studies show that digital innovation appropriation tends to be more 
straightforward for distinct business processes and domains, which are more uniform and tightly 
integrated (Yoo, Lyytinen and Yang, 2005; Henfridsson, Mathiassen and Svahn, 2014). In these 
domains, digital innovations may be easily adapted across development, implementation and use 
activities to fit activities that can, and implicitly should be streamlined and rationalized. These domains 
are largely efficiency- driven and financially focused. Even in these cases, organisational actors often 
respond to digital innovations with a wide variety of idiosyncratic appropriations and local 
misalignments at the front- line of activity (Sia and Soh, 2002; Berente and Yoo, 2012; Herzhoff, 
Elaluf-Calderwood and Sørensen, 2010). These misalignments are becoming increasingly significant, 
as ESNs spread within organisations over time.  
Researchers have only recently turned their attention to making sense of the local appropriation of ESN 
within organisations. While the larger share of ESN research has indicated that specific ESN features 
exert fairly deterministic pressures across organisations (Parameswaran and Whinston, 2007; DiMicco 
and Millen, 2007), recent research around its effects of performance show that ESN adoption often 
reinforces, alters, or dramatically transforms how organisational actors accomplish important processes 
within organisations (Treem and Leonardi, 2012; Majchrzak et al., 2013; Vaast and Kaganer, 2013). 
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ESNs embedded “ideology of openness” and its non-transactional nature particularly create social 
tensions that largely run against the grain of organisational rationality and efficiency, pervade key 
organisational processes and lead to wide variations in how organisational actors interpret and 
appropriate ESN features within organisations (Pike, Bateman and Butler, 2013; Treem et al., 2015). 
In these cases, the materiality of ESN cannot be overlooked, but can be idiosyncratically appropriated, 
in very different ways. 
In the majority of treatments of digital innovation and ESN appropriation in organisations, there is a 
pervasive presupposition that in order to be successful, the ESN must, more or less, be gradually aligned 
with key organisational values and activities over development, implementation and use appropriation 
activities (Vaast and Kaganer, 2013; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013). This implies a process of 
simultaneous and mutually reinforcing organisational and technological change, where the system 
essentially structures parts of organisational fabric in each of these appropriation activities, and is in 
turn structured or adapted by actors in some way during the enactment of these appropriation activities. 
In cases like this, where there are deep organisational-level misalignments related to conflicting 
institutional structures, a growing number of digital innovation studies have highlighted that processes 
of institutional diffusion during technological appropriation help to drive mutual organisational and 
technological alignment (Azad and Faraj, 2011; Compagni, Mele and Ravasi, 2015; Henfridsson and 
Yoo, 2013). Similar studies have demonstrated that this approach is also consistent with an “extended 
design” perspective since it illustrates how linguistic, material and social processes co-evolve during 
alignment (Scarbrough, Robertson and Swan, 2015; Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell, 2014; Hansen, 
1999; Hsu, Huang and Galliers, 2014). Despite this, little empirical research has studied potentially 
relevant internal organisational diffusion processes and mechanisms underlying how digital innovation 
adopted at the organisational level are aligned with often pluralistic front- line organisational processes. 
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In this research I explore these dynamics, based on three observations from the literature on digital 
innovations: (1) that the introduction of digital innovations often generates different types of structural 
misalignments across the front- line activities of various communities of organisational actors, and (2) 
that different structural misalignments emerge from legitimation gaps between technological and 
organisational institutions, and can be aligned through entrepreneurial linguistic framing processes. 
Granted these observations, I draw primarily on macro-institutional (field and organisational level) 
studies of IT diffusion and related framework of rhetorical legitimation to theorize about the 
mechanisms and processes by which digital innovations adopted at an organisational level, become 
justified, diffuse, and transform front-line activities and behaviours, as well as the enabling and 
precipitating dynamics and entrepreneurial intervention that generate and condition these mechanisms 
and processes. Throughout this research I refer to this process as the internal diffusion of digital 
innovations. 
1.1!Institutional Views on IT Diffusion 
The dominant understanding of technology diffusion dynamics is rooted in the economic rational 
research traditions that focus on how managers rationally assess the factors affecting IT diffusion 
according to their expected economic returns (Fichman, 2004). However, the “IT assimilation” branch 
of this dominant perspective has long established that IT diffusion decisions in locally situated contexts 
are often more irrational and influenced by social and political dynamics (J. Wei, Lowry and Seedorf, 
2015; Cooper and Zmud, 1990). The institutional perspective provides a way of identifying social and 
political regularities and consistencies that shape technology appropriation decisions (Scott, 2001). 
With this, the institutional lens offers an especially useful lens for studying the appropriation of new 
digital innovations (Orlikowski and Barley, 2001). Not only can this perspective illuminate structural 
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and systematic understandings related to irrational political and social factors beyond the systems 
immediate context, but it also integrates techno- rational considerations (Orlikowski and Barley, 2001).  
Institutions are essentially pre-constructed patterns of action that actors draw on to guide their daily 
activities and behaviours. In doing so, institutions may be perceived by actors as objective reality, even 
though they are socially constructed by actors themselves (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Giddens 
(1984) describes institutions as the ‘more enduring features of social life’ (p. 24) since they persist and 
are reproduced over significant periods of time. The institutional lens can therefore be used to examine 
prescriptions, values and objectives that legitimate and underlie the behaviors of communities of actors 
or individual actors (Ocasio and Thornton, 1999). 
Friedland and Alford (1991) advanced the concept of the “institutional logic” as way to study 
institutional dynamics between societal, organisational and individual levels of analysis (Friedland and 
Alford, 1991, p.242). Institutional logics provide the ’formal and informal rules of action, interaction, 
and interpretation’(Ocasio and Thornton, 1999, p.804), that, outline the means to be employed, ends 
to be pursued, and standards to be used to define success, in a specific context (Greenwood et al., 2011; 
Pache and Santos, 2010).  
Since information technologies are “carriers” of institutional structure (Scott, 2001), they can embed 
distinct institutional logics (Berente and Yoo, 2012).  Institutional perspectives on IT diffusion 
therefore advance that variations in the speed, form, and appropriation of a newly- introduced 
innovation depends on the degree to which the logic embedded in the innovation is aligned with the 
organisation’s prevailing institutional prescriptions. Traditional institutional studies explain that 
organisations in similar institutional fields tend to appropriate technologies in similar ways in order to 
gain or maintain legitimacy within that field. While isomorphic effects are possible, institutional 
process studies highlight that since organisations are constituted of multiple, conflicting institutional 
logics-  a concept popularly referred to as institutional pluralism (van Gestel and Hillebrand, 2011) – 
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newly-introduced digital innovations may simultaneously be in conflict and congruent with the logics 
that underlie different communities of actors’ front- line activities (L. K. Lewis and Seibold, 1993; S. 
Standing et al., 2013). I refer to this situation of multiple simultaneous institutional misalignments as 
infusion variance.  
Process studies also demonstrate that IT alignment should be precipitated by (1) the early unlearning, 
dis-embedding, or de-legitimation of established technologies with similar form and function to the 
newly-incoming digital innovation (Garud and Karnøe, 2001; C. Oliver, 1992), and (2) the early and 
on-going mobilization of linguistic micro-processes to drive internal meaning making, legitimation and 
the eventual mobilization of resources around the new digital innovation (Kambil et al., 2000; Swanson 
and Ramiller, 1997). These linguistic micro-processes trigger a process of alignment that involves 
mutually constitutive organisational and technological change, where the process of organising 
generates technology appropriation and alignment processes that in turn, change the process of 
organising (Leonardi, 2007; Mekonnen and Sahay, 2008).  
Studies in the institutional translation perspective add that institutional misalignments may be technical, 
cultural and political in nature (Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 2010). Technical misalignments emerge from a 
lack of knowledge or experience of the new innovation and are relatively easily managed through the 
transfer of vicarious knowledge about the innovation. However, there is relatively scarce research into 
how this knowledge is filtered and framed and how actors make sense of this knowledge (Scarbrough, 
Robertson and Swan, 2015). Related research suggests that meaning-making and filtering processes 
around vicarious knowledge about the innovation is influenced by the degree to which that knowledge 
is aligned to the institutional logic of the target audience – this is an instance of cultural misalignment. 
These studies highlight that institutional entrepreneurs play a crucial part in managing cultural 
misalignments since they are sensitive to the organisation’s cultural complexity and have access to key 
sources of vicarious knowledge (Wang and Swanson, 2007; Henfridsson and Yoo, 2013). While the 
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majority of research in this area has only investigated bottom up, organic instances of micro-level 
cultural alignment between innovation and audiences, they importantly highlight that institutional 
entrepreneurs may use framing practices to strategically manage cultural, and related knowledge 
misalignments. In highly pluralistic contexts, rhetorical framing practices importantly drives a process 
of contestation and negotiation around different IT configurations, in order to ensure that the working 
system accommodates key interests and embeds useful compromises (political misalignment) 
(Orlikowski and Gash, 1994; Azad and Faraj, 2011).  
It is therefore my argument that in cases where the logic inscribed in the newly- introduced digital 
innovation is in conflict with the logics that shape prevailing front-line activities, the result will be the 
emergence of multiple, simultaneous institutional technical, cultural and political misalignments across 
various departments, job roles and hierarchical groups. These misalignments affect organisational 
actors’ ability to make sense of the system and thus, hinders standardization and scaling during internal 
diffusion. Institutional entrepreneurs in different organisational groups will manage these 
misalignments from the top by mobilizing competing rhetorical framing practices (justifications) to 
legitimate the system configuration that they believe is more appropriate.  
In line with this insight, I advance the notion of “rhetorical legitimation” to narrow or widen the gap 
between the local activities and behaviours related to the digital innovation in pluralistic contexts with 
the prevailing institutional order in which these practices are situated. These dynamics constitute the 
process of internal diffusion, which illustrates how digital innovations adopted at the organisational 
level are eventually translated and transform front- line organisational practices. In locating rhetorical 
legitimation processes within a web of prevailing organisational institutional logics, including the logic 
inscribed in the technology, I suggest that clear-cut regularities can be pinpointed. In particular, I 
advance that institutional logics constitute the interests, values and objectives that are salient to a 
specific community of actors at a particular period of time, and will therefore shape rhetorical 
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legitimation actions, be reflected in some way in the form and function of the aligned, working system. 
In many ways, the institutionally embedded nature of rhetorical legitimation is implicit, and thus makes 
for a tightly integrated conceptual lens.  
1.2!Intra-Organisational Rhetorical Legitimation  
The rhetorical legitimation lens (Harmon, Green and Goodnight, 2014) asserts the importance of 
rhetorical structure and type for understanding the role of rhetoric in processes of legitimation and 
institutional change. In particular, different forms and types of rhetorical arguments in actors’ 
technology configuration justifications will influence the target audience’s assumptions of the 
innovation’s legitimacy in different ways. In turn, as actors develop different assumptions of the digital 
innovation’s legitimacy, they will appropriate the innovation in ways that either maintains or changes 
their immediate institutional logic (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Harmon, Green and Goodnight, 
2014). Actors would maintain or change their immediate institutional logic by either adapting the 
innovations form and function, or adapting their activities and behaviour. 
In embedding rhetorical legitimation actions within a web of institutional logics, I extended the lens to 
provide a tightly integrated and uniform way of conceptualizing the deep interests that underlie 
rhetorical framing practices, and the web of dynamic institutional objectives and interests that constitute 
organisational and technological change. Moreover, the extended lens is also adjustable to multiple 
levels of analysis (supra- organisational, organisational, intra-organisational, conceptual, technical 
etc.), and can therefore be used to support multi-level theorizing, and generalize conclusions across 
institutional orders. While the concept of institutional logics is widely established across a number of 
disciplines, including information systems, rhetorical legitimation is relatively less established. 
However, the idea of rhetorical legitimation is implied in a host of classic organisational (Selznick, 
1949; Toulmin, Rieke and Janik, 1984; Klein and Hirschheim, 1989; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; 
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Elsbach and Sutton, 1992; Zucker, 1977; Rogers, 1995). However, the term itself was only recently 
explicitly labelled by Harmon, Green and Goodnight (2014), after being adopted by a host of 
management researchers (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Greenwood et al., 2011; Green and Li, 2011; 
Suchman, 1995; Pfeffer, 1981; Weick, 1969; Green, 2004). Earlier explicit references to the concept 
were also quite fittingly referred to as a “Rhetorical Theory of Diffusion” (Green, 2004, p. 656) and a 
“Rhetorical Model of Institutionalization” (Green, 2009, p. 16). Therefore, it is entirely congruent with 
classic management enquiry to view the institutional diffusion as a process of rhetorical legitimation 
(Barrett, Heracleous and Walsham, 2013; Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell, 2014; Hsu, Huang and 
Galliers, 2014). 
However, with the exception of a few recent studies (Barrett, Heracleous and Walsham, 2013; Hsu, 
Huang and Galliers, 2014), the concept of rhetorical legitimation has not received explicit attention in 
the information systems diffusion literature. Even those studies that have alluded to rhetorical 
legitimation in some way to explain IT diffusion (Cho and Mathiassen, 2007; Swanson and Ramiller, 
1997) have either not delved deeper than the organisational level of analysis. Instead, the institutional 
diffusion literature acknowledges only two broad outcomes of new technology introduction: resistance 
(Swanson and Ramiller, 1997; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994) or acceptance (Gallivan, 2001; Venkatesh, M. 
Morris and G. Davis, 2003). However, discontinuous studies of IT development, implementation and 
use recognize that technology often triggers organisational and technological changes that result in a 
form of simultaneous acceptance and resistance, or loose- coupling (Marakas and Hornik, 1996; 
Berente and Yoo, 2012). In this research, I integrate an institutional perspective of IT diffusion with 
the notion of rhetorical legitimation to engage in an in-depth case study of internal diffusion of an 
enterprise social networking platform. 
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1.3!Research Summary 
To explore the internal diffusion of new digital innovations across the front- line activities of 
organisational actors, this study focuses on a novel form of enterprise information systems, an 
enterprise social networking platform (ESN).  
1.3.1 Enterprise Social Networking 
Over the last decade the use of Enterprise Social Networks within organisations has grown and is now 
considered to be a viable medium for realizing business objectives and enabling new work behaviours. 
Typically, organisations adopt ESN with the intention of dissolving traditional horizontal and virtual 
lines of communication, and enhancing the connections between people, information and processes. 
(McAfee, 2009; Huang, Baptista and Galliers, 2013). More often than not, organisations also justify 
ESN adoption as a way to enhance employee satisfaction and engagement. This is unlike the majority 
of diffusion research that examines business applications which by nature are linked to improvements 
in efficiency and are therefore more likely to follow known patterns of diffusion (Culnan and Markus, 
1987). In contrast, the organisational appropriation of ESN features and services is significantly shaped 
by non-transactional prescriptions of use that are set outside organisational contexts, and often driven 
by consumer use cases (Treem et al., 2015). As such they don’t necessarily fit in traditional business 
models and established processes of diffusion that are based on technical and economic benefits. 
In deploying ESN in this context, organisations usually mimic popular social networking sites such as 
Facebook by integrating multiple social technologies such as social networking, social tagging, micro-
blogging, and document sharing into one Enterprise Social Networking platform (ESN). While 
traditional standalone technology such as email, forums and corporate directories, or more 
sophisticated groupware and knowledge management systems could be deployed to achieve similar 
objectives, ESN not only allows all these activities to occur in a single space, but also affords the 
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enterprise-wide visibility and persistence of communicative actions(Treem and Leonardi, 2012). ESNs 
visibility, persistence and interpretively flexible attributes constitute its unique and problematic 
“ideology of openness” (Gibbs, Rozaidi and Eisenberg, 2013). ESNs embedded “ideology of 
openness” and its non-transactional nature particularly create social tensions that largely run against 
the grain of organisational rationality and efficiency, pervade key organisational processes and lead to 
wide variations in how organisational actors interpret and appropriate ESN features within 
organisations (Pike, Bateman and Butler, 2013; Treem et al., 2015). 
ESN makes all communicative actions and outputs of individual everyday work, which were 
traditionally just visible to others in their immediate network through asynchronous technologies like 
email and telephone, visible to all organisational actors. This visibility either significantly reduces the 
amount of time and effort that organisational actors have to expend to locate information, or 
significantly increases this effort by making it harder to interpret information quality (Pike, Bateman 
and Butler, 2013). ESN also makes communicative actions and outputs persistent or accessible for 
longer periods of time after their initially creation, than synchronous technologies like video 
conferencing and instant messaging. Organisational actors therefore do not have to witness or help to 
enact interactions or actions to have the ability to look at previous successes and learn from the 
experiences of others (Majchrzak et al., 2013). Access to visible and persistent information can lead 
organisational actors to either share more information in order to facilitate social learning, or limit 
knowledge sharing to pursue more instrumental interests (Gibbs, Rozaidi and Eisenberg, 2013).  
These tensions arise because ESN’s ”ideology of openness” makes it both interpretively flexible and 
counter to the usual organisational ethos and status quo. As ESNs are appropriated internally, they are 
increasingly characterized by a multiplicity of different types of users, agendas, and purposes, and is 
often misaligned with the organisational activities and behavior that follow rationale and efficiency 
seeking institutional logics (Leonardi, Huysman and Steinfield, 2013; Huang, Baptista and Newell, 
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2015). Deep institutional misalignments are especially likely when ESN is adopted for non- 
transactional purposes like enhancing social learning (knowledge management, collaboration) and 
employee engagement. However, these ESN adoption decisions represent a significant shift away from 
the usual adoption of digital innovations that are (implicitly) linked to improvements in efficiency. 
Indeed, the appropriation of ESN for non- transactional purposes is a relative novelty and intriguing 
empirical oddity in a field of enquiry that for the most part, has based its technology diffusion and 
appropriation theories on the study of transactional, efficiency seeking systems (Treem et al., 2015). In 
this research, I explore the internal diffusion of ESN within organisations, and particularly examine 
how organisational actors navigate institutional misalignments between the front- line activities and 
behaviours related to ESN in pluralistic contexts, and the prevailing institutional order in which these 
activities and behaviours are situated. Next, I will provide a brief outline of my case site and highlight 
key findings. 
1.3.2 Case Site 
My case study involved a structured- pragmatic- situational (SPS) (Pan and Tan, 2011) and latent 
content analysis (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Berg, 2009) of the 3 years following iSource 
consultancy’s announcement that they would be replacing email with an ESN. This approach was 
refined from my earlier investigation of ESN adoption at another site (see Ramotar and Baptista, 
(2013)- Legitimating User Participation in Mature Organisations). The professional consulting 
environment is especially results and efficiency driven (Swanson, 2012), and is thus an ideal setting to 
observe the internal diffusion alignment processes. Further, their experiences with ESN resonated with 
a large variety of organisations (Treem and Leonardi, 2012). iSource was very pluralistic since it was 
formed of highly structured functional departments that developed conflicting objectives, interests and 
behaviours around ESN development, implementation and use. Despite this, iSource 3 year, top-down 
ESN adoption imitative and extreme stance on phasing out the use of email, was much discussed and 
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praised in academic and practitioner arenas as the “gold standard” for ESN adoption. Therefore, the 
case is highly suited for developing academic and managerial knowledge since it represented an 
extreme case of unusual success (Gerring, 2006, p. 101).  
The research extended over 2 years and focused on understanding how a steering team justified ESN 
and with what consequences, through the analysis of 50 interviews transcripts and a proportionally 
larger number of documents. Using my rhetorical legitimation conceptual model as a guide, I found 
that the core internal diffusion process was intra-organisational theorizing. Unlike the organisational 
level theorizations proposed by Swanson and Ramiller (1997) and Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings 
(2002), intra-organisational theorizing was an ongoing process of elaborating and refining the 
organisational level theorization for ESN to suit front- line employees in their immediate contexts. In 
this way it was vital to the standardization and scaling of the diffusing innovation’s IT ontology (form 
(meaning) and function (material features)), as the innovation was appropriated by different 
communities of actors (infusion). In each infusion, intra-organisational theorizing unfolded in three 
cumulative and relatively sequential phases of legitimation: (1) rationale framing (2) value advertising, 
and (3) motivating engagement.  
Managers co-opted people, ESN functions, and practices from other infusions, and strategically grafted 
on other intra-organisational theorizations, as they contested and negotiated among ESN infusions 
where actors followed different institutional logics. Equally as important, I found that processes of de-
legitimation and legitimation both appealed to pragmatic legitimacy. Managers were able to successful 
legitimate particular ESN ontologies by employing primarily pathos appeals to the pragmatic 
institutional needs of target audiences.  On the other hand, these legitimation processes were initiated 
and concurrently executed alongside managers’ primarily logos appeals to pragmatic legitimacy, which 
were aimed at de-legitimating email.  
14!
1.4 Core Argument 
The fundamental thread running through this thesis involves the examination of the connections among 
three distinct concepts: (1) institutional IT diffusion, (2) Intra-organisational rhetorical legitimation, 
and (3) enterprise social network adoption. My case study particularly involves an effort to theorize 
about the institutional mechanisms and processes driving internal diffusion of an enterprise social 
network adopted an organisational level, and through the conceptual lens of “rhetorical legitimation” 
point to the salience of intra-organisational theorizing. Based on my research, I propose that by 
employing specific rhetorical strategies across IT development, implementation and use, managers can 
direct the effective standardization and scaling of digital innovations like ESN across pluralistic front- 
line practice. Altogether, my overarching arguments and contributions are as follows: 
1! Organisations are institutionally pluralist social systems, that is, they are constituted of multiple, 
often competing institutional logics that shape organisational front- line activities and behavior; 
2! Institutional pluralism is maintained by simultaneous alignment and misalignment of various 
organisational activities and structures; 
3! Since digital innovations can extend across hierarchical boundaries and practices, they are 
increasingly introduced into domains whose activities are shaped by institutional logics that are 
incongruent with that of the digital innovation; 
4! Misalignments are especially likely and deep with ESN since its unique “ideology of openness” 
is also in conflict with the logic of organisational rationalism that epitomizes the mechanistic 
principles of hierarchical control and tight integration; 
5! In cases where the institutional logics related to the digital innovation are in conflict or 
incongruent with logics guiding local activities, discontinuous approaches to examining 
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development, implementation and use activities will miss the real complexity of technology 
appropriation where organisational changes triggered by the technology during the conduct of one 
of these activities generates changes to the technology itself. 
6! Processes of institutional diffusion help to drive mutual organisational and technological 
alignment and can therefore be used to conceptualize technology appropriation over development, 
implementation and use. However, research has only examined diffusion processes at a field and 
organisational level. 
7! Research question 1: How can we conceptualize the development, implementation, and use of 
newly- introduced digital innovation as a process of internal diffusion?; 
8! In cases where an existing technology supports the same activities that the new innovation is 
intended to enhance, the existing technology must be de-legitimated in order to effectively align 
the new innovation. However, studies have not examined these processes of de-legitimation in 
detail; 
9! Research question 2: How are existing, competing technologies de-legitimated during internal 
diffusion; 
10! Multiple, simultaneous internal institutional misalignments between the newly- introduced 
innovation and the organisation (infusion variance) may be technical, cultural and political in 
nature.  
11! Institutional entrepreneurs can use rhetorical framing practices to narrow or widen infusion 
variance in order to respectively legitimate or de-legitimate a specific technology. However, 
research on how entrepreneurs manage diffusion through rhetorical actions is mostly confined to 
field and organisational level. 
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12! Research question 3: How can the process of internal diffusion be purposefully managed from the 
top? 
13! Contribution 1: The core internal diffusion process is intra-organisational theorizing.  intra-
organisational theorizing is an ongoing process of modifying and refining the organisational level 
theorization for ESN to suit front- line employees in their immediate contexts. Intra-organisational 
theorizing unfolds in three cumulative and relatively sequential phases of legitimation across 
distinct groups: (1) rationale framing (2) value advertising, and (3) motivating engagement. 
14! Contribution 2: Strategically grafting on other intra-organisational theorizations, and co-opting 
people, ESN functions, and practices from other infusions enabled meaning making between 
competing groups. 
15! Contribution 3: Processes of de-legitimation and legitimation occurred in parallel (de-legitimation 
was initiated first), and both appealed to pragmatic legitimacy. Managers employed primarily 
pathos appeals to the pragmatic institutional needs of target audiences to legitimate ESN. 
Managers de-legitimated email using primarily logos appeals to pragmatic legitimacy. 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter Two highlights the different 
perspectives and debates related to the IT diffusion in the IS literature, and particularly focuses on 
institutional views on IT diffusion. The research questions outlined in section 1.4 are also discussed 
during this examination. Chapter Three outlines the conceptual lens of intra-organisational rhetorical 
legitimation that will be used to conceptualize how actors can use rhetorical justifications to narrow 
(legitimation) and widen (de-legitimation) the institutional misalignments that emerge during 
technology diffusion. Here I conceptualize different types of legitimacy and how they are gained, how 
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to empirically identify institutional logics and alignment dynamics, and the relationship between 
legitimation and different elements of rhetorical. Chapter Four outlines the methodological 
considerations related to my study. I discuss how I chose the research site, my role in the research, my 
research orientation, design and data collection process. I then turn to discussing how I analyzed the 
data using the rhetorical legitimation analytical device. I end this chapter by considering the limitations 
of my methodological approach. 
Chapter Five outlines the data collected at iSource in chronological order. I particularly focus on 
highlighting the key ESN features and events that were central to managers strategic communications. 
In Chapter Six, I describe the values, interests and practices that make up the institutional logics of the 
key stakeholder groups, paying attention to illustrating how these logics co-exist and compete; then I 
follow the chronology outlined in Chapter Five to illustrate the rhetorical legitimation practices around 
the ESN features and events described in this chronology.  In Chapter Seven, a number of concepts 
developed in previous chapters are brought together in a conceptual model that illustrates how the 
internal diffusion of ESN at iSource was influenced by top-down rhetorical legitimation processes. 
Chapter Eight concludes the thesis, by drawing on the conceptual model developed in Chapter Seven 
to analyze its implications for practitioners faced with novel innovations like ESN, and it implications 
for IS research on technology evolution.  
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Chapter 2 Internal Organisational Diffusion 
 
In this chapter I intend to position my study within the extant diffusion literature. In doing so I show 
that an internal diffusion lens is highly suited to conceptualizing the gradual process of institutional 
misaligning and aligning that shape the construction of meaning, and the form and function of newly- 
introduced digital innovations. I show that this lens resonates with the emerging view that technology 
is represented in intra-organisational discourse, and is thus replicated and transformed by organisational 
actors through legitimating discourse or rhetoric. Most importantly, I show that unlike traditional 
technology evolution approaches, an internal diffusion lens does not separate technological and 
organisational change by the act of implementation, but rather conceptualizes the evolution of digital 
innovations as a continuous process of technological and organisational co-evolution. This approach is 
especially relevant for the study of contemporary digital innovations that follow more open and 
uncertain appropriation trajectories.  
As discussed in the chapter 1, traditional approaches that adhere to a temporal technology evolution 
sequence of development, implementation and use, run the risk of discounting the crucial role that 
material technological features play in the process of organising, and that organisations play in the 
evolution of technological innovations. The internal diffusion perspective mitigates this risk by 
conceptualizing technology development, implementation and use as parallel and interactive processes. 
This view resonates with recent empirical observations that novel digital innovations like ESN and 
other consumer-oriented organisational innovations do not adhere to the traditional temporal 
development, implementation and use sequence, because they can be easily adapted to multiple 
objectives as they evolve within organisations.  
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In order to understand how new digital innovations like ESN diffuse within complex organisational 
environments, it is vital to firstly clarify what is the nature of diffusion in general, and how and why 
diffusing innovations vary and change as they are appropriated into front- line practice. I explore these 
questions by firstly examining how the established economic rational and macro- institutional (namely 
the variance and process traditions) wings of the IS diffusion library have addressed variation in the 
speed, form and function of diffusing innovations. Economic rational accounts span multiple levels of 
analysis and show how diffusion is driven by actors’ rational assessments of factors related to the 
innovation’s comparative economic and efficiency benefits. This view locates the trigger for variation 
in technology form and function in the internal organisational processes and choices that are enacted 
to better align the technology to specific routines, objectives and strategies. Macro- institutional 
accounts on the other hand pay attention to how field and firm level social pressures for legitimacy 
cause organisations to somewhat irrationally adopt and use technologies in different ways. Here, 
variation results from misalignments between the institutional properties of the organisation and the 
technology. 
I conclude this chapter by showing how the institutional translation perspective (Czarniawska-Joerges 
and Sevón, 1996; Sahlin and Wedlin, 2008) specifically attends to economic- rational and macro-
institutional perspectives relative lack of attention to how intra-organisational change processes and 
mechanisms around a digital innovation can constrain and drive its appropriation and organisational 
impact. Translation research organically extends economic- rational and macro- institutional 
perspectives by highlighting that over time digital innovations are increasingly open to adaptation and 
multiple intra-organisational misalignments. Organisational actors grapple with these misalignments 
through social legitimation processes around mutually constitutive technological and organisational 
mechanisms.  
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2.1 Economic Rational Diffusion Perspectives 
The concept of diffusion emerges from Rogers (1995) seminal work on the diffusion of innovations. 
He defines diffusion as ‘the process in which an innovation is communicated through certain channels 
over time among the members of a social system’ (Rogers, 1995, p. 35). Actors may be “persuaded” to 
adopt or “decide” to accept an innovation ‘as the best course of action available’ based on knowledge 
communicated during the diffusion process (Rogers, 1995, p. 171). Accordingly, the dominant 
economic-rational view of IT diffusion has traditionally analyzed the factors that influence the decision 
to adopt an innovation across firm, organisational unit and individual levels (Fichman, 2004; Katz and 
Shapiro, 1987; Sturdy, 2004; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1998). This form of analysis is 
focused on uncovering the “right characteristics” that firms need to develop in order to adopt particular 
innovations more often, earlier and thoroughly (Fichman, 2004).  
Over the years economic rational studies have shifted between optimization views that focus on how 
innovation characteristics influence rational actors to adopt and use particular types of technological 
innovations (Venkatesh, M. Morris and G. Davis, 2003; Fichman, 2001; F. Davis and Bagozzi, 1989), 
to  evolutionary perspectives. Evolutionary studies adopt a less technology deterministic view by 
arguing that there are general organisational characteristics such as size, structure and knowledge that 
predispose particular organisations to better adopt and exploit a particular range of technologies. Still, 
other studies increasingly argue that diffusion patterns are rarely uniform after organisations decide to 
adopt and use IT innovations. Rather, the gradual generation of visible behavioural change as 
innovations are put into practice (IT assimilation) (Rogers, 1995) does not mean that organisational 
actors have accepted the innovation as the best course of action (Cooper and Zmud, 1990; Armstrong 
and Sambamurthy, 1999; Swan, Newell and Robertson, 1999; Purvis, Sambamurthy and Zmud, 2001; 
Mu, Kirsch and Butler, 2015; J. Wei, Lowry and Seedorf, 2015). 
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‘While rational diffusion models may be of use in explaining those behaviours that lead to IT adoption, 
such models may be of only minor use in explaining a firm’s success or lack of success in infusing IT 
within its work systems. Political interests seem to be of basic importance, while rational actions serve as 
facades to mask political motives and to legitimize self-interest.’(Cooper and Zmud 1990, p. 136) 
From this “assimilation” view, researchers focus on what factors cause different forms of diffusion or 
the marked diversity that exists in how well firms deploy and leverage business value from IT 
innovations (diffusion form) after the initial decision to accept and implement the innovation 
(Mansfield, 1993; Hu, C. Saunders and Gebelt, 1997; Venkatraman, Loh and Koh, 1994; Ravichandran, 
2001; J. Wei, Lowry and Seedorf, 2015).  
Internal IT diffusion is a key process of IT assimilation that focuses on the extent to which an innovation 
is used across organisational units, projects, tasks and people (Cool, Dierickx and Szulanski, 1997; 
Massetti and Zmud, 1996). Academic research in this area generally distinguishes between two 
sequential internal diffusion processes: (1) the infusion process immediately following initial adoption 
where an IT innovation’s features are gradually used in more complete and sophisticated ways (Zmud 
and Apple, 1992; Massetti and Zmud, 1996), and  (2) the routinization  or stabilization of the innovation 
within organisational processes and behavior (Zmud and Apple, 1992; Somers and Nelson, 2003). 
However, empirical research has tended to conflate these processes into a general process of IT 
“incorporation” that has paid more attention of the dynamics of routinization at the expense of infusion 
(Massetti and Zmud, 1996; Fichman, 2000). Attending to this underserved area of infusion enquiry 
could potentially shed much needed light on how digital innovations evolve within organisations and 
the mechanisms initiating and driving internal IT diffusion. In particular, varying degrees of internal 
diffusion can be observed across two dimensions of infusion (1) the extent of IT innovation use across 
key functional business units (value chains), and (2) the extent of IT innovation use in supporting 
competitive strategies, such as enhancing customer relations and improving or creating new services 
and products (business strategy).  
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Accordingly, unlike former diffusion perspectives which emphasized relatively uniform diffusion 
patterns across particular types of firms and technologies (Nadler and Tushman, 1999), the 
“assimilation view” emphasizes variation in the form and speed of diffusion for similar types of 
organisations and technologies (Markus and Robey, 1988; Ragin, 1999). Indeed, post-adoption 
diffusion patterns inevitably fluctuate under pressure from a combination of institutional, political and 
social forces that shape individual actors’ decisions to accept or reject innovations in particular ways 
(Sia and Soh, 2007; Cooper and Zmud, 1990). Specifically, assimilation researchers use empirical 
findings to show that neither distinct technological or organisational antecedents and mechanisms can 
fully explain what drives IT innovations to produce business value for specific firms.  
For instance, Loh and Venkatraman (1992) empirically show that the adoption of systems integration 
and facilities management IT outsourcing in the US during the 90s  ‘was motivated more by internal 
influence (or imitative behavior) than by external influence amongst the user organisations’ (p. 2). This 
study and the majority of extant “assimilation” research continue to reinforce that internal 
organisational capabilities such as absorptive capacity, managerial capability and organisational 
complexity can significantly impact on IT innovation performance (efficiency and economic return) (J. 
Wei, Lowry and Seedorf, 2015; Mu, Kirsch and Butler, 2015). As a consequence, these internal 
capabilities also shape how individual organisational actors accept, reject and generally appropriate 
new innovations. Early post- adoption stages such as internal diffusion may therefore be the site where 
a lot of the dynamics relevant to improving our understanding of diffusion variance issues begin rather 
than end.  
Chief among these diffusion variance issues has been the long-standing question of how to explain 
“assimilation gaps”, where organisational actors’ widespread use of IT innovation tends to lag behind 
their adoption. In this regard, Fichman (2004) proposes that the economic- rational philosophy is not 
well suited to explaining this gap since they generally tend to exhibit a pro-innovation bias where 
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merely possessing the “right” capabilities (e.g. absorptive capacity, leadership, less complex systems) 
to effectively adopt an innovation translates to business value. More recent assimilation studies have 
additionally suggested that this pro-innovation bias may also be a consequence of decades of empirical 
diffusion investigations of mandatory use innovations such as TQM and ERP, which are less open to 
post-adoption appropriation (J. Wei, Lowry and Seedorf, 2015; Mu, Kirsch and Butler, 2015). Indeed, 
Bharati, Zhang and Chaudhury (2013) empirically demonstrate that the impact of internal 
organisational capabilities (specifically absorptive capacity and other related capabilities) on ESN 
appropriation is magnified since organisational actors are not forced or do not need to use the 
technology to carry out their work duties.  The authors additionally suggest that the relative economic 
uncertainty and flexibility associated with ESN usage hinders the ability of organisations to learn, 
exploit, and eventually infuse ESN, is influenced more by institutional mechanisms than by 
comparative economic benefits. 
Along these lines, a number of economic-rational studies have suggested that more focused social and 
political views are better suited to improving our understanding of post-adoption diffusion dynamics. 
Specifically, economic rational studies do not fully explain how and why there are variations or 
adaptations to an innovation’s material features (form) and organisational impact (function) after 
adoption. Institutional studies on the other hand attribute these variations to misalignments  and 
accordingly investigate the processes through which diffusing innovations are appropriated in various 
ways to better align with different business objectives and value chains (J. Wei, Lowry and Seedorf, 
2015; Fichman and Kemerer, 1999; Cooper and Zmud, 1990; Zhu, Kraemer and Xu, 2006). These 
alternative social perspectives are the focus of my research and are therefore afforded a more detailed 
discussion in the remaining sections. 
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2.2 Social Diffusion- Institutions and IT Innovations 
Social diffusion studies (Strang and Meyer, 1993; Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 2002) consider 
the ways in which institutional and social mechanisms influence the spread (diffusion form and speed, 
and institutionalization) of IT innovations. Institutional studies compliment economic rational 
perspectives of technology diffusion by considering the ways in which local “situatedness” in a 
particular context shapes the form and function of the diffusing innovation (Orlikowski, 1992; Barley, 
1986). The concept of institutional “situatedness” draws attention to the established view that 
‘organisations are suspended in a web of values, norms, beliefs, and taken-for- granted assumptions’ 
(Barley and Tolbert, 1997), that progressively structures (constrain and guide) their organising norms, 
such as perceptions, work practices, interaction patterns. As such, while technologies may diffuse 
uniformly within organisations solely because of their comparative economic and productivity benefits, 
they may also diffuse irrationally when institutionally situated organisations try to resolve institutional 
misalignments between the organisation’s prevailing institutions and the institutions inscribed in the 
technology (Gosain, 2004; Soh and Sia, 2004). 
The institutional lens also offers a way to identify regularities and consistencies relating to the 
appropriation of diffusing innovations (Scott, 2001). These regularities emerge from the prevalence 
and pervasiveness of institutions as ‘organised, established, procedures’ (Jepperson, 1991, p. 143). 
The label “organised” signifies structure, and “established” signifies a historical and enduring 
procedure. As this procedure is compulsively reflected on and replicated, it constitutes a distinct social 
pattern of rules that constrain and guide the everyday organising of groups and individuals within an 
institutional field (Scott, 2008).  In this way, the institutional lens offers a way to analyze the 
prescriptions, values and goals that legitimate situated appropriation activities, and can thus, enhance 
our understanding of idiosyncratic technology appropriation activities across different social contexts.  
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Friedland and Alford (1991) propose that institutions may be analyzed from a societal, organisational 
and individual level of analysis, using the “institutional logic” conceptual device (Friedland and Alford, 
1991, p.242). Institutional logics are taken-for-granted organising prescriptions that underpin actors 
practices- both legitimate goals and how they may be pursued- in a way that is consistent with a 
particular institution (Friedland and Alford, 1991). 
Institutions are so pervasive that they gradually become inscribed in material objects like technology 
(Berente and Yoo, 2012; Gosain, 2004) as embedded institutional logics or normative assumptions and 
practices that are consistent with the means and ends of the embedded institution (Scott, 2001; Gosain, 
2004).  In embedding and therefore reflecting institutions, the form, function, and appropriation of 
diffusing technologies tends to vary with the degree to which the innovation’s embedded institution is 
in conflict or congruent with the target organisation’s prevailing institutions (Soh and Sia, 2004; Hong 
and Y.-G. Kim, 2002).  
Soh and Sia (2004) usefully refer to this as the package (technology)- organisation dialectic. where 
‘one set of forces arise from structures around the implementing organisation’ (p.83) and another ‘set 
of forces arise from structures (reflecting developers’ assumptions, norms, and values) embedded in 
the technology’ (p. 83). The authors broadly suggest that technologies with institutional logics that are 
compatible with prevailing organisational institutional properties like non-negotiable industrial 
standards (i.e. “imposed-surface misalignments”) require minimal customization during development 
in order to diffuse effectively. However, technologies that are misaligned with prevailing organisational 
institutions tend to diffuse slower and require significant development customizations (e.g. Christiaanse 
and Huigen, 1997; Wagner and Newell, 2004; Soh and Sia, 2004; Benders, Batenburg and van der 
Blonk, 2006).  
The majority of the studies in this tradition primarily explain technology diffusion from a macro- 
institutional level. Field variance studies primarily attribute variations in the form and speed of IT 
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innovations to isomorphic institutional pressures towards conformity. Institutional process studies on 
the other hand attribute variations to a gradual process of co-evolution between the IT innovation and 
a complex web of prevailing organisational institutional logics. 
2.2.1 Field Variance Studies 
This tradition’s enquiry into how and why diffusing innovations vary, is spread along a continuum 
where variance and alignment processes are rooted in irrevocable institutional conformity at one end, 
and inevitable resistance at the other end. 
Conformity 
Similar to classical economic-rational research, these studies broadly explain that while early adopting 
organisations are motivated by productivity benefits, subsequent adopters may adopt and infuse 
‘fashionable’ innovations to gain legitimacy within a particular organisational network (e.g. industry) 
through isomorphic processes (e.g. Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Teo, Wei and 
Benbasat, 2003; Avgerou, 2000; Orlikowski and Barley, 2001).  Organisations that reflect and 
reproduce institutions are seen as legitimate and accepted, and are more likely to survive longer within 
an institutional field (Meyer and Scott, 1983). Thus, organisations may passively manage their 
legitimacy by employing conformation strategies (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008b; Suchman, 1995) 
to align with one or more normative (inter-organisational networks) (Chatterjee, Grewal and 
Sambamurthy, 2002; W. Lewis, Agarwal and Sambamurthy, 2003), or coercive (regulatory structures) 
(Miranda and Y. M. Kim, 2006; Liang et al., 2007) institutional pressures. They may also actively copy 
the actions of outstanding organisations (mimetic institutional pressure) (Soares-Aguiar and Palma-
dos-Reis, 2008; Gosain, 2004). As such, studies in this tradition broadly assume that organisations in 
similar institutional fields will have a single, uniform and overarching set of institutional prescriptions 
that structure organisational actors’ values, practices, and IT decisions. 
27!
As a result, organisations embedded in similar institutional fields will gradually draw on similar 
institutional prescriptions when making decisions on how to appropriate new digital innovations. 
Gosain (2004) for example illustrates that organisations in highly regulated institutional fields tend to 
mimic the enterprise information system configuration and usage patterns of more successful and larger 
organisations or formal professional networks, especially when the enterprise innovation is novel and 
its standards are uncertain. In a similar fashion, but with more attention to development processes, 
Nicolaou (1999) suggests that organisations tend to ‘conform to social constraints to develop IS 
consistent with [institutional] expectations in order to demonstrate legitimacy in operational and 
managerial decision making’ (p. 133). In these cases, diffusing IT innovations tend to be appropriated 
and aligned in different ways across different societal and industrial institutional fields (Teo, Wei and 
Benbasat, 2003; Son and Benbasat, 2007; Gosain, 2004; Nicolaou, 1999). However, these studies have 
frequently received criticism for not being able to adequately explain why some institutionally 
misaligned innovations are still successful, or why some institutionally aligned innovations sometimes 
fail (e.g. Cho and Mathiassen, 2007; see Soh et al., 2003- package-organisation misalignments; Markus, 
2004- techno-change misfits). 
Resistance 
In particular, a smaller proportion of research that focuses more on innovation use, suggests that rather 
than conforming to field level institutional norms, some organisational actors exercise agency to resist 
the prescribed and established ways of appropriating specific technologies (C. Standing, Sims and P. 
Love, 2009; Davidson and Chismar, 2007; Hu, Hart and Cooke, 2007). As a result, certain elements of 
an IT innovation may be rejected, adapted or ceremonially adopted when firms employ compromise or 
avoidance strategies to better fit the innovation with their own prevailing organising norms, past 
experiences, or recommendations of key external actors (Sia and Soh, 2007; Cho and Mathiassen, 2007; 
Mark, 2007a). For example, some studies show that local organising norms, objectives and past 
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technology experiences may be mobilized through symbolic actions to significantly enable or constrain 
how potential adopters appropriate and use technologies (Phang, Kankanhalli and Ang, 2008; Akkeren 
and Rowlands, 2007; Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008). Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2008) for example 
highlight that in many cases organisations within similar institutional contexts may appropriate an 
institutionally embedded and accepted technological innovation in different from other in their field in 
order to gain a competitive advantage. This suggests that the form and function of diffusing 
technologies may also vary within distinct institutional fields, and across technologies with similar 
institutional logics. 
Process-oriented research has has usefully explored the dynamics of varying degrees of conformance 
and resistance. Process studies importantly highlight that “agentic” micro-processes, such as power 
politics, contestation, and negotiation mediate the interaction between technological structuring and 
institutional processes of organising (perceptions, work practices, interaction patterns). Building on 
these micro-processes, and the conformity behaviours exhibited in technology development versus 
resistance actions in technology use, contemporary diffusion research suggests that technological 
evolution should be examined over the entire development, implementation and use continuum. Such 
an analysis is necessary in order to fully understand how these socio-technical micro-processes affect 
technological misalignment and appropriation. 
2.2.2 Institutional Process Studies: Consequences of Infusion misalignment 
Process studies are sensitive to the important role that material technological features play in the 
organising process, and that organisational dynamics play in technological evolution. They also 
importantly focus on the role of discursive micro-processes in this mutually constitutive relationship 
(Leonardi, 2009; Carugati, Giangreco and Sebastiano, 2011). 
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Process studies add that under institutional pressures to adopt and implement IT innovations, processes 
of communicating and deploying changes in technology and organisational structures and practices are 
crucial for navigating misalignments and bringing innovations to life (Swanson and Ramiller, 2004; 
Gosain, 2004). A majority of these studies examine voluntary-surface and voluntary-deep 
misalignment dynamics during the IT institutionalization process. This process unfolds from the 
destabilization of prevailing institutional norms (de-institutionalization  e.g. Lawrence and Suddaby, 
2006 and unlearning e.g. Starbuck, 1996) through the materialization and diffusion of new IT ideas as 
new pre-institutionalized structures,  to eventually becoming “taken for granted” (Baptista, Newell and 
Currie, 2010; Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 2002; Currie and Guah, 2007; Lyytinen, Newman 
and Al-Muharfi, 2009).  
Innovation Related Discourse 
Empirical process studies generally indicate that one of the most important processes impeding and 
fueling IT innovation evolution is  the elaboration of “innovation related discourse” (Kambil et al., 
2000; Swanson and Ramiller, 1997; Ramiller and Swanson, 2003; Currie, 2004). Within this tradition, 
Swanson and Ramiller’s (1997) theory of organising visions is arguably one of the most well researched 
contemporary examples of innovation related discourse. An organising vision for an IT innovation is a 
clearly labelled (e.g. ‘enterprise 2.0’ and ‘green IT’), abstract symbolic theorization that facilitates 
interpretation (sense-making), legitimation and mobilization of resources necessary for the 
standardization and scaling of IT innovations within organisations. Organising visions are more 
effective at facilitating these processes when they are deployed early in the diffusion process, and when 
they are stable and collectively coherent. In this case, the mobilization of an organising vision will 
enable organisational actors to effectively communicate, manage and standardize institutionally aligned 
ideas for appropriating innovations, and uniform material features and practices  (Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997; Fichman, 2004; Wang, 2010).  
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However, early stability and collective coherence tends to be inhibited by contestation amongst the 
heterogeneous communities of field-level actors who rhetorically construct these visions from their 
own micro-level organisational experiences with the IT innovation. Although the process of reaching 
collective agreement is facilitated by the fact that the key stakeholders draw meanings from broadly 
similar IT, business and management institutional logics, it is often organic and slow (Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997; Lucas and Spitler, 2000; Kambil et al., 2000). Accordingly, the organising vision for 
exceptionally new IT innovations like ESN will often be underdeveloped and unstable, and thus, more 
open to organisational interpretation and modification (Wang, 2010; Treem and Leonardi, 2012; Treem 
et al., 2015). In this case, even though novel innovations will be shaped in some way by under-
developed field level organising visions, it will likely be influenced more by actors micro-level 
communications regarding their experiences with the IT innovation (Wang, 2010).  
In this regard, linguistic process studies have demonstrated the utility of examining discursive micro-
processes as a way to understand the dynamics of the relationship between technological and 
organisational change (Rice and Gattiker, 2001; Vaast and Walsham, 2005; Leonardi, 2007; 
Orlikowski, 1996). These studies are rooted in the view that discursive micro-processes organise 
standardization and scaling processes. Accordingly, discursive micro-processes reflect and reinforce 
the changes that occur in organisational structures and technological form and function during internal 
diffusion (Rice and Gattiker, 2001; Vaast and Walsham, 2005).  Empirical studies show that, as 
organisational structures change, the micro-processes that organise standardization and scaling 
processes, will also change the form and function of diffusing IT innovations (Rice and Gattiker, 2001; 
Vaast and Walsham, 2005).  Similarly, as IT innovations are appropriated, standardized and scale 
across different communities of organisational actors, the micro-processes around them will gradually 
transform organisational perceptions, work practices and interaction patterns (Leonardi, 2007; 
Boudreau and Robey, 2005).  
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Discursive micro-processes reflect the institutional organising processes of stakeholder communities, 
such as their shared perceptions (Kraut et al., 1998), their interaction patterns around a technology 
(Barley, 1990b; Aydin and Rice, 1992), and their ways of working (Scott and DeSanctis, 1992; Poole 
and DeSanctis, 1990). These organising activities in turn form the “logics of action” of the communities 
involved, and ‘color[s] their understandings of what groups should be involved in the development, 
implementation, or use of a technology, what the technology should look like, what it should do, and 
how it should change existing practices’ (Leonardi, 2009, p. 297).   
Infusion Variance- Multi-Dimensional Misalignments 
Contemporary research into how discursive micro- processes shape IT evolution within organisations 
have also highlighted that the communication, interpretation and legitimation of innovation related 
discourse and material technological features is often more contentious and unpredictable than variance 
studies suggest (van Gestel and Hillebrand, 2011; Green, 2004; Kraatz and Block, 2008). These studies 
have in a sense departed from the variance tradition’s pre-occupation with isomorphism, to focus on 
how the micro- processes around a technology are characterized by contestation and negotiation.  
Empirical studies highlight that organisational communities may draw on very different logics of action 
when they are faced with radical shifts in objectives, highly complex and uncertain situations, or highly 
flexible and novel technology like ESN (van Gestel and Hillebrand, 2011; Tilson, Lyytinen and 
Sørensen, 2010). In particular, constructivists studies highlight that different stakeholders often have 
unique reasons for wanting to appropriate and change technology (van Gestel and Hillebrand, 2011; 
Kappos and Rivard, 2008). Thus, tussles often build up between different communities of actors. These 
tussles can lead to multiple, simultaneous organisational (multi-dimensional) misalignments when 
competing communities of actors aim to appropriate the technology according to their own, distinct 
interests (Hughes, 1987, Lewis and Seibold, 1993, Standing et al., 2013, Kraatz and Block, 2008). For 
example, in a discussion of e-procurement implementation in mature and complex organisational 
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environments, (Barca and Cordella, 2006) proposes that it is critical to consider mechanisms to address 
the multi-dimensional product-organisation misalignments (infusion variance) that arise when different 
departments draw on different institutional logics (departmentalism). Infusion variance often leads to 
limited penetration of technologies into business strategies and value chains (limited infusion), where 
the technology is only used within some organisational departments rather than across all relevant 
departments (Barca and Cordella, 2006).  
Over time, these contestations can potentially transform (rather than reproduce) the dominant 
institutions, as different communities ‘negotiate these interests and objectives into alignment through 
persuasive campaigns’ (Leonardi, 2009, p.296). However, the dynamics of negotiation and agreement 
processes have rarely received much attention in the process tradition (Mignerat and Rivard, 2009; 
Deephouse and Suchman, 2008a). In particular, in their review of institutional IS studies, Mignerat and 
Rivard (2009) highlight that very few studies have focused on contestation and alignment strategies, 
and ‘this could be an avenue for IT institutionalists to make a contribution that would benefit 
organisation theory as a whole’ (p. 389).  
De-institutionalization 
A consequence of process researchers’ preoccupation with how innovation related discourse drives IT 
institutionalization processes is that they overlook important package-organisation misalignment 
dynamics during the initial de-institutionalization stage. De-institutionalization dynamics are important 
to diffusion since they potentially condition how community members construct and interpret 
organising visions for particular IT innovations (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Van de Ven, 1986; C. 
Oliver, 1992). The way in which organisational actors rationalize (recognize and evaluate) new IT 
innovations is often shaped by the presence of competing technological artefacts that embody dominant 
organisational values, structures, processes and knowledge.  
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Audiences’ alignment with an established, competing technology can significantly decrease the amount 
of cognitive effort that they are willing or able to spend on making sense of the new innovations 
(Maguire and Hardy, 2009; C. Oliver, 1992). These technological artefacts and their associated 
organisational structures need to be progressively de-institutionalized or unlearned in order for new 
innovations to effectively diffuse, especially within organisations (Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 
2002; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Hislop et al., 2013; Starbuck, 1996; Garud and Karnøe, 2001). 
The concept of de-institutionalization is well established in the institutional and wider IS literature. 
Studies in the organisational memory tradition mostly examine de-institutionalization as an organic 
process, and find that the willingness of organisational actors to unlearn established organisational 
artefacts and practices, and embrace new innovations is greatly influenced by economic rational factors 
such as the cost of change, past experiences with technology, and adequate training and support 
(Dunbar, Garud and Raghuram, 1996; Starbuck, 1996; Becker, 2010).   
Similar organic approaches suggest that de-institutionalization is hugely influenced by the degree to 
which key stakeholders formally and informally communicate the need for change, and support the 
collection of feedback for system enhancements (Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 2002; Lawrence 
and Suddaby, 2006; Henfridsson and Yoo, 2013; C. Oliver, 1992). Based on these findings, researchers 
across these fields have suggested that the process of top-down de-institutionalization rests on the 
ability of key stakeholders to use strategic communications to convince the receiving audience of the 
existing artefact’s ineffectiveness, cultural incompatibility, and the potential value of newer 
innovations (Garud and Karnøe, 2001; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Becker, 2010). Such a process 
would essentially be the reverse of alignment efforts discussed so far. Instead, linguistic micro-
processes would be aimed at increasing the misalignment between the logic associated with the 
established, competing technology. With respect to digital innovations, Garud and Karnøe (2001) 
examination of how the Post-it note idea successfully diffused within 3M shows that employing 
strategic top-down communications to encourage organisational actors to break away from the firm’s 
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embedded belief of creating glues that stuck was crucial to mobilizing support for the creation of Post-
it notes. Despite similar findings in various areas of academic IS enquiry, the literature is silent on how 
and what information should be communicated to encourage effective de-institutionalization during 
internal IT diffusion (Becker, 2010; 2005; Garud and Karnøe, 2001; C. Oliver, 1992).  
Mutual Technology and Organisational Evolution 
As the previous sections suggest, process research also holds the view that the process of linguistically 
aligning newly-introduced digital innovations and target organisations is characterized by mutually 
constitutive organisational and technological change processes (Avgerou, 2000; Mangan and Kelly, 
2009; Mekonnen and Sahay, 2008; Leonardi, 2011). This is especially applicable to the study of digital 
innovations like ESN, which increasingly blur the lines between technological and social structures 
within organisations (Monteiro et al., 2012; Brynjolfsson and A. Saunders, 2010).  Along these lines, 
Leonardi (2007) advances that researchers can only fully grasp the role of linguistic micro-processes, 
infusion variance and de-institutionalization in technological evolution if they adopt a synchronous 
empirical and theoretical approach. According to his synchronous framework, researchers must 
examine technology development, implementation and use processes together since,  
[attending to] ‘development, implementation, or use activities in isolation from one another 
(diachronically), he or she will be unable to grasp fully those sociotechnical transformations surrounding 
the one set of activities that occasioned the interpretive conditions that influence the next set 
(synchronically)’ (Leonardi, 2009, p. 303) 
Similarly, in their review of a sample of contemporary institutional IT studies, Mignerat and Rivard 
(2009) highlight that ’through processes of standardization and scaling, formal institutions and informal 
constraints end up being institutionalized in work practices through IT implementation’ (Mignerat and 
Rivard, 2009, p. 388). Within this sample, they show that technologies that were implemented and used 
with little adaptation either failed or gradually changed the intuitional properties of the host 
organisation (Hu, Hart and Cooke, 2007; Davidson and Chismar, 2007; Khalifa and Davison, 2006), 
while those that were adapted eventually replicated and reinforced organisational institutional 
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properties (C. Standing, Sims and P. Love, 2009; Noir and Walsham, 2007; Lapointe and Rivard, 2005). 
A framework of internal diffusion of technologies, particularly of digital innovations (Monteiro et al., 
2012; Brynjolfsson and A. Saunders, 2010), should therefore be responsive to how the process of 
organising can generate technology appropriation and alignment processes that in turn, change the 
process of organising(Leonardi, 2009).  
Summary 
Overall, process research confirms that the standardization and scaling of especially novel digital 
innovations is significantly influenced by multi-dimensional product-organisation institutional 
misalignments (infusion variance). In line with this insight, these studies demonstrate that the notion 
of institutional logics is useful to conceptualize the dynamics existing between the situated practices 
related to the digital innovation in pluralistic contexts and the institutional order in which the practices 
are situated. Following this view, I argue that regularities in innovation appropriation may be observed 
across different communities of organisational actors, such as different functional departments, job 
roles and levels of hierarchy. 
I also argue that de-legitimation and legitimation processes condition infusion variance. These 
processes are enabled and reflected in the contestation and negotiation around discursive micro-
processes. Specifically, over time discursive contestation and negotiation may gradually narrow or 
widen the gaps between the local practices related to the diffusing digital innovation in pluralistic 
contexts and the prevailing institutional order in which the practices are situated. While these processes 
are clearly important to understanding how new innovations diffuse within organisations, they remain 
understudied in the wider diffusion literature, particularly in relation to their role in micro-
organisational processes. Translation research offers a fruitful avenue for addressing these gaps since 
since it explores the mechanisms, dynamics, and agentic responses that drive misalignment and 
alignment dynamics (Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 2010). 
36!
2. 3 Translation perspective: Consequences of infusion variance 
Translation researchers address the issue of infusion variance by conceptualising diffusion 
misalignments as the norm rather than the exception, and focusing on the veiled re-alignment 
movements and flows that embody the cultural and linguistic nature of diffusion. In doing so, these 
studies embrace a view the introduction of new technologies may trigger simultaneous acceptance and 
resistance, which generate linguistic contestations and negotiations towards resolving infusions 
variance (Marakas and Hornik, 1996; Berente and Yoo, 2012). This diffusion perspective builds on 
Scandinavian institutionalism’s focus on, the ’dynamic aspects of circulating idea; how and why ideas 
become widespread, how they are translated as they flow and with what organisational consequences’ 
(Sahlin and Wedlin, 2008, p. 219). 
Thus, translation studies mostly emphasize how IT innovation ideas (linguistic objects and attached 
meaning) change and become legitimized as they travel from one organisational context to another, 
and de-emphasize how the ideas accepted at organisational level become legitimized and infused 
(materialize and change meaning)  within organisational value chains and strategy (with the exception 
of Reay et al., 2013; Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell, 2014 and; Scarbrough, Robertson and Swan, 
2015). They do however capture subtle discursive factors like power, legitimacy, unpredictability and 
contingencies that are pivotal to how organisational actors navigate post-adoption decisions and 
construct collective meanings, but are de-emphasized in the diffusion perspectives discussed so far. 
Importantly, this body of research indicates that infusion variance inhibits the construction of collective 
meaning around diffusing innovations.  
The translation view is therefore rooted in examining processes of aligning diffusing innovations.  From 
this perspective, alignment is thought to be social and rational process of legitimation, where adopters 
make meaning and decisions as “cognitive misers” rather than “cognitive dopes” (Rao, Greve and G. 
37!
F. Davis, 2001), and organisations deal with uncertainty with the help of cognitive shortcuts (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974). Thus, resolving infusion variance within local settings is a process that entails 
change in how IT innovations are discursively legitimated or framed over time (Davidson, 2002; 
Olesen, 2014; Zilber, 2006), and variations in material technological features at different points in the 
diffusion process (Kennedy and Fiss, 2009; L. K. Lewis and Seibold, 1993; Jiménez-Castillo and 
Sánchez-Pérez, 2013; Swan and Clark, 2008; Zilber, 2006).  
During this legitimation process, the embedded logics, characteristics, and organising visions 
associated with individual technologies can either enable or constrain internal IT diffusion by providing 
opportunities for adopters to interpret and respond to misalignments in different ways (Zilber, 2006). 
Mignerat and Rivard’s (2009) review of institutional IS research for example shows that the translation 
of traditional enterprise innovations generally produces more uniform outcomes than more 
interpretively- flexible web technologies like e-marketplaces. However, other than advancing a few 
similar anecdotal observations and propositions regarding the role of strategic communications 
(Volkoff, Strong and Elmes, 2007; Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 2010), we know little about how innovation 
adopters legitimate technological characteristics to enable, and particularly constrain the appropriation 
of IT innovations. In support of this view, Mignerat and Rivard (2009) also highlight that the existing 
literature on alignment covers ‘only a limited aspect of this complex and crucial subject... and a more 
adequate formulation would contain careful, widely-accepted definitions, and would examine more 
aspects of the concept, and would incorporate more strategic and institutional views’ (p. 389). 
Accordingly, my overall intention in this review of the translation literature is to highlight findings that 
resonate with the institutional explanations of linguistic alignment that I have discussed so far.  I 
specifically focus on how organisational actors navigate and resolve misalignments between their 
specific needs and organisational and IT innovation values and norms. With this, the balance of this 
chapter reviews relevant findings on technical, cultural and political alignment that make useful 
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contributions to the study of internal IT diffusion, particularly with regard to probing the internal 
organisational dynamics of infusion variance. 
2.3.1 Technical Perspectives on IT Translation 
Variations in how particular groups of organisational actors appropriate an IT innovation and the 
outcomes of these limited infusions, increases subsequent adopters experience and knowledge about 
the IT innovation (Kohli and Kettinger, 2004; Strang and Macy, 2001).  For instance, academic 
literature is replete with accounts of success stories helping to generate wider diffusion, and stories of 
failure having the opposite effect (Baskerville and Myers, 2009; Gill and Bhattacherjee, 2009). This is 
echoed by researchers who argue that the availability of knowledge about an IT innovation is a key 
mechanism that affects how adopters align new IT with existing organisational characteristics 
(technical alignment) (Volberda, Foss and Lyles, 2009). These knowledge mechanisms shape how 
much subsequent departmental infusions will vary in scope and meaning, and how standards develop 
around each subsequent infusion.  
For example, Francalanci and Morabito (2008) demonstrate that effective use and standardization of 
newer information infrastructures at a field level is greatly facilitated by the the degree to which prior 
knowledge about the IT innovation possessed by some organisational groups, is transferred to groups 
with less knowledge. This study also shows that effective use and standardization is also facilitated by 
subsequent infusions ability to absorb additional, relevant external knowledge such as technology and 
professional compliance standards. Knowledge mechanisms therefore also play a crucial role in IT 
innovation scaling, as knowledge availability, absorption and transfer help IT innovations to move from 
limited diffusion within specific organisational groups to wider diffusion across other departments.  
Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, (2010) hypothesize that a similar dynamic may also occur within organisations.  
They advance that since increasing knowledge lowers uncertainty about the IT innovation, internal 
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organisational adopters in subsequent infusions are more likely to experiment and learn from previous 
infusions. Subsequent adopters are therefore expected to be better prepared to reduce infusion variance 
by appropriating IT to be more extensive (scalable), and more customized in terms of tangible (form) 
and intangible (meaning) features. Ansari, Fiss and Zajac (2010) crucially suggest that empirically 
testing this proposition could possibly advance an alternative view of institutionalization where 
innovations are increasingly adapted as they diffuse internally.  
Empirical studies highlight that in addition to the degree of vicarious knowledge, the technical 
legitimacy of this knowledge also directly impacts on the form and meaning of subsequent infusions. 
That is, knowledge mechanisms are more effective at minimizing infusion variance when they 
themselves are aligned to supra-organisational factors such as technological and regulatory standards, 
organisational factors such as technological base and innovation experience, and intra-organisational 
factors like the technical orientation of users (Jiménez-Castillo and Sánchez-Pérez, 2013; Roberts et 
al., 2012; Mol, Birkinshaw and Birkinshaw, 2008). Despite the importance of technical alignment and 
knowledge mechanisms to the standardization and scaling of diffusing innovations, we still know 
relatively little about how organisational actors make sense of this knowledge and experiences 
(Volkoff, Strong and Elmes, 2007), and how it is filtered and framed during internal diffusion 
(Scarbrough, Robertson and Swan, 2015; Hsu, Huang and Galliers, 2014). 
2.3.2 Cultural Perspectives on IT Translation 
Work in a parallel cultural research stream however, offers some insight into how vicarious knowledge 
around a new IT innovation is transferred between organisational actors. Similar to variance and 
process views, researchers in this stream argue that IT innovations do not just diffuse into organisations 
that are cultural vacuums. Rather, corporate environments embody a web of cultural security 
mechanisms like pre-existing values, objectives and philosophical orientations, which outline the 
boundaries for how adopters assess appropriate behavior, and thus, shapes how IT diffuses within 
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organisations. Accordingly, research in this area indicates that actions to resolve infusion variance will 
be more effective when they attempt to position the new IT innovation as an organisational artifact that 
reproduces and reinforces values and practices that are pertinent and proper for the receiving audience’s 
circumstance (Schein, 2010; Canato, Ravasi and Phillips, 2013; Rerup and Feldman, 2011). 
For the most part, these cultural perspectives on IT translation are similar to institutional process studies 
since they generally indicate cultural security mechanisms gradually exert an increasingly intense 
conformance or institutionalization pressure to ensure that new IT innovations are aligned with the 
values and practices of the adopting audience. For instance, Ansari, Fiss and Zajac (2010) highlight 
that later adopters are less able to resolve infusion variance around a new IT innovation since 
conformance pressures create fewer “degrees of freedom” for them to customize the innovation’s form 
and meaning. This situation often results in less extensive diffusion, as late adopting users struggle to 
make sense of the new IT innovation, or just ceremonially engage with the innovation’s features and 
superficially change their behaviour (Kostova and Roth, 2002; Alvesson, 1993; Wang, 2010). Ansari, 
Fiss and Zajac (2010) therefore hypothesize that (early) adopters who are able to resolve local cultural 
misalignments as early as possible in the translation process, will more likely be able to standardize 
new innovations with a wider audience. Consistent with process studies view that IT assimilation is a 
process if mutual organisational and technological change, the authors show that cultural 
misalignments may be managed through organisational or technological (IT) adaptation.  
With respect to IT adaptation, re-designing the technology’s field-level form and function to suit the 
local context is a widely practiced approach for generating early acceptance. However, this approach 
often requires significant economic and social resources (Scarbrough, Robertson and Swan, 2015; 
Markus et al., 2010). In addition, excessive IT adaptation may also dampen the intended effects and 
benefits of introducing the IT innovation in the first place (Bloom et al., 2014; Bala and Venkatesh, 
2015). On the other hand, adapting the local organisational culture in some way to be more receptive 
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to new IT innovations, can reduce resistance without the significant economic and social costs of IT 
customizations. However, the relatively intangible, robust and pluralistic nature of organisational 
culture makes organisational adaptation slow and difficult to manage (Orlikowski, 2000; Fichman, 
2004; van Gestel and Hillebrand, 2011).  Accordingly, internal IT appropriation efforts that rely solely 
on organisational adaptation strategies are more prone to being widely rejected or ceremonially 
appropriated. 
In this regard, studies show that the transformation of field or organisational level ideas of an IT 
innovation to front- line practices (internal IT diffusion) is greatly facilitated when organisational and 
technological adaptation efforts are aligned with the local circumstances of the receiving audience 
(Markus et al., 2010; Reay, Golden-Biddle and Germann, 2006; Orlikowski and Gash, 1992; Smets, T. 
Morris and Greenwood, 2012). The relatively few studies that have attempted to understand this crucial 
dimension of internal IT diffusion have indicated that bottom-up institutional change is often more 
effective for generating contextual organisational and technological adaptation (e.g. Smets, T. Morris 
and Greenwood, 2012; Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell, 2014; Reay, Golden-Biddle and Germann, 
2006). Nielsen, Mathiaseen and Newell (2014), for instance show that the embeddedness of 
organisational actors in their local context importantly helps to drive contextual organisational and 
technological adaptation by positioning the new IT within the local technology landscape, 
experimenting with the IT to prove its value, and using the former and latter in pro-longed rhetorical 
legitimation practices to improve the ITs comprehensibility (also see Hsu, Huang and Galliers, 2014; 
Scarbrough, Robertson and Swan, 2015). There are even fewer investigations of top down attempts to 
drive this type of cultural alignment during technology appropriation (Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell, 
2014; Reay et al., 2013).   
However, the literature on institutional entrepreneurship at a field and organisational level provides a 
useful blueprint of how top- down cultural alignment can direct internal IT diffusion. This body of 
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research suggests that “cultural insiders” are especially crucial to promoting top- down internal IT 
diffusion. Ansari, Fiss and Zajac (2010) indicate that these “cultural insiders” are able to effectively 
manage cultural misalignments because of their heightened awareness of how cultural legitimacy is 
affected by technological factors such as the cultural values and meaning structures embedded in IT,  
supra-organisational factors  such as dominant industry logic and macro-level theorizations, 
organisational level factors such as corporate cultures and philosophical orientations, and intra-
organisational factors such as group values and perceptions of appropriate practice. 
These informed “cultural insiders” use skillful or artful mobilization to simultaneously adapt IT 
innovations to the “cultural security scanners” of receiving audiences, and re-wire these scanners to be 
more receptive the cultural values and meaning structures embedded in IT innovations (Wang and 
Swanson, 2007; Henfridsson and Yoo, 2013; Garud, Hardy and Maguire, 2007; Munir and Phillips, 
2005). Henfridsson and Yoo (2013) for example argue that institutional entrepreneurs skillfully 
leverage their privileged access to organisational and wider knowledge and resources to legitimate new 
institutions (IT adaptation) (E. G. Love and Cebon, 2008) or ‘ignite’ organisational changes so that 
adopters eventually accept minimally adapted IT as legitimate (organisational adaptation) (Lozeau, 
Langley and Denis, 2002).  
Overall, cultural translation studies draw attention to the importance of accounting for the vested 
interests of entrepreneurs and other organisational stakeholders, who help to shape how IT innovations 
spread and stabilize within organisations. A greater proportion of these studies also highlight that 
institutional entrepreneurs are better able to reduce infusion variance in the early stages of internal IT 
diffusion. However, similar to institutional process studies view that discursive micro-processes help 
to reduce cultural gaps between IT and organisations, institutional entrepreneurs can tailor and 
transform audiences’ ‘cultural scanners’ that restrict organisational and technological modifications in 
later infusions through linguistic framing practices (Hargadon and Douglas, 2001; Azad and Faraj, 
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2011). The effects of this framing process in both early and late stages of diffusion are demonstrated 
in political IT translation research.  
2.3.3 Political Perspectives on IT Translation 
Unlike rational and social accounts of diffusion, entrepreneurial enquiry in the information systems and 
strategy literature emphasize that organisations are inherently political environments, where there are 
constant struggles over divergent interests, and where the introduction of new IT innovations can 
change work processes and reallocate resources and power (Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen and Van de Ven, 
2009; Yoo, Lyytinen and Berente, 2007; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In particular, collective action 
studies into IT diffusion and alignment shed light on often neglected processes of strategizing and 
competition between different interest groups for power and control of resources. From this perspective 
organisations are conceptualized as movement-based political systems where diffusion outcomes are 
rarely isomorphic but rather, are dynamically shaped by adopters’ power structures, interests and norms 
(Markus and Pfeffer, 1983; Iacono and Kling, 1996; Barrett, 1999).  
Empirical studies point to the crucial role of frames and framing contests in the process of IT innovation 
diffusion, on multiple levels of analysis (Azad and Faraj, 2011; Orlikowski and Gash, 1994; Davidson, 
2006; Lin and Silva, 2005; Swan et al., 2010). Notably, studies show that institutional entrepreneurs 
can tailor and transform the “cultural scanners” that restrict alignment in later infusions by framing 
the contextual and local knowledge gained from early alignment efforts (first order change recipients) 
as “second order change agents”.  For instance, Hargadon and Douglas (2001) demonstrated that 
institutional entrepreneurs may exploit established institutions to gain legitimacy for new innovations 
within an institutional field by framing the fundamental features of the innovation around established 
competing technologies. Specifically, imitating features of gas lighting in the design for Edison’s 
electric lighting (“design skeuomorph”) enabled early adopters to easily understand, accept and use 
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electric lighting. In turn, the flexibility of these design frames eventually led to the displacement of the 
established institution of gas lighting.  
Similar actions have also been observed but not fully examined within organisations. For instance, 
(Hargrave and Ven, 2006) illustrates that competing actors or groups, each striving to achieve their 
goals around a preferred IT configuration and design, “struggle with each other to frame and reframe 
the meaning of relevant issues” (p. 869). These struggles over meaning are often contentious since they 
entail actions by various stakeholder groups to build on existing and competing arguments to legitimate 
their preferred definitions for IT system design and functionality as the collectively accepted and 
preferred working IT system.  
Orlikowski and Gash (1994), for example highlight the role of framing as a sense making mechanism 
(Weick, 1995), where a particular technological frame is the interpretive schema shared by members 
of a particular group that may shape their perceptions and actions toward technology implementation. 
‘Different technological frames imply different ways of knowing and making sense of technology’ 
(Orlikowski and Gash, 1994 , p. 203), and result in challenges for technology implementation and use. 
Different technologies may also possess the flexibility to be interpreted and framed in a multitude of 
different ways than others. For example, Garud and Karnøe (2001) highlight that since web 
technologies can be partitioned in a number of different ways institutional entrepreneurs may have the 
“opportunity to share different chunks with different people at different points in time, and, in the 
process, shape emerging preferences of key stakeholders”(p. 18).  
Lin and Silva (2005) on the other hand focus on framing as a dynamic stabilization process, where over 
time, the discursive contestation and interaction of key stakeholder claims and interpretations around a 
new technology eventually lead to a stable technological configuration. Accordingly, IT framing can 
be understood as a process by which interpretive schemas (frames) are constructed and modified 
through social and discursive action, to eventually generate a collective definition of an IT innovation. 
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While these studies acknowledge that frames and framing are mutually reinforcing and dynamic 
constructs, they make clear analytical distinctions to either focus on one or the other.  
Along these lines, macro-level computerization movements research (Iacono and Kling, 1996; Elliott 
and Kraemer, 2008; Barrett, Heracleous and Walsham, 2013; Kling and Iacono, 1995)  advances a 
more dynamic, mutually reinforcing perspective of framing and frames. These studies examine how 
entrepreneurs filter and frame group interests and vicarious knowledge, and how competing stakeholder 
interests interact to shape limited departmental infusions and wider internal organisational diffusion. 
CM research suggests that in (re) framing, movement entrepreneurs intentions are mobilized through 
ideology-driven discursive devices. This discourse is strategic, as it can condition organisational actors 
beliefs about the relationship between the preferred social order and the IT innovation, and thus, 
importantly legitimizes or erodes support for the innovation(Iacono and Kling, 1996; George, Iacono 
and Kling, 1992). CM researchers conceptualize a distinct frame as an ideological boundary between 
what is “right” and “wrong”, and framing as a process aimed at igniting social change by persuading 
organisational actors to interpret IT innovation related discourse in a way that is consistent with a 
particular frame’s ideological stance (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994).  
Social change  occurs as frames that reflect the dominant organisational ideology about how IT relates 
to ‘ways of working’ are challenged, transformed and eventually replaced over time, by what actors 
perceive to be a more salient frame, or a more important definition of what is “right” and “wrong” 
(Elliott and Kraemer, 2008). This process exhibits a mutual reinforcement dynamic that is similar to 
the institutionalization-deinstitutionalization relationship, where framing processes may 
simultaneously legitimate particular ways of designing and using IT, and erode support (de-legitimate) 
for other, perhaps competing IT designs (Cadili and Whitley, 2005; Dunbar, Garud and Raghuram, 
1996; Garud and Karnøe, 2001).  
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Relatedly, Ansari, Fiss and Zajac (2010) hypothesize that although a high degree of political 
misalignment between a new IT innovation and a dominant frame can constrain early realigning 
possibilities, institutional entrepreneurs may create opportunities for knowledge transfer and cultural 
alignment by challenging normative claims with competing claims (“counter-mobilizing”). Thus, 
contrary to what much of the translation and wider IT adoption literature suggests, full scale conformity 
to a dominant frame is therefore not required to implement a working system. Rather, a functional 
solution can be agreed upon by aligning competing frames. According to their hypothesis, “Counter-
mobilization” generates framing contestation and compromise, where a ‘back and forth ideological 
contest will lead to a gradual shift in the original position’ (Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 2010, p. 81). This 
in turn generates a working system that reflects compromises that ‘accommodate the political demands 
of a heterogeneous political environment’ (Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 2010, p. 81) 
In this regard, empirical research shows that institutional entrepreneurs are more effective at generating 
framing contestation and comprise when they are sensitive to the following sources of political 
legitimacy-  (1) IT innovation factors such as the normative claims that make particular innovations 
more controversial (Treem et al., 2015; Cadili and Whitley, 2005), (2) organisational-level factors such 
as formal and informal power structures and resource dependencies that position powerful 
organisational groups to reject particular elements of technically feasible innovations (Mamman, 2009; 
Wilson and Howcroft, 2005), (3) intra-organisational factors such as cultural values (W. Lewis, 
Agarwal and Sambamurthy, 2003; Tingling and Parent, 2004) and interests (Barrett, 1999; Brass, 
2002), and (4) supra- organisational factors such as corporate and professional policies that shape 
organisational power structures (Zeitz, Mittal and McAulay, 1999; Elliott and Scacchi, 2013).  
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2. 4 Summary of Institutional Diffusion Research 
Translation research augments mainstream discussions of internal diffusion issues, summarized in 
Table 2.1, in several ways. Translation sheds light on how technical, cultural and political 
misalignments drive infusion variance, and how inter-related knowledge, conformity pressures and 
framing compromise mechanisms shape alignment dynamics at different points in the internal diffusion 
process. Communicative framing mechanisms in particular synthesizes these mechanisms and thus, 
offers an avenue to streamline how we conceptualize the mutual relationship between individual 
objectives and needs, and organisational and technological values and practices.  
 
Table 2.1 Summary of Innovation Diffusion perspectives 
Diffusion 
Approach 
Focus and contribution to internal diffusion Shortcoming Level of 
Analysis 
Economic 
rational 
Consider how and why the comparative 
efficiency and economic benefits of an IT 
innovation influences its diffusion processes, 
such as assimilation and infusion.  
!
Organisations that are more diverse, larger,  
have supportive top management, possess 
previous knowledge and experience of IT 
innovation adoption, will adopt more 
innovations, adopt and infuse them earlier and 
infuse them more thoroughly. 
Studies are relatively silent on 
irrationalities of adopting and 
infusing innovations that don’t have 
immediate or clear economic and 
efficiency benefits. 
 
Macro, Filed 
and Intra-
organisational 
level 
 
 
Field 
variance 
Consider the ways in which the social 
mechanisms that perpetuate dominant 
organisational norms, beliefs and practices, 
and material technological features influence 
the form and function of internally diffusing 
innovations 
!
The form and speed of diffusing innovations 
varies with the degree of “alignment” or “fit” 
between the IT innovation and the adopting 
organisation’s institutional context. 
 
Organisational values, practices and 
IT decisions are unrealistically 
assumed to draw from a single, 
uniform, overarching  set of 
institutional prescriptions. 
!
Does not connect institutional 
antecedents of diffusion to more 
pervasive consequences of 
misalignment such as resistance, 
power politics, and extensive IT and 
organisational customizations that 
are inevitable during internal 
diffusion.  
 
Simply put, variance studies do not 
adequately explain misaligned 
Primarily  
Field level 
Intra-
organisational 
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adoption and infusion successes, or 
aligned failures 
Institutional 
process 
IT diffusion as a process of mutually 
constitutive organisational and technological 
change, driven and constrained by discursive 
micro-processes that widen (de-legitimate) or 
narrow (legitimate) infusion variance (multiple 
simultaneous package-organisation 
institutional misalignments) 
!
Examine package-organisation misalignment 
dynamics during the institutionalization of IT 
innovations, from the destabilization of 
prevailing institutional norms (unlearning or 
deinstitutionalization) through the 
materialization and diffusion of new IT ideas 
as new institutional structures, to their eventual 
assimilation and “taken-for-grantedness”. 
!
Infusion as limited diffusion- materialization, 
standardization and use of IT innovation by 
functional organisational groups. 
!
Internal organisational diffusion- Captures 
dynamics of progressive infusions across 
different functional groups. 
!
The early presence of a stable and meaningful 
theorization promotes the rapid 
communication and adoption, and internal 
diffusion of IT innovations. 
Does not explore- 
!
The contestation and alignment 
micro-processes that shape infusion 
variance. 
!
How and what information should be 
communicated to encourage 
effective de-institutionalization  
 
 
Primarily 
field- level 
Intra-
organisational 
Institutional 
translation 
Considers how infusion variance emerges and 
is resolved in different organisational contexts. 
 
Sheds light on how technical, cultural and 
political misalignments drive infusion 
variance; and how knowledge, conformity 
pressures and framing compromise shape 
alignment dynamics at different points in the 
internal diffusion process. 
The relationship between 
mis/alignment, and knowledge, 
cultural confirmation and framing 
alignment mechanisms has not been 
widely empirically explored (Ansari, 
Fiss and Zajac, 2010). For example, 
why particular frames are contested 
and/or generate different patterns of 
stakeholder action around IT 
Innovation (Mignerat and Rivard, 
2009) 
Intra-
organisational 
 
However, much of the work reviewed here, and in particular, Ansari, Fiss and Zajac (2010) propositions 
on the inter-relationship between alignment and knowledge, conformity and framing mechanisms, 
would benefit greatly from more empirical work (Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 2010; Mignerat and Rivard, 
2009). Recent studies have pointed out that the majority of existing studies of IT evolution within 
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organisations tends to focus on static elements of framing since an adequate analysis of how frames 
co-evolve with technology and organisational change would require in –depth longitudinal analysis 
(Karasti, Baker and Millerand, 2010).   As a result, we still know little about why particular frames are 
contested and/or generate different patterns of stakeholder action and innovation outcomes (notable 
exceptions are Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell, 2014; Scarbrough, Robertson and Swan, 2015). 
Addressing these underserved areas would particularly help to address the gaps regarding the role that 
adopters play in enabling or constraining the appropriation of new IT innovations, and the need for 
more explicit attention to the legitimation dimension of IT innovation translation (Mignerat and Rivard, 
2009).  
Barrett, Heracleous and Walsham (2013) partly attribute this oversight to a relative lack of research 
focus on conceptualizing the relationship between ideology and framing, particularly as it relates to the 
diffusion of novel IT innovations. Indeed, ideology often reflects the deep technological, 
organisational, intra-organisational and supra-organisational legitimacy structures that I have 
highlighted as having a significant effect on the success of entrepreneurial actions to manipulate 
technical, cultural and political misalignments. However, IS implementation studies have favoured a 
conceptualization of ideology that only attends to intra-organisational and organisational level factors, 
where ideology is central to actor’s beliefs and values regarding the suitability of a new IT innovation.  
Moreover, existing research tends to oversimplify political concerns by conflating ideologies and 
frames (P. E. Oliver and Johnston, 2000), where ideologies can sometimes be mobilized as frames, but 
not vice-versa (Gomez and B. C. Jones, 2000; Snow and Benford, 2000). For this reason this study uses 
an institutional logics and rhetorical- legitimation lens (Harmon, Green and Goodnight, 2014) to 
capture how ideology and technology framing work together, and how they are linked to broader social 
institutions and intra-organisational diffusion dynamics. 
50!
In the next section I will discuss this lens using a synthesis of this section’s findings with an original 
discussion of how institutionally embedded rhetorical legitimation practices help to explain why and 
how IT innovations vary as they diffuse within organisations. These discussions are synthesized in two 
main ways. First, I will focus on how the dynamics of framing contestations and compromises are made 
more visible and comprehensible by looking at the process of legitimation and the type and sequence 
of rhetorical claims underlying entrepreneurial actors framing strategies. I will also show how 
institutional logics can improve conceptualization of organisational pluralism and the ideological roots 
of framing contestations. Synthesizing these views leads to a conceptualization of internal diffusion as 
a process of institutionally embedded rhetorical legitimation.  
!  
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3  Internal Diffusion: Intra-Organisational 
Rhetorical Legitimation  
 
The notion of internal organisational diffusion is an attempt to move beyond classical diffusion’s focus 
on invariant field level innovation adoption (economic-rational and macro-institutional), and 
contemporary Scandinavian focus on how IT innovation ideas change as they travel between 
organisations. Specifically, the previous chapter illustrates that the translation view is well researched 
in the IT diffusion literature and can usefully improve the field’s current understanding of internal 
organisational diffusion dynamics. Notably, the translation view points to the formative role of multiple 
competing arguments by conceptualizing diffusion as a process that is constituted through various 
technical, cultural and political misalignments (Powell, Gammal and Simard, 2005; T. Morris and 
Lancaster, 2006). The previous chapter also highlights that while intra-organisational “legitimating 
accounts” (rhetoric) and legitimation play important roles in the appropriation of internally diffusing 
innovations (Currie and Guah, 2007; A. D. Brown, 1998), they have rarely received explicit attention 
in IS diffusion and implementation literature (Mignerat and Rivard, 2009).  
In this chapter I advance an intra-organisational “rhetorical legitimation” (Harmon, Green and 
Goodnight, 2014) lens to conceptualize the internal diffusion of digital innovations. This lens places 
emphasis on the interaction between multiple prevailing organisational institutions, emerging frames, 
and tangible and intangible innovation characteristics (IT ontology). Here I use the term “IT ontology” 
to refer to the set of related knowledge such as product cues and usage conditions (meaning), and 
defining features that distinctly blueprints the ‘logic of action’ for implementing and using a particular 
technology. I elaborate on these distinct concepts to pose that the translation of IT innovations within 
organisations is constituted through a rhetorical-legitimation cycle of (1) using legitimating accounts 
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(rhetorical arguments) to frame and justify (2) re-configuring an innovation’s ontology according to its 
elaborated organising vision and (2) the logic of specific communities of actors. 
Accordingly, I define internal diffusion as the process whereby the symbolic and material dimensions 
of an IT innovation (IT ontology) and/or the constellation of institutional logics in which it is 
embedded, become generally appropriate or desirable to a diverse community of organisational actors. 
Finally, I will summarize what it means to analyze intra-organisational diffusion dynamics using this 
lens. 
3.1 The Focus on Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a fundamental and axiomatic part of the rhetorical-legitimation cycle and consequently 
plays a crucial role in internal diffusion.  Defined as a generalized assumption of appropriateness or 
desirability (Suchman, 1995; Zucker, 1977), legitimacy is imparted onto an object through its 
alignment with a social group’s moral, normative, and cognitive cultural structures, such as interests 
and belief systems (legitimacy standards).  Depending on the degree of alignment with these standards, 
legitimacy can enable or constrain the thoughts and actions of social actors (Berger and Luckmann, 
1967), and is therefore critical to processes of institutional (organisational and technological) change 
and stability (Scott, 2001; Johnson, Dowd and Ridgeway, 2006). Accordingly, the internal diffusion 
process of generating technical, cultural and political alignment to reduce infusion variance is at its 
core, an instance of IT legitimation. 
Authors have conceptualized legitimation and de-legitimation as cognitive processes through which an 
object or institution gains legitimacy by becoming stable and connected to a social group (Zucker, 
1977; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996), or loses legitimacy by becoming unstable and dissonant from a social 
group (G. F. Davis, Diekmann and Tinsley, 1994).  Similarly, Hannan and Carroll (1992) suggests that 
an object or idea attains its highest level of legitimacy when ‘there is little question in the minds of 
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actors that it serves as a natural way to effect some kind of collective action’ (p. 34). Thus, on one 
hand, legitimacy is often conceptualized as a cognitive construct that is grounded in assumptions of an 
object’s interpretability or comprehensibility, appropriateness and desirability (Meyer and Scott, 1983; 
Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). While on the other hand, legitimacy is also thought to have a cultural 
dimension where an object’s comprehensibility or desirability is inevitably judged within a socially 
constructed system of values, norms, definitions and beliefs (Scott, 2003). 
In his study of strategic and institutional strategies for managing legitimacy, Suchman’s (1995) 
proposes that both cognitive and cultural dimensions of legitimacy can be captured in three different 
forms of legitimacy illustrated in Table 3.1: pragmatic, moral and cognitive. 
 
Table 3.1 Legitimation strategies in translation 
Legitimation 
strategy 
Literature instances Gains Pragmatic or Moral 
legitimacy by 
Pragmatic: Conformation 
build reputation Technology vision and goals should align with stakeholder 
needs (Kohli and Kettinger, 2004; Ramiller and Swanson, 
2003; Currie, 2004) 
Exchange legitimacy - highlighting 
how the IT innovation will directly 
benefit the audience. 
responsive  to 
needs 
Trust in IT innovation is one of the most important factors 
driving the adoption and use (Sollner, 2015; Lim, Jarvenpaa, 
and Lanham, 2015) 
Dispositional legitimacy- 
highlighting how aspects of IT 
project shares the audience’s values 
and interests 
co-opt 
constituents 
Involving users in IS development and implementation 
(Wasko and Faraj, 2004; Hartwick and Barki, 1994, Beath, 
1991) 
Influence legitimacy- highlighting 
how IT innovation will help the 
audience to achieve their goals or 
interests 
Pragmatic: Select markets 
locate friendly 
audiences 
Prioritize roll-out of IT among stakeholders who are most in 
need of IT benefits (Lapointe and Rivard, 2005; Kappos and 
Rivard, 2008) 
Exchange legitimacy 
recruit friendly 
co-optees 
Select champions who are credible and influential to 
stakeholder community and share the ITs vision and 
objectives (Beath, 1991) 
Influence legitimacy 
Pragmatic: Advertise 
advertise 
product & 
“Informating the clan” on the value of IT benefits through 
boundary spanning, community discussion (Kohli and 
Kettinger, 2004, Davidson and Heslinga, 2007) 
Exchange legitimacy & 
Dispositional 
Communicating IT success stories {Kohli and Kettinger, 
2004; Davidson and Chismar, 2007) 
Exchange  
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advertise image Communicating how charismatic leaders use IT {Johnson, 
Safadi, and Faraj, 2015} 
Influence legitimacy 
Moral: Conformation to Ideals 
produce proper 
outcomes, 
 
 
embed in 
institutions,  
Adoption of fashionable innovations (Baskerville and 
Myers, 2009) 
!
!
Align IT idea with organisational and departmental norms 
(Barca and Cordella, 2006; Prasad, 1993) 
Consequential legitimacy-
highlighting the IT innovation’s 
track record of socially valuable 
consequences. 
Employing consultants using proven methods to implement 
IT (Wright, Sturdy, Wylie, 2012,;Bloomfield and Coombs, 
1992; Bloomfield and Ardha, 1995) 
Procedural legitimacy- highlighting 
that the IT innovation uses socially 
accepted procedure and techniques 
 
 
 
 
offer symbolic 
displays 
Appoint charismatic and respected leader as IT champion  
(Beath, 1991) 
Personal legitimacy- highlighting 
that the IT innovation is supported 
by charismatic or influential actors 
Professional and anthropomorphic symbolism significantly 
shapes IT assimilation process (Prasad,1993) 
Dispositional legitimacy 
Moral: Select domain 
Define goals 
 
Prioritize roll out of IT among adopters that share similar 
norms to that of transformation goals( Lapointe and Rivard, 
2005; Kappos and Rivard, 2008) 
Exchange legitimacy 
Moral: Persuade 
Proselytize,  
 
demonstrate 
success 
Communicate virtues of the IT (Strang and Macy, 2001; 
Cabrera, Cabrera, and Barajas, 2001) 
Consequential legitimacy 
Showing benefits of IT through early use or external 
examples, validates procedures, structures and personal  
(Swanson and Ramiller, 1997, Standing, Standing, Love, 
Gengatharen, 2013) 
Procedural legitimacy 
 
3.1.1 Pragmatic Legitimacy 
Table 2.1 highlights the strategies that Suchman (1995) advances for gaining each form of legitimacy 
(Column 1) and maps them to the basis on which he indicates that they are granted (Column 3). In this 
typology he suggests that pragmatic legitimacy ‘rest[s] on the self-interested calculations of an 
organisation’s most immediate audience, and may be gained in three ways.  
Firstly, on the basis of direct exchanges by highlighting how the object or idea will directly benefit the 
audience (exchange legitimacy) (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). Empirical examples of strategies for 
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gaining support through exchange legitimacy include satisfying audiences’ demands for an IT 
innovation with a track record of technical superiority (Kohli and Kettinger, 2004), which also  meets 
their immediate needs (Ramiller and Swanson, 2003; Currie, 2004). Second, pragmatic legitimacy may 
be gained for an object on the basis of its expected influence (influence legitimacy) or whether the 
audience believe that it can help them to achieve their larger goals and interests(Selznick, 1949). For 
example, incorporating users in key IT development and implementation structures such as steering 
teams, is often more effective at motivating engagement than producing quick results (Wasko, Faraj 
and Teigland, 2004; Hartwick and Barki, 1994; Beath, 1991).  
Thirdly, an audience may also grant pragmatic legitimacy to an object if they believe that the object is 
“trustworthy”, “decent”, “wise”,  “shares their values” , or has “their best interests at heart”  
(dispositional legitimacy) (Scott, 2003). In this regard, numerous empirical studies have demonstrated 
that trust is one most important drivers of IT adoption and use (Söllner, 2015; Lim, Jarvenpaa and 
Lanham, 2015; Vance, Elie-Dit-Cosaque and Straub, 2014). Other studies have demonstrated that 
pragmatic legitimacy may be gained appointing credible and influential champions that share the IT 
vision (Beath, 1991), and (2) organising collective lobbying efforts (Wasko, Faraj and Teigland, 2004; 
Hartwick and Barki, 1994).  
3.1.2 Moral Legitimacy 
Moral legitimacy on the other hand rests in how well the object or idea is aligned to the organisation’s 
prevailing moral values and norms (e.g. welfare and justice) and may also be gained in three distinct 
ways (Suchman, 1995). First, it is gained on the basis of credible consequences (consequential 
legitimacy) or the object or idea’s track record of socially valuable consequences (Scott, 1977). 
Empirical IS research is replete with examples of consequential legitimacy in action, where 
organisations adopt fashionable IT innovations and with the expectation that the myths of its virtue 
alone will drive user engagement (see Baskerville and Myers, 2009 for a review).  
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Second, since morally valuable consequences are inherently difficult to measure and negotiate, an 
object or idea can gain moral moral legitimacy in a more direct way by embracing socially accepted 
procedures and techniques (procedural legitimacy) (Scott, 1977). For example, empirical studies often 
attribute successful IT implementation projects to the use of standardized and proven management 
consultancy expertise (Wright, Sturdy and Wylie, 2012; Bloomfield and Coombs, 1992; Bloomfield 
and Danieli, 1995).Thirdly, moral legitimacy may also be gained on the basis of the personal charisma 
(personal legitimacy) of an entrepreneurial organisational actor (Zucker, 1977). Again, empirical 
research is replete with accounts of how entrepreneurial actors play significant roles in disrupting 
established organisational norms using IT innovations (Beath, 1991, Henfridsson and Yoo, 2013). 
3.1.3 Cognitive Legitimacy  
Suchman (1995) adds that cognitive legitimacy increases proportionally with increases in pragmatic 
and moral legitimacy. Cognitive legitimacy may be increased by motivating collective action through 
‘popularization (promoting comprehensibility by explicating new cultural formulations) or 
standardization (promoting taken-for-grantedness by encouraging isomorphism)’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 
592). An object or idea may be “popularized” by constantly illustrating its reality through 
communicative actions such as advertising its technical advantages and image to gain pragmatic 
legitimacy (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997; S. Standing et al., 2013), and proselytizing its moral virtues 
to gain moral legitimacy (Strang and Macy, 2001; Á. Cabrera, E. F. Cabrera and Barajas, 2001) (see 
Table 3.1). 
However, generating comprehensibility among communities of actors with contrasting values and 
objectives is often prone to chaotic path dependencies and requires added standardization efforts to 
generate collective action (Arthur, 1990; David, 1986). In this regard, the institutional entrepreneurship 
literature discussed in chapter two’s review of the translation literature suggests that standardization is 
the product of discursive pressures, which are aimed at regulating or replicating successful 
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organisational and technological change patterns (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; 
Avgerou, 2000).   
Despite these observations, IS research has paid relatively little attention to examining the details of 
how legitimacy is gained, eroded or repaired through discursive, rhetorical and technical struggles 
(Deephouse and Suchman, 2008a; notable exceptions being Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell, 2014; 
Hsu, Huang and Galliers, 2014). This study intends to address this underserved area of legitimacy 
research by illuminating how an internally diffusing IT innovation becomes comprehensible to 
heterogeneous organisational actors. 
3.1.4 Comprehensibility and Collective Action 
Research suggests that an innovation may be simultaneously “popularized” and “standardized” in 
pluralistic contexts through combinations of pragmatic and moral communicative actions (Greenwood, 
Suddaby and Hinings, 2002; Strang and Meyer, 1993). For instance, institutional entrepreneurs use 
“theorizations of change” to simultaneously present a new IT innovation as the solution to a shared 
organisational failing, thus granting the innovation pragmatic legitimacy, and justify an abstract 
solution by aligning the innovation with prevailing normative prescriptions, granting the idea moral 
legitimacy (Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 2002; Suchman, 1995). Similarly, organising visions 
expand the reach of fashionable IT innovations within an institutional field by broadly explaining its 
usefulness and purpose, thus making it more universally applicable (Strang and Meyer, 1993; Swanson 
and Ramiller, 1997).  
Political translation studies particularly demonstrate how new IT innovations become comprehensible 
and legitimate in the early stages of institutionalization. These studies hold the common view that 
prevailing institutional logics provide the standards of legitimacy by which actors judge the 
appropriateness or desirability of new IT innovations (Klein and Hirschheim, 1989; Hussain and 
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Cornelius, 2009). Empirical studies importantly highlight that communicative actions such as framing 
can reduce IT infusion variance and generate collective action by increasing the alignment between IT 
innovations and prevailing legitimacy standards. 
They also show that framing constructs such as Hargadon and Douglas’s (2001 design skeumorphs 
allow organisational actors to instantiate specific legitimacy standards rather than others when they 
communicate messages, so that they shape how these messages are interpreted by particular social 
groups. In this way institutional entrepreneurs can simultaneously de-legitimate existing technologies 
and legitimate new ones. Framing strategies embody institutionally desirable interests and values, and 
communicate these interests through observable ‘legitimating accounts’ or rhetoric such as root 
metaphors and central themes. Skilled actors such as institutional entrepreneurs generate collective 
action around their intentions for the IT innovation by using this rhetoric to connect their ideology and 
desired IT ontology to the adopting organisation’s prevailing institutions (Suchman, 1995; Harmon, 
Green and Goodnight, 2014; Lammers, 2011). Berente and Yoo (2012) also observe that when an IT 
innovation is introduced into an organisation with contradictory practices, different groups of 
organisational actors loosely couple their practices from those of the IT, in different ways (temporal, 
material, procedural and interpretive).  The type of coupling adopted by a particular group usually 
reflects the degree to which they perceive the new practices as legitimate.  
These studies show that the use of persuasive language is crucial for encouraging a target audience to 
perceive a new IT innovation as appropriate and desirable. They also show that generating 
comprehensibility for an IT innovation requires pro-active actions to reconfigure dominant ideologies 
within the host organisation. Many of these studies also point to the central role of institutional logics 
in rhetorical framing and legitimation processes, and thus, in the process of internal IT diffusion. These 
studies also indicate that organisational pluralism tends to be the rule rather the exception in 
contemporary organisations. As a result, a number of rhetorical –legitimation episodes reflecting 
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conflicting institutional logics, legitimacy standards, and frames may exist concurrently or sequentially 
over the duration of internal IT-innovation diffusion. 
3.2 The Focus on Ideology, Institutional Logics and Complexity 
Empirical research in chapter 2 illustrates that the effectiveness of entrepreneurial actions to achieve 
technical, cultural and political legitimacy during IT translation depends on entrepreneurs’ sensitivity 
to technological, organisational, intra-organisational and supra-organisational factors. Chapter 2 also 
shows that although ideology reflects these factors and has thus been used in a number of IS 
implementation studies, this ideological conceptualization neglects the important technological and 
supra-organisational factors. On the other hand, a number of recent IS studies have usefully employed 
an institutional logics lens to demonstrate the interrelations between these four factors and diffusing 
innovations (Yoo, Lyytinen and Yang, 2005; Berente and Yoo, 2012; Mola and Carugati, 2011; Currie 
and Guah, 2007). 
3.2.1 On Ideology and Institutional Logics 
 Although there is an on-going scholarly debate attempting to draw clear conceptual distinctions 
between ideology and institutional logics (for an overview, see Thornton and Ocasio (2008)), it is 
generally accepted that they are empirically almost inseparable. The general pattern across this 
literature indicates that enquiries which do not intend to make explicit theoretical contributions to either 
of these concepts may conflate them or treat them as tightly coupled (Mutch, 2009; Archer, 1996; 
Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991). Following the lead of similar innovation diffusion studies(Suddaby and 
Greenwood, 2005; Heracleous and Barrett, 2001; Azad and Faraj, 2008; Delmestri, 2009), I also adopt 
a stance of empirical conflation. However, I conceptually embrace the view that ideologies are value-
based (cultural structures), chains of cause and effect that link individual identities and actions to 
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institutional logics. My intention in adopting this view is to analyze the ideologies underlying actors’ 
frames as distinct institutional logics that point to distinct ideologies. 
3.2.2 On Institutions 
Organisational institutions can be any persistent structure with ‘an organised, established, procedure’ 
that is ‘simultaneously material and symbolic’ (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p. 241). They are the 
material patterns of social action that organisational actors invoke to construct and maintain relatively 
homogenous ideologies, identities and practices in particular contexts (Friedland and Alford, 1991). 
Simultaneously, they are symbolic systems of linguistic and ideational processes that guide how 
organisational actors order reality, consequently making situated ideologies, identities and practices 
legitimate and meaningful (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Rooted in the notion of isomorphism 
(inevitable homogeneity), the majority of macro-social IT diffusion studies conceptualize organisations 
as institutions in their own right, and focus their analysis on sector, industry, and organisational level 
adoption of IT innovations. Yet, institutional research cautions that while institutions facilitate the 
chronic reproduction of micro-level practices, they are themselves generatively constructed through 
these everyday individual actions (Powell, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2012).  In this 
regard, the institutional lens enables researchers to examine the values, goals and prescriptions that 
underlie and legitimize the symbolic and material behaviors of individuals and groups actors (Powell 
and Colyvas, 2008). The collection of values, goals and prescriptions related to a specific institution 
mold a distinct rationale or institutional logic.  
3.2.3 On Institutional Logics 
Institutional logics are sets of material and symbolic “organising principles” that draw on higher order 
institutions such as family, state, capitalism, and professions, to define ‘rules of action, interaction, and 
interpretation’ for organisations and individuals to elaborate (Ocasio and Thornton, 1999). Through 
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elaboration, these organising principles outline the micro-level “logics of action” or the means, ends, 
and standards for assessing what objects and actions are appropriate in a particular context  (Greenwood 
et al., 2011; Pache and Santos, 2010). Since the logic of the institution extends across individual, 
organisational and societal levels of analysis, the conceptual apparatus of institutional logics allows 
researchers to relate individual micro-level actions to broader societal institutions. The societal-level 
institutions associated with logics are continually replicated in the everyday actions of individuals, and 
are consequently reflected in organisational activities (Friedland and Alford, 1991). In order to capture 
the dynamics of this relationship I focus on four key elements of an institutional logic outlined in Table 
3.1 in the following section.  
3.2.4 Identifying Institutional Logics  
Table 3.2 illustration of the characteristic of institutional logics is based on a  synthesis of taxonomies 
outlined by Thornton and Ocasio (2008) and Cloutier and Langley (2013).  
 
Table 3.2 Formative characteristics of Institutional logics 
Element Definition Example and Source: Market logic 
Common 
Principles 
Core goals and values characterizing 
the organising principles of a 
particular logic. 
Profit maximization (Thornton, 2002; Thornton,2004) 
Material 
manifestations 
People, objects, procedures, and 
symbols that embody what it is to be 
legitimate within  a particular  logic 
Profit maximization is legitimated by shareholders, stock 
price, financial measures, share price considerations, 
control- and efficiency-seeking behaviors (Thornton, 
Ocasio, Lounsbury, 2012; Pache and Santos, 2013) 
Assumptions The proper behaviours that 
organisational actors or objects must 
espouse in order to be considered 
legitimate within a particular logic. 
Self-interests and individualism are basis of norms and 
individual behavior (Almandoz, 2012; Marglin, 2008) 
Identifying 
Characteristics 
Features or practices espoused by 
persons, ideas, objects, or IT ontology 
that establishes their legitimacy within 
a particular logic 
Distant, efficient, controllable, transactional exchange 
relationships reflect self-interested assumptions 
(Almandoz, 201;Marglin, 2008; DiMaggio, 1997) 
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Thornton and Ocasio’s (2008)  work is aimed at highlighting the content and structure of explicit 
institutional logics, while Cloutier and Langley (2013) focus on the resources and mechanisms that 
actors invoke to assess the legitimacy of situated objects and practices. 
First, institutional logics provide a higher common principle that defines appropriate forms of conduct, 
the degree of legitimacy for particular societal values and rules, and thus organises collective action 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991). Second, material manifestations and practices of institutions authorize 
and legitimate organising principles in specific contexts. For instance, prevailing organisational 
objects, symbols, practices (ways of achieving objectives), and actors’ roles and identities tend to 
exemplify the institutional standards of legitimacy in different contexts (Thornton, Ocasio and 
Lounsbury, 2012; Sia and Soh, 2007; Boudreau and Robey, 2005). Third, institutional logics are based 
on means-ends assumptions, such as the appropriate behaviors and symbolic actions that actors and 
objects need to exhibit in order to gain legitimacy. This may either be discrete habits, emotions, and 
espoused goals, and/or symbolic demonstrations of commitment (e.g. sacrifice) to the values 
underlying a particular logic (Almandoz, 2012; Bacharach, Bamberger and Sonnenstuhl, 1996; 
Marglin, 2008; Boudreau and Robey, 2005). Fourth, assumptions are reflected in the characteristics of 
legitimate organisational objects and practices. These characteristics help organisational actors to 
assess the degree of legitimacy of organisational objects, practices and actors (DiMaggio, 1997; 
Jepperson, 1991). Distinct institutional logics are therefore formed of particular sets of characteristics. 
Whereas classical institutional research assumes that actor’s elaborate these scripts in a non-rational 
and passive way, the institutional logics view embraces the notion of embedded agency, where actors 
do often act rationally, but always against situated institutional pressures that espouse taken-for-granted 
assumptions and goals (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). 
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3.2.5 On Institutional Complexity and Misalignment 
Contemporary organisations typically operate over multiple institutional fields, and thus encompass 
numerous, often conflicting institutional logics, simultaneously. Commonly referred to as institutional 
pluralism (Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009; Dunn and C. Jones, 2010), this heterogeneous circumstance 
importantly influences infusion variance and re-alignment mechanisms during internal IT diffusion. 
While some institutional logics are complimentary and are easily reconciled, organisational actors do 
not easily switch to contradictory logics but fiercely defend the institutional logic that guided their 
actions and meaning-making in the past (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2002).  
When a contradictory logic enters an organisation either in the form of a new IT innovation or 
management prescription (external jolt), organisational actors may experience cognitive and social 
dissonance as competing logics become more misaligned with each other, and newly- introduced 
innovation. The literature conceptualizes the consequences of this form of misalignment as loose 
coupling (Berente and Yoo, 2012) and co-mingling (Smith-Doerr, 2005; Swan et al., 2010). Both of 
these conceptualizations conclude that misalignments create difficulties for local inter-group 
interactions that front-line actors resolve by adopting distinctly different patterns of action, but still 
remaining responsive in some way to competing patterns of action (Clemens and Cook, 1999; Orton 
and Weick, 1990). For instance, a number of studies have established that financial and consulting 
services companies are often dominated by an extreme form of market logic that is innately co-mingled 
with underlying community and professional logics (Smets et al., 2014; G. F. Davis, 2009; Swanson, 
2010). Despite institutional scholars acknowledgement that competing demands from numerous 
incompatible logics leads to local dissonance, scholars are relatively silent on how managers can 
proactively deal with this dissonance at an intra-organisational level (Greenwood et al., 2010; Berente 
and Yoo, 2012). Such research is vital to understanding how technological alignment can be managed 
from the top-down. 
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3.2.6 On Institutional Entrepreneurship and Rhetorical Alignment  
Though interest in top-down institutional alignment has steadily increased to this point (Lawrence, 
Suddaby and Leca, 2009; Swan et al., 2010; Smets et al., 2014), few studies have explored how 
managers deal with and resolve the conflicts that pluralism generates (Zilber, 2011; Cloutier and 
Langley, 2013). Institutional entrepreneurship and social movements theory have provided useful 
examples of how individual agency (DiMaggio, 1988; Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca, 2009) and social 
interaction (Lounsbury, 2002; Clemens and Cook, 1999) play crucial roles in dealing with intra-
organisational misalignments and social dissonance. Institutional entrepreneurship is a process where 
actors with sufficient resources or other forms of power seize opportunities to shift or replace prevailing 
organisational logics according to their interests (C. Oliver, 1992; DiMaggio, 1988; Munir and Phillips, 
2005).  
Research shows that while an external jolt may sometimes introduce a completely new contradictory 
logic into an organisation, it more often energizes entrepreneurial action to lobby for a peripheral logic 
to become insurgent (Lounsbury, 2007; Clemens and Cook, 1999; Maguire and Hardy, 2009; Garud, 
Jain and Kumaraswamy, 2002). A parallel stream highlights that contradictions and ambiguities in the 
language that reproduces specific logics make them especially mutable to appropriation. Such that, 
institutional entrepreneurs who are sensitive to these contradictions can skillfully use rhetorical practice 
to justify and recast change as “efforts to restore tradition” (Rao, Monin and Durand, 2003; Barrett, 
Heracleous and Walsham, 2013). Social movements research similarly propose that entrepreneurial 
actions are more effective when elements of the insurgent logic are connected via rhetoric to core 
organisational and field level values (Rao, Monin and Durand, 2003). Organisational actors are more 
likely to view a change as legitimate  ‘when they fit into the pre-existing cultural beliefs, meanings, 
and typifications of an organisational community’ (Ruef, 2000, p.661). For example, a number of 
studies highlight that the institutional logic of professionalism may be linguistically connected to 
65!
“community” or “market” logics, since although professionalism is rooted in historical “expert” and 
“trustee” language, its masks commercial market interests (e.g. Leicht and Fennell, 2001; Suddaby and 
Greenwood, 2005; Freidson, 2001).  
3.2.7 Final Note on Institutional Logics 
These studies suggest that institutional logics encode the criteria that organisational actors use to assess 
the legitimacy of new IT innovations as they diffuse internally. As new objects diffuse internally, 
competing logics are loosely coupled in a period of heightened strategic, symbolic contestation 
(rhetorical framing practices) to legitimate the object according to different logics.  After multiple 
rhetorical- legitimation episodes, loosely-coupled logics may become tightly coupled or ‘hybridized’ 
as legitimacy standards are shifted, compromises are reached and the object starts to diffuse between 
organisational groups (Swan et al., 2010; Lounsbury, 2007; Battilana and Dorado, 2010).  In some 
cases, this hybridization may lead to the complete transformation or replacement of the dominant logic 
and the diffusion of unintended material and symbolic practices (Pache and Santos, 2013). They also 
point to the central role of rhetorical-legitimation in entrepreneurial framing practices. Entrepreneurs 
use rhetorical practices to exploit and manipulate logics and legitimacy standards according to their 
own interests, and in turn, influence how internally diffusing IT innovations are mis/aligned within 
local organisational contexts. 
3.3 The Focus on Rhetoric in Framing 
As the art of persuasion, ‘it is through rhetoric that agency is restored as actors attempt to shape the 
legitimacy of practices to suit their goals and interests.’ (Barrett, Heracleous, Walsham, 2013, p. 204). 
Prior to the emergence of scientific rationality, academic theorists held rhetoric as the principal source 
of invention and inspiration in the production of social action (Burke, 1966; Bizzell and Herzberg, 
2001).  With the recent “linguistic turn” in organisational studies researchers have revived and extended 
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this rhetorical theory to emphasize how social actors’ use strategic language to displace and shift 
meaning during social change (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Harmon, Green and Goodnight, 2014). 
Along this linguistic turn, contemporary rhetorical theory has built on narrative analyses, hermeneutics 
and particularly discourse, which have also established that language does indeed help to direct social 
action. Independent from these streams however, rhetoric is theorized as a type of instrumental 
discourse that is used to ‘persuade audiences, reach reliable judgments or decisions, and coordinate 
social action’ (Green, 2004, p. 654). Accordingly, rhetorical diffusion theory suggests that framing 
practices are discursive justifications around a new idea or object. As these discursive justifications 
become more persuasive the new idea is seen as more appropriate and legitimate (comprehensible), 
and consequently diffuses more widely. 
3.3.1 On Rhetorical Legitimation and Comprehensibility 
The dominant diffusion paradigms have shown that the diffusion of new objects and ideas (product 
ontologies) are often accompanied by legitimating discourse that points to how the product ontology 
helps organisational actors to rationally pursue valued economic (economic-rational) and social needs 
(institutional) (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Abrahamson, 1991; Strang and Macy, 2001). These studies 
highlight that increasing legitimate product ontologies are accompanied by increasingly persistent and 
prevalent material features that change according to actors’ valued economic and social needs (Tolbert 
and Zucker, 1983; Westphal, Gulati and Shortell, 1997). Rhetorical theory extends this observation to 
try to understand when and how these material practices are acquiring legitimacy—that is, diffusing 
more widely or becoming more institutionalized. Research in this stream empirically and theoretically 
depart from dominant rhetorical perspectives’ tendency to sideline symbolic institutional aspects and 
overemphasize material aspects (Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 2010). Rather they adopt a more cognitive and 
communicative (ideational) stance that explores how the structure, form and content of discursive 
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justifications shapes and reflects the changes in legitimacy of diffusing product ontologies (Suddaby, 
2011).  
In doing so, the theory of rhetorical legitimation enhances the dominant paradigms in three major ways. 
Firstly, it suggests that the rationale behind decisions and actions is embedded in readily observable 
and empirically measurable arguments (rhetorical arguments) or reasons, rather than in immeasurable 
beliefs and assumptions. In turn “reasons or arguments reflect and shape the institutional logics and 
belief systems that guide practical action” (Green, 2009, p. 14). Secondly, this view accordingly 
explains why particular economic and social needs become salient and why a particular institution or 
object satisfies these needs in specific contexts. The first two positions rely on ideas of situated social 
agency, cultural deviance and political adaptation, which therefore capture how established objects or 
institutions (and associated institutional logics) may be de-legitimated and how insurgent logics (and 
associated objects) can become salient and legitimate. 
Empirical research along these lines highlight that while only social actors can directly use rhetoric to 
legitimate new ideas and objects, presentations and documents from prior adopters, academic and 
business press, and special events or meetings are proxies that reflect what organisational actors hold 
as salient or legitimate (Strang and Soule, 1998; King and Kugler, 2000). More importantly, 
organisational actors can use this rhetoric to justify their actions and institutionalize new objects and 
practices (Suddaby, 2011; Green, Li and Nohria, 2009), and explicitly construct legitimacy (Harmon, 
Green and Goodnight, 2014; Vaara and Tienar, 2008). For example, King and Kugler (2000) found 
that new practices were more efficiently and effectively comprehended by organisational actors when 
managers used increasingly persuasive discursive justifications (or sense making mechanism (Weick, 
1995)) to rationalize and legitimize their usefulness (rhetorical legitimation strategies). These 
justifications were more persuasive when they connected the new practice to prevailing institutional 
logics and practical problems.  
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3.3.2 On Rhetorical Diffusion and Institutional Change 
Empirical evidence on rhetorical diffusion advances a redefinition of legitimation (Hussain and 
Cornelius, 2009; Zelditch, 2001; Klein and Hirschheim, 1989; Mignerat and Rivard, 2009). Whereas 
Suchman (1995) defines legitimacy as a generalized assumption that actions or objects are socially 
appropriate or desirable, Harmon, Green and Goodnight (2014) argue for a reconceptualization that 
embraces mutual technical and organisational institutional change. They define legitimacy as ’a 
generalized assumption that an institutional context and/or certain actions within that context are 
desirable or appropriate’ (p.86).  
These views are rooted in translation researchers’ view that institutional entrepreneurs, their target 
audience, and the new product ontology are necessarily influenced by the symbolic prescriptions of 
prevailing institutional logics. These views also resonate with the institutional logics view of 
entrepreneurship and shifting logics by suggesting that although ‘certain types of rhetorical strategies 
might maintain the boundaries of institutional arrangements and make them more resilient and 
reproducible, … others might disrupt these boundaries and challenge the foundation of the institutional 
edifice’ (Harmon, Green and Goodnight, 2014, p. 89). Entrepreneurs may enhance the persuasiveness 
of their claims about a new product ontology through institutional maintenance or technology 
adaptation. This involved mobilizing rhetoric to align their justifications for the new product ontology 
with the institutional logics that guide the target audience’s activities and interests. Their rhetorical 
arguments may also legitimate the new product ontology by pursuing institutional change or 
organisational adaptation. In this case, their rhetoric would be aimed at gradually shifting the logic that 
guides audiences’ interests, members of the audience come to perceive the new object as legitimate. In 
the case of institutional change, when a newly- introduced product ontology challenges established 
ways of working in novel and unusual ways, diffusion is often characterized by contestation between 
different organisational stakeholders on how to redefine the institutional context so that the object 
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becomes more comprehensible and legitimate (Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell, 2014; Scarbrough, 
Robertson and Swan, 2015). As such, rhetorical legitimation facilitates the diffusion of a product 
ontology by actively shaping how new objects and ideas are interpreted and theorized (Green, Li and 
Nohria, 2009).  
As objects diffuse, the number and frequency of supporting rhetorical legitimation strategies are more 
intense in the early stages of diffusion, prior to the object achieving cognitive legitimacy or taken-for-
granted status (Green, 2004). Green (2004) adds that rhetorical legitimation strategies tend to vary in 
type and sequence at different points in the diffusion process and across different institutional contexts. 
Harmon, Green and Goodnight (2014) add that diffusion research can better understand the dynamics 
and effects of contestation between diverse organisational actors by exploring variations in rhetorical 
structure.  
3. 4 Principles of Rhetorical Legitimation  
A rhetorical view of legitimation and diffusion can lead to a better understanding of variations in the 
pace and outcome of diffusion. since it holds the potential to explain why different organisational actors 
execute a specific strategy, or multiple strategies, in different ways. This is enabled through a combined 
focus on how variations in elements, types, structure, sequence and institutional groundings (logic) of 
rhetorical strategies build or erode legitimacy for an idea or object. Table 3.3 outlines these key 
principles, where elements, type, and structure are listed in the first column, and sequence, institutional 
grounding, and implications are summarized in the other columns. As I will discuss in this section, 
these principles are based on frameworks explaining and exploring the role of rhetoric in diffusion 
(Green, 2004) and institutionalization (Green, Li and Nohria, 2009; Harmon, Green and Goodnight, 
2014). These principles also resonate with key issues and mechanisms of innovation translation (section 
2.2.2) and converge on conceptualizing internal diffusion as a process by which an idea or object 
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develops comprehensibility through rhetorical strategies. Conceptualizing distinct rhetorical 
justifications as made up of data, claim, warrant and backing dimensions usefully points to how 
variations in rhetorical type, institutional grounding, and sequence shapes diffusion. Specifically, the 
content, type and institutional grounding point to the state of legitimation (Green, 2004), while the 
sequence of rhetoric strategies models the process of legitimation (Green, 2009; Harmon, Green and 
Goodnight, 2014). 
 
Table 3.3 Principles of Rhetorical Legitimation  
Principles Empirical features Implications 
Elements of 
Rhetoric 
 
Data: Evidence that organisational actors use to 
support a claim e.g. success stories, benefits 
!
Claim: The conclusion that actors are seeking to 
establish as legitimate e.g. calls to action 
Warrant: The reason that legitimizes or sanctions 
the link between claim and data e.g. fundamental 
focus, business case 
 
Backing: Commonly held characteristics, 
principles, material consequences and 
assumptions of a discursive community 
(institutional logic) that organisational actors use 
to judge whether the warrant and data justifying 
a claim are legitimate. In reflecting the concerns 
of one or more elements of an argument’s 
institutional grounding the backing therefore 
points to the logic behind a rhetorical argument. 
!
Syllogism: argument with warrant, data and 
claim 
!
Enthymeme: argument with data and claim 
!
Unsupported claim: argument with just claim 
 
The state of diffusion may be traced by 
examining the presence and content of particular 
elements, while the diffusion process is 
constituted as changes in argument structure (see 
row 3). 
!
 
Syllogisms are more persuasive than 
Enthymemes, and these are all more persuasive 
than unsupported claims 
 
 
 
 
Types of 
rhetoric 
 
Pathos appeals link data to claims using 
passionate calls to an audience’s emotions (e.g. 
greed, fear) and self-interests 
!
Logos appeals make logical calls to an 
audience’s desire for efficiency and effectiveness 
!
 
Pathos and logos appeal to an audience’s self-
interests to swiftly generate relatively transient 
pragmatic legitimacy; Ethos appeals to moral and 
social norms to slowly generate durable moral 
legitimacy. 
!
Pragmatic and moral legitimation processes are 
vital in internal diffusion since they help to 
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Ethos appeals call on audiences to judge whether 
an action is morally and socially “the right thing 
to do” 
generate the cognitive legitimacy that increases 
comprehensibility. 
Structure of 
rhetoric 
 
Intra-field rhetoric is used to argue the validity 
of warrants and data supporting a claim in a 
specific context 
!
Inter-field rhetoric is used to argue the validity 
of the backing (institutional logic) that 
authorizes warrants and data supporting a claim. 
 
 
Different combinations of pathos, logos and 
ethos syllogisms and enthymemes over time 
correspond to the extent and speed at which new 
IT innovations are gaining or losing legitimacy. 
!
Syllogism ! Enthymeme: A prolonged 
streamlining and decrease of rhetorical warrants 
indicates increasing legitimacy and 
comprehensibility. 
!
Inter-field to intra-field shifts in rhetorical 
strategies indicate increasing legitimacy and 
comprehensibility. 
!
Intra-field to inter-field shifts in rhetorical 
strategies indicate de-legitimation. 
 
3.4.1 Elements of Rhetoric 
Harmon, Green and Goodnight (2014) illustrate that ‘an argument moves from data (i.e., the evidence 
social actors use to support the claim) to claim (i.e., the conclusion whose legitimacy social actors are 
seeking to establish) by virtue of a warrant (i.e., a reason that authorizes the link between data and 
claim)’ (p. 79). The backing supplies the institutional grounds via which organisational actors judge 
whether the warrant and data justifying a claim are legitimate or generally acceptable (Toulmin, 2003). 
As such, researchers note that a rhetorical argument’s backing reflects commonly held social beliefs of 
a discursive community (Areni, 2002; Toulmin, Rieke and Janik, 1984), such the common principles, 
material manifestations, assumptions, and identifying characteristics that define an institutional logic 
(see Table 3.2). Additionally, while warrants are more entrenched in backings (institutional logics), 
data draws from individual or local experience and knowledge (Corbett and Connors, 1999; Toulmin, 
Rieke and Janik, 1984). Accordingly, researchers note that rhetorical arguments with a warrant, data 
and claim (syllogism) are more persuasive than arguments with just data and claims (enthymeme), and 
72!
enthymemes are more persuasive than unsupported claims (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; 
Areni, 2002).  
Empirical studies drawing on this principle show that variations in the presence and content of these 
elements in a justification, provides a readily observable way to judge the state of diffusion over time 
(Barrett, Heracleous and Walsham, 2013; Hsu, Huang and Galliers, 2014; Green, Li and Nohria, 2009). 
For example, a decrease in stating the warrant of a rhetorical argument over time indicates that the 
innovation is gaining legitimacy and comprehensibility (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Green, 
Li and Nohria, 2009). The prolonged suppression of warrants (syllogism to enthymeme) may eventually 
lead to suppression of the data dimension of an argument (enthymeme to unsupported claim), indicating 
that the warrant and data have both become taken-for-granted by the audience (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 1969; Green, Li and Nohria, 2009). These studies also suggest that variations in the relationship 
between a justification’s backing and its warrant and claim is particularly pertinent for understanding 
how organisational actors passively and actively experience institutional complexity during internal 
diffusion. In complex institutional settings, there may be multiple, pertinent backings with different 
warrants and courses of action. Crucially, a number of studies have demonstrated that the dynamics of 
this complexity is best captured by looking at how justifications appeal to different types of legitimacy 
over time (Barrett, Heracleous and Walsham, 2013; Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell, 2014; Green, 
2004; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Erkama and Vaara, 2010). 
3.4.2 Types of Rhetorical Appeals 
Prior research discussed in section 3.1 highlight that institutional entrepreneurs may use symbolic 
actions, such as those proposed by Suchman (1995) to explicitly generate pragmatic and moral 
legitimacy, and as a consequence, cognitive legitimacy (S. A. Brown et al., 2002; Hussain and 
Cornelius, 2009; Kaganer, Pawlowski and Wiley-Patton, 2010).  However, enquiry into Suchman’s 
(1995) strategies of advertising the innovation’s benefit (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997; S. Standing et 
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al., 2013), and proselytizing its moral virtues (Strang and Macy, 2001; Á. Cabrera, E. F. Cabrera and 
Barajas, 2001) to respectively gain pragmatic and moral legitimacy (see Table 3.1), broadly converge 
on the view that non-linguistic symbolic actions often reflect rhetorical concerns (Strang and Soule, 
1998; King and Kugler, 2000). In this regard, studies on linguistic symbolism highlight that different 
combinations of warrants, data and claims can make either pathos, logos or ethos legitimacy appeals to 
legitimate a diffusing IT innovation (Green, 2004; Hsu, Huang and Galliers, 2014; Nielsen, Mathiassen 
and Newell, 2014; Barrett, Heracleous and Walsham, 2013).  
Pathos and logos appeals both rest on an audience’s self-interested calculations of an object’s direct 
expected value or whether it shares particular social interest and goals, and thus construct and build 
pragmatic legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Scott, 2001). In particular, pathos appeals link data to claims 
using passionate appeals to an audience’s emotions (e.g. greed, fear) and self-interests. This type of 
persuasive appeal is especially effective early in the diffusion process for challenging the status quo 
and grabbing actors finite attention span, but less so at sustaining this social action (Bizzell and 
Herzberg, 2001; Herrick, 2005). Logos appeals make logical calls to an audience’s desire for efficiency 
and effectiveness (Putnam and Mumby, 1993). These warrants have more sustained persuasive power 
than pathos appeals since they elicit gradual, methodological means-ends calculations (Simon, 1976). 
In contrast, ethos appeals depart from a focus on individual interests (logos and pathos) to invite 
audiences to judge whether an action is morally and socially “the right thing to do”. Ethos persuasive 
appeals accordingly build moral legitimacy that rests on an audience’s judgments of whether a new 
object promotes and/or resonates with their shared moral values and norms (Suchman, 1995; Scott, 
2001). Because of this social focus, ethos appeals have a slow and gradual effect but are the most 
effective at generating sustained social action and comprehensibility (Suchman, 1995; Herrick, 2012).  
These findings suggest that pragmatic and moral legitimation are the most pertinent processes for the 
examination of innovation diffusion, in so far as they gradually generate cognitive legitimacy for 
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diffusing innovations (Suchman, 1995; Green, Li and Nohria, 2009; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; 
Vaara and Tienar, 2008). Specifically, diffusion research generally agrees that a pattern of declining 
amounts of pragmatic and moral justifications on the whole indicate that the diffusing object is gaining 
cognitive legitimacy and thus, becoming more comprehensible and taken-for-granted by a situated 
community of actors (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). 
3.4.3 Structure of Rhetoric 
The third rhetorical legitimation principle points to the role of rhetorical structure. Extant diffusion 
research shows that we can better understand variations in the extent and speed at which a new idea 
gains or loses legitimacy over time by observing how organisational actors combine different types of 
rhetorical appeals in particular sequences. For example, Green (2004) hypothesizes that new ideas and 
objects are most likely legitimated in a pattern where, 
‘pathos appeals help direct behavior away from the status quo. Logos appeals link new actions and 
behaviors to effective outcomes [and] Ethos appeals lock in new behaviors and hinder movement from 
the new equilibrium’. (p.661) 
However, focusing solely on the sequence of rhetorical appeals does not shed light on why different 
organisational actors adopt specific rhetorical strategies. Harmon , Green and Goodnight (2014) argue 
that this gap can be addressed by conceptualizing how rhetorical strategies relate to organisational 
actors’ legitimacy assumptions on two levels, inter-field and intra-field.  
Intra-field Rhetorical Justifications 
Intra-field rhetoric is used to argue about ideas and issues around a specific backing but do not explicitly 
challenge or justify the backing (Toulmin, Rieke and Janik, 1984).  The prevalence of this type of 
rhetoric around an internally diffusing product ontology suggests that the audience collectively 
perceive the related backing as legitimate. In this case, entrepreneurs acknowledge and use warrants 
and data that are authorized by the socially agreed backing to further align particular claims about the 
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internally diffusing product ontology with the existing institutional context (Friedland and Alford, 
1991; McNulty, 2004). Intra-field justifications therefore reflect entrepreneurial action to generate 
institutional stability, compromise and maintenance, or align the product ontology with the audience’s 
prevailing institutional logics.  
For instance, Harmon, Green and Goodnight (2014) illustrate a case of uncertainty over a multi-national 
organisational merger, where the company argued that the merger was viable because it was forecasted 
to yield a 25% profit in the next two years. Financial analysts countered that the profitability estimate 
was exaggerated because the company’s financial model inputs were incorrect; investors argued that 
the profitability projection did not account for unexpected foreign spending; and the company 
responded to the former with additional data to support its model and to the latter with financial proof 
of sufficient cash reserves to cover unexpected future expenditures. Despite each stakeholder group’s 
disagreement about the merger’s legitimacy, their rhetorical strategies of challenging the organisational 
data on financial grounds, implicitly indicated that they generally accepted financial evaluation as the 
dominant backing for the merger in this context. Thus, with intra-field rhetoric, while contestations do 
occur, these dynamics take place within a socially accepted institutional logic or backing (e.g. financial 
evaluations) that sets the boundaries for the types of warrants and data that are permitted in the local 
context.  
Inter-field Rhetorical Justifications 
However, persistent and persuasive intra-field rhetorical rebuttals may gradually weaken social 
consensus and lead to inter-field arguments, where organisational actors progressively experiment with 
backings that better explain and fit the diffusing idea or object. In fact, in most complex environments 
different organisational actors often draw on multiple backings (e.g. political, financial, professional) 
to support their claims. Entrepreneurs justifications remain as intra-field when the data associated with 
different prevailing backings legitimates similar claims(Toulmin, Rieke and Janik, 1984; Goodnight, 
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2006). However, when the data associated with different backings substantiates contradictory claims, 
organisational actors are likely to mobilize multiple inter-field justifications to decide which 
combination of backings (loosely coupled or co-mingled logics) or single backing is most suitable for 
the institutional context. The outcome of this contestation and negotiation is a shared understanding of 
the product ontology’s usefulness or a product ontology that best meets the needs of key stakeholders 
(Toulmin, Rieke and Janik, 1984). 
Re-citing Harmon, Green and Goodnight’s (2014) example, while the financial data (25% increase in 
profit) may broadly sustain the merger’s legitimacy, a special interest group may advance a political 
backing and contest that the merger threatens national security. When an alternative backing (e.g. 
political interests) for a situated phenomenon is introduced, organisational actors may suppress intra-
field rhetorical elements (i.e. claim, warrant, data) and explicitly provide alternative rhetorical 
justifications to defend or challenge the dominant backing (e.g. financial evaluation) (Toulmin, Rieke 
and Janik, 1984; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). Similarly, proponents of the dominant financial 
backing will likely engage in similar inter-field rhetorical justifications to defend their backing. In 
particular, when the diffusing product ontology is especially novel there are unlikely to be readily 
available backings for rhetorical rebuttals. In this case organisational actors may mobilize inter-field 
rhetoric that draws on loosely coupled institutional logics to construct an original backing that generates 
legitimacy for the new object (Harmon, Green and Goodnight, 2014). Inter-field justifications therefore 
reflect individual, political and institutional change around diffusing IT innovations (Suchman, 1995; 
Green and Li, 2011), or attempts at organisational adaptation. So while intra-field rhetoric reflects 
actors perceptions about the legitimacy of a diffusing product ontology, inter-field rhetoric reflects and 
actively shapes organisational actors’ perceptions about the legitimacy of the institutional context itself. 
Studies around these principles have roughly estimated levels of legitimacy for product ontologies or 
institutional backings by examining corresponding amounts of related rhetoric. For instance, a decrease 
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in the amount of rhetorical appeals indicate an increase in legitimacy and comprehensibility (Tost, 
2011; Jepperson, 1991; Green, Li and Nohria, 2009). While this view is useful, an extended focus on 
the transitions between inter-field and intra-field rhetoric enables researchers to pinpoint specific 
moments at which legitimacy begins to increase or decrease for an internally diffusing IT innovation. 
3.4.4 A Closing Note on Rhetorical Sequence 
An observed shift between inter-field and intra-field rhetoric reflects mechanisms driving the 
legitimation or de-legitimation of an idea or object. Specifically, a number of studies show that a shift 
from inter-field to intra-field rhetoric indicates that a community of organisational actors generally 
accept a specific backing as a legitimate way to shape and make sense of a diffusing product ontology 
(e.g. Green, Li and Nohria, 2009; Cole and Scott, 2000; Cole, 1999). In this way an inter-field to intra-
field shift points to increased institutional stability because “it creates a shared understanding and 
foundation on which social actors can build legitimacy for their actions and practices” (Harmon, 
Green  and Goodnight, 2014, p. 86). 
In contrast, an observed intra-field to inter-field shift reflects mechanisms underlying the process of 
de-legitimating an established backing, where organisational actors are not just questioning the 
legitimacy of the practice (Vaara, Tienari and Laurila, 2006) but also the institutional context (Holm, 
1995). A number of studies illustrate that as a community of organisational actors deconstruct the 
dominant backing they simultaneously undermine the criteria (warrants and data) that they have 
historically used to make sense of surrounding ideas and objects. This state triggers loose coupling 
between prevailing logics and the eventual displacement of the dominant institutional logic (Suddaby 
and Greenwood, 2005; Green and Li, 2011).  
These studies are particularly pertinent and relevant to my research because they advance insights into 
how to apply rhetoric to translation research. They highlight a number of different rhetorical principles 
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that entrepreneurs use to frame justifications for diffusing IT innovations, and crucially shows how 
rhetorical legitimation reflects the dynamics of technological and organisational change. 
3.5 Internal Diffusion Process 
Whereas theorization is concerned with how new IT innovations are defined and legitimated within an 
industrial field, I propose that intra-organisational rhetorical legitimation is concerned with how IT 
theorizations are subsequently tailored, filtered and reformed as are aligned with institutionally plural 
front- line work activities and behaviours. So far I have outlined the key legitimation, institutional and 
rhetorical components of the rhetorical legitimation model, and highlighted how these components 
(Table 3.2) may be instrumentally leveraged by interest driven institutional actors, such as institutional 
entrepreneurs (Zilber, 2006; Røvik, 2011; Boxenbaum and Battilana, 2005). My intention in 
concluding this chapter is to outline how these components fit together into a holistic conceptual model. 
This model, outlined in Figure 3.1 is based on recent studies in the translation tradition’s linguistic turn, 
where rhetorical legitimation dynamics are evident (Reay et al., 2013; Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell, 
2014; Scarbrough, Robertson and Swan, 2015; Røvik, 2011; Wang and Swanson, 2007).  
The rhetorical diffusion process is triggered when an organisation decides to adopt a “fashionable” or 
proven innovation from the stock of circulating field level innovation ideas in order to solve a problem 
or satisfy a business need (Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 2002). Organisations immediate 
response will be to elaborate the innovation’s organizing vision in a way that aligns the technology to 
overall organisational needs (organisational alignment) (Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell, 2014).  
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Figure 3.1 Conceptual Model of Internal Diffusion Process 
 
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the innovation’s theorized label (e.g. “Green IT”,  “Enterprise 2.0”) is 
firstly unpacked into an organisational level organising vision that serves as a set of standard practices 
and language for generating collective meaning making and legitimacy, and thus, standardizing the 
innovation according to organisational objectives (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997; Greenwood, Suddaby 
and Hinings, 2002). For example, although the ESN organising vision is relatively unstable because of 
its novelty,  studies show that ESNs embrace an “ideology of openness” that promotes features and 
practices that enable engagement rather than disengagement, sharing rather than control and visibility 
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rather than invisibility (Gibbs, Rozaidi and Eisenberg, 2013; Treem and Leonardi, 2012; Vaast and 
Kaganer, 2013). Entrepreneurial actors elaborate this vision in their communications to align their ideas 
for appropriating ESN with the common interests of their immediate audience. Relatively good 
alignment with a particular audience constitutes a distinct infusion, or instance of limited diffusion.   
For example, ‘naming’ the newly- introduced innovation using transient material artifacts like vision 
statements, presentations and early prototypes creates ‘frames of comparability’ that define the 
boundaries of how the IT innovation will be developed, implemented and used, and thus facilitates its 
rhetorical legitimation throughout the organisation (Røvik, 2011; T. Morris and Lancaster, 2006; Porac, 
Ventresca and Mishina, 2002).  
Here, institutional logics are especially important. The institutions embedded in newly- introduced 
innovations (Gosain, 2004; Scott, 2008), and the institutions in which organizational actors 
(entrepreneurs and audience) are embedded, shape their interests and objectives, and how they 
elaborate the innovation’s vision in their activities and communications (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; 
Greenwood et al., 2010). If for example ESN was introduced into an institutionally plural context, the 
“open” logic embedded in ESN can either be in conflict or congruent with incumbent organisational 
logics that shape front-line practices across specific communities of actors. Accordingly, entrepreneurs 
targeting different audiences will often adopt competing ideas for appropriating ESN, and will mobilize 
competing communications to narrow the institutional misalignments between the technology and the 
target audience.  
In cases where competing entrepreneurs elaborate different “names” or justifications for IT usage, 
‘framing contestations’, marked by complex observable rhetorical justifications for legitimacy takes 
center stage. Contested justifications often depart from their original form as repeated rhetorical 
contestation eventually results in some ontological features (IT ontology) gaining legitimacy and rising 
to the forefront at the expense of others (Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell, 2014; Sahlin and Wedlin, 
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2008). Over time, negotiated ontological features that survive this competition may become 
organisational imperatives and examples of good practices, and transform the original organisational 
level vision and logic (technological alignment). 
The outcomes of rhetorical contests depend on how well entrepreneurs use different argument types 
and structures to promote the pragmatic and moral value (see Table 3.2) of more robust material 
practices and artifacts, such as training programmes, installed hardware and software, and work process 
changes(Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell, 2014). It is typical for proponents of an idea to use rhetoric 
that firstly frames the idea as a call to action against a commonly accepted organisational failing in 
order to gain pragmatic legitimacy, and secondly aligns justifications for the proposed solution with 
the prevailing normative order, to gain moral legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Over time, the collapse of 
discourse around the IT ontology is an indication that it is gaining cognitive legitimacy and becoming 
more institutionalized (Czarniawska, 2009; Suchman, 1995; Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 2002). 
More often than not, the legitimated IT ontology is inevitably different from the initial idea 
(Orlikowski, 2000). 
To conclude, the work in this chapter details the role of rhetoric and legitimation in diffusion through 
a model of institutionally embedded rhetorical legitimation (Green, 2004; Green, Li and Nohria, 2009; 
Harmon, Green and Goodnight, 2014; Berente and Yoo, 2012). This model views internal IT diffusion 
as a process whereby the symbolic and material dimensions of a newly- introduced digital innovation 
(IT ontology) and/or the constellation of institutional logics in which it is embedded, become 
appropriate or desirable to a community of organisational actors (Greenwood, 2002; Johnson et al, 
2006; Harmon, Green and Goodnight, 2014). In this way intra-organisational rhetorical legitimation is 
conceptualized as an axiomatic micro-process of translation and is vital to understanding how and why 
an IT innovation is translated in a particular way, in different institutional contexts.  
!  
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4. Empirical Approach 
 
Theorizing about the legitimacy struggles and related institutional mechanisms driving the internal 
diffusion of ESN calls for a close examination of the activities and meaning-making of the actors 
involved in it (Walsham, 2006). To theorise about this phenomenon and derive practical strategies for 
managerial consideration, I conducted in-depth field studies of ESN implementation success a global 
consulting firm (iSource). The case study methodology is ideally suited to (1) exploratory studies 
(Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead, 1987)  (2) developing knowledge of contemporary phenomenon (Yin, 
2013) (3) that is relevant for managerial practice (Amabile and Mueller, 1999; Leonard-Barton, 1990). 
The case of iSource is also well suited for developing academic and managerial knowledge since it 
represents an extreme case of unusual success. Extreme cases are “considered to be prototypical of 
some phenomenon of interest” (Gerring, 2006, p. 101) and are therefore ideal for theory generation, 
particularly in the early stages of enquiry into a phenomenon. 
A number of recent progressive studies have positioned ESN as a key part of the new “digital firm”, 
and even more conservative studies have highlighted that it has an important role in more established 
business challenges like collaboration, innovation and engagement (Andriole, 2010). Despite this, ESN 
adoption success is extremely rare in large corporations because of its relative novelty and ideology of 
openness (Gibbs, Rozaidi and Eisenberg, 2013). Moreover, iSource’s success is also an extreme case 
because they adopted a radically different top-down approach to ESN implementation that was most 
notably aimed at gradually phasing out email use. 
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I spent over 1 year at iSource, conducting in-depth interviews and observations of managers and line 
employees in all departments that were invested in enterprise social networking use. This inter-
departmental data collection allowed me to compare the ESN impressions and actions of different 
groups to understand how and why key stakeholders granted or withheld legitimacy for ESN use. I also 
supplemented my interview and observational data with document analysis of strategy documents, 
email lists, employee records, meeting minutes and other relevant communications. In this chapter, I 
will outline my case site and detail my data collection and analysis approach. 
4.1 Reflexivity in Interpretive Research 
“What we call our data are really our own constructions of other people’s constructions of what they and 
their compatriots are up to”  Geertz, 1977, p. 9) . 
As this quote suggests, it is critically important that researchers be reflexive of their role in the research 
process, particularly when using interpretive data collection and analysis methods. In this section I will 
review the empirical guidelines that I followed in conducting and applying interpretive case research 
in empirical settings, and how these guidelines influenced my empirical approach. In the tradition of 
theory and method going hand in hand, I pay careful attention to choose guidelines that have also been 
employed by exemplar institutional logics and rhetorical analysis studies (Suddaby and Greenwood, 
2005; C. Jones and Livne Tarandach, 2008; Treem et al., 2015; Hsu, Huang and Galliers, 2014).  
Similar to these studies my research is also concerned with how competing actors mobilise justificatory 
accounts like rhetoric and other symbolic mechanisms to negotiate the process of implementing new 
organisational objects like technology according to particular ‘logics of appropriateness’ or beliefs, 
ways of working and values. Using prescriptions from these studies and the work of (Walsham, 1995; 
2006) on  “doing interpretive research” in information systems, I will outline four guidelines in the next 
section that should be used to judge this work (Klein and Myers, 1999), and explain how I use them in 
my study.  
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First, concerning the object of study, interpretive sociology suggests that researchers should reflect 
upon how their philosophical beliefs influence their choice of the object to study (Pan and Tan, 2011; 
Meyer, 2001). Similar to Walsham (2006) I accept interpretive sociology’s epistemological position 
that (1) our knowledge of reality and human action is a social construction by human actors, but, in 
critical realist spirit (2) I strongly believe that there is an objective reality of structures that have the 
power to affect human action. For example in institutional analysis, as “speaking presupposes a 
language as well as material resources such as vocal chords”, social action (observable actions in 
empirical domain) possesses causal powers to reproduce and transform institutions, but is itself always 
embedded in and enabled by higher order institutions and institutional logics in the domain of the actual 
and real respectively (Leca and Naccache, 2006; Ekström, 1992). While actors do not always perceive 
constructs in the domain of the actual and real, researchers training and knowledge of related literature 
allows them to reveal and describe these higher order constructs in order to generate theory. For these 
reasons my journey of constructing a phenomenon to study took many years of iterating between 
empirical field data and pre-constructed explanations of my empirical observations in the literature.  
The latter part of this journey is illustrated in my introduction. First, I worked on a pre-constructed 
problem of “technology resistance”  arising from low cultural fit (Lapointe and Rivard, 2005) between 
ESN’s open, unstructured practices and traditional organisational values of efficiency and privacy. It 
was during my data collection, after being exposed to translation as an analytical lens and uncovering 
the conflicting interests and ideologies of practitioners within different functional departments that I 
started to focus on “intra-organisational diffusion”. With this my analytic focus was on the competing 
discourse and legitimating strategies influencing the spread of technology between departments, and 
the interrelationship between the sequence and type of rhetorical claims underpinning actors 
legitimating strategies and institutional logics underlying their conflicting ideologies. 
85!
For the second guideline, Eisenhardt (1989) notes that ‘[data] triangulation made possible by multiple 
data collection methods provides stronger substantiation of constructs and hypotheses’ (p. 538). In 
other words, she does not hold either qualitative and quantitative methods as “best practice” for data 
collection, but advocates using as many methods as possible that would allow for effective 
triangulation. Because my study concentrates on institutional views on technology diffusion and how 
actors’ competing logics are mobilized to diffuse ESN practices through discourse and rhetoric, I 
thought it necessary to privilege intensive qualitative methods over wide scale quantitative analysis.  I 
studied one organisation that was in the process of adopting enterprise social networking, using 
interview and documentary analysis data collection techniques to get a full understanding of the 
discursive strategies used, the rationale for employing these strategies, and actors’ views and 
interpretations with regards to ESN’s role in the organisation (Walsham, 2006, p.1995).  To get a better 
understanding of the organisation and the logics prevalent among functional organisational departments 
I supplemented my interview and documentary data with observations of team meetings and everyday 
working practices, and archival analysis of company web pages, popular press reports, industry analysis 
and financial statements.  
The third empirical guideline for interpretive case research is to follow the “the principle of suspicion”. 
Rich empirical fields are filled with symbolic stimuli that can cause researchers and social actors to 
express bias or misinterpret the social order for what it really is. In my research, I consciously and 
necessarily drew on the Klein and Myers (1999) principle of dialogic reasoning to practice suspicion. 
According to this principle, researchers should embrace the possibility of contradictory stories 
emerging from the data under the light of different theoretical preconstructions or lenses, and continue 
to refine their findings under different lenses through multiple stages of data collection and analysis. 
For example, the early data collection and analysis suggested that early ESN implementation was a 
failure until the implementation team took action to improve its low cultural fit and lack of pragmatic 
legitimacy. However, with further data collection and a shift towards the translation lens we looked at 
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all the ESN failures and subsequent successes as an interrelated process of diffusion marked by 
instances of limited diffusion rather than failure, and eventual success or wider diffusion. With the shift 
towards conceptualizing the phenomena as a process of diffusion I embraced the literature on 
technology diffusion as a social movement and a discursive accomplishment and did further analysis 
on the nature of the discourse around the ESN implementations. 
Finally, the fourth guideline regards generalizing from inductive research I try as far as possible to 
build a ‘transferrable’ model from the empirical case. (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) illustrates the concept 
of transferability in case research in the following excerpt: 
“How can one tell whether a working hypothesis developed in Context A might be applicable in Context 
B? We suggest that the answer to that question must be empirical: the degree of transferability is a direct 
function of the similarity between the two contexts, what we shall call “fittingness”. Fittingness is defined 
as the degree of congruence between the sending and receiving context. If Context A and Con- text B are 
sufficiently congruent, then working hypotheses from the sending originating context may be applicable 
in the receiving context” (p. 124). 
Using a preliminary study to build my model was also a good way of setting a base to later test the 
transferability of my methodology and findings (working hypotheses), and refining and extending these 
findings. A good model should combine the data in such a systematic way that it can be further tested 
through further data collection and can reveal invariants that describe the phenomenon beyond the 
particular case from which it was constructed. In line with this, my aim was to build a model from my 
case that would allow naturalistic generalizability, so that readers have- (1) an appropriate base of 
descriptive information to make judgments on whether my insights are applicable to other contexts, 
and (2) sufficient information to understand the findings (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Hellström, 2006). 
To develop such a systematic model, I followed the eight steps of (Pan and Tan, 2011) structured-
pragmatic situation approach to conducting case research, and the “retroductive” coding strategy that 
Walsham (1995) recommends to draw specific implications from empirical data.  
Both of these approaches are built on a systematic iterative approach to comparing empirical data. 
Broadly, after the research phenomena is identified, alternative explanations for the phenomena are 
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constructed through a forensic review of literature and empirical data, then the mechanisms driving the 
phenomena are identified and described. In describing these mechanisms, the researcher should be 
sensitive to the role of the conceptions and actions of human actors, and the location of empirical events 
within a particular space and time. I applied these four guidelines to the conduct of my empirical 
research at a financial firm and a consulting firm. In the next sections, I will briefly discuss the empirical 
site and how my selection criteria for this site, and follow this with more detail of my data collection 
and analysis. 
4.2 Research Setting 
Why the choice of case studies? 
The goal of my research was to understand how ESN practices unfolded within a complex and mature 
organisation, and how this unfolding process was affected by the interests and discursive actions of key 
stakeholders from different functional units. At the point of embarking on this research in 2012, many 
organisations were embarking on ESN projects in some way but adoption was much slower in mature 
organisations than it was in start-ups and SMEs. Notably, practitioner research noted that the bottom 
up and open nature of social media and its general lack of cultural fit, was a notable barrier to its 
adoption in mature organisations (Andriole, 2010; Kietzmann et al., 2011).  Academic research on the 
other hand was concerned with ESN’s impact on existing organisational practices after implementation 
(Leonardi, Huysman and Steinfield, 2013; Treem and Leonardi, 2012) rather than with the process of 
how organisations appropriated ESN over time (Aral, Dellarocas and Godes, 2013). These research 
sources therefore indicated that organisations were mostly concerned with understanding how ESN 
could be implemented to enable benefits in collaboration, innovation, and employee engagement.  
I supplemented these formal sources of knowledge with more hands on knowledge that I acquired from 
my participation in the regular meetings of a network of practitioners (DWF- Digital workplace forum) 
88!
discussing ESN adoption barriers and best practices, as well as a preliminary study of ESN adoption at 
one of the most established banking and financial institutions in the UK (Banksi). These hands on 
research experiences confirmed the literature’s findings, and also revealed that many senior managers 
and implementation teams were more concerned about how they could measure ESNs financial value 
to convince the most powerful stakeholder groups of ESNs value. Employees at these workshops and 
at Banksi particularly highlighted that the conflicting interests of different functional units was the most 
significant barrier to ESN adoption. Thus, central focus of my study shifted to understanding the 
dynamics of how the interests, and practices of stakeholders in different functional departments shape 
the trajectory of ESN within organisations. 
With this in mind, I needed to select a research site that successfully adopted and implemented ESN, 
where I could readily access data on the full adoption process. I was also very conscious that it would 
be difficult to find a site owing to (1) the novelty of ESN implementations in large corporations and (2) 
organisational reluctance to have me ask questions relating to organisational technology strategy and 
conduct observations of organisational practice (Walsham, 2006). So, even though my ideal choice 
would be a large company that was highly successful in adopting ESN, I was open to any company that 
was willing to grant me appropriate access.  
At the preliminary study site Banksi, I was granted a high level of access that was ideal for collecting 
rich empirical data. However, their ESN adoption approach was typical (bottom-up) and their level of 
use was relatively low. iSource provided the opportunity to explore a widely recognised and successful 
ESN initiative that was both atypical in approach (top-down) and had comparably high levels of use. 
Through my introductory encounters with representatives from iSource, I realised that they were both 
highly interesting and appropriate settings for studying the intra-organisational diffusion of ESN for 
the following reasons: 
89!
1.! Like Banksi, senior leaders at iSource showed a high level of interest and support for my 
research since cutting edge technology like ESN was crucial to their business. A perusal their 
recruiting brochures, financial and mainstream and practitioner media reports indicated that 
they derive their competitive advantage from the use of cutting edge technology to support their 
employees’ innovative practices. iSource’s CEO also regularly communicated to employees 
and mainstream media that enterprise social networking was an integral part of their business 
strategy. Therefore, department heads and team leaders they were open to my research despite 
having their own reservations about ESN’s benefits. For the most part, even those employees 
that were staunch resistors to ESN supported my research in hope that it would provide 
learnings and insights that would benefit their ESN initiatives.  
2.! Unlike Banksi, iSource would most likely provide the rich empirical data that I needed to 
effectively conceptualise this novel research phenomenon, since it was acknowledged as a 
world leader in the adoption of enterprise social networking and digital working. Additionally, 
the relatively top-down and structured nature of iSource’s ESN implementation also meant that 
employees would most likely have documentation and other resources to support their 
recollection of past adoption events. iSource’s journey was also undoubtedly unique to both the 
consulting industry and the world since unlike other companies their stated intention was to 
completely replace email with ESN. 
3.! The professional consulting environment is especially results and efficiency driven (Wright, 
Sturdy and Wylie, 2012), and is therefore an ideal setting to examine internal diffusion 
alignment processes. iSource was also highly pluralistic since it was formed of highly structured 
functional departments that developed conflicting objectives, interests and practices around 
ESN development, implementation and use. As highlighted in the previous chapters,  pluralism 
plays a central role in how highlight flexible technologies like ESN is justified, appropriated 
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and eventually diffused. iSource was particularly complex since it grew to become one of the 
largest technology consultancies in Europe over the last 10 years, through a growth strategy of 
mergers and acquisitions. This gave me ample opportunity to observe how the interests of 
different stakeholder groups affected ESN use and its spread between functional units. 
4.2.1 The Role of the Preliminary Banski Study 
Prior to my main study at iSource, I conducted a 7 month pilot study of ESN adoption at the B2B sales 
division (Banksi) of one of the UKs oldest and established banking and financial services institutions. 
Banksi was widely recognized as one of the largest payment providers in the world, with over 10, 000 
employees in 50 countries serving approximately 35 million customers worldwide. As its payment 
processing business grew to become more diversified, its operations also became marked by varying 
and often conflicting interests across supporting risk management, human resources and internal 
communications departments, and core service lines like consumer credit card lending, corporate 
charge and credit issuing, retail merchant payment processing. Additionally, each of these functional 
units had necessarily distinct sales strategy, product development and front- line sale departments 
(account development, telephony and mobiles).  
This organisational pluralism became especially evident and salient when a number of Banksi’s 
departments decided to initiate a number of different grass roots ESN projects from 2008 to 2012. 
During this period, different Banksi departments appropriated ESN to improve collaboration and job 
satisfaction following the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007, improve information management and 
sharing following unexpected and significant customer growth 2011, and support behavioural change 
and engagement after the inter-bank exchange rate (libor) fraud in 2012. I visited Banksi on average of 
3 times per week staying 5 hours per day from November 2012 to April 2013. During my 6 or so 
months at Banksi I divided my time between following 13 in-office account development and telephony 
staff from two company locations, mobile sales staff, sales effectiveness team meetings and weekly 
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office meetings. I spent an average of 5 hours per day observing in- office staff and shadowed mobile 
staff for an average of 3 days.  
During this time, I used ethnographic shadowing techniques to understand how mobile sales staff 
collaborated using ESN tools. I also conducted 41 scheduled interviews over 2 phases, during 
November 2012 to December 2013 and February 2013 to April 2013. My interview protocol was 
focused on understanding the teams (structure, practices, rituals, heritage), individual motivations for 
using ESN, how they used ESN, and significant events and engagement strategies. I supplemented 
observations and interviews with 39 company documents relating to the company history, business and 
technology strategy, work practices and policies, collaboration, and social media and ESN use. I coded 
this data in three relatively open and iterative stages according to the prescriptions of grounded theory 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; C. Oliver, 2011), and the modified content analysis employed in Berg’s 
(2001) study of how different notions of “success” and “failure” hampered the implementation of a 
hospital patient care information systems. Using this as a guide I looked for broader theorizations for 
driving change with ESN and the institutional vocabularies and non-linguistic actions surrounding 
distinct theorizations. 
My initial analysis indicated that Banksi’s adoption of ESN was significantly shaped by historical 
political, cultural, economic and technological institutional pressures that I coded as distinct market, 
community and professional logics. Along these lines, Banksi’s culture of distinctly different objectives 
and working practices significantly influenced the ESN motivation, objectives and adoption strategies 
of actors in different functional units. While this competition proved to be an impediment for much of 
their journey, I found that actors with competing market and community ESN interests were able to 
make collective sense of ESN when its features and ethos were focused on reinforcing the aims and 
means of professional logics. Further analysis into how this collective ESN design emerged revealed 
that institutional entrepreneurs were fostered collective meaning making and engagement by applying 
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pragmatic confirmation, selection, and advertising strategies. These results were presented in the 
institutional logics, IT adoption and technology strategy tracks of several conferences spanning 2013- 
2014, most notably at the International Conference on Information Systems 2013 in a paper titled 
“Legitimating User Participation in Mature Organisations: Exploring Social Media Adoption in a 
Financial Services Organisation” (see Ramotar and Baptista, (2013)).  
After critical discussion of these findings, I concluded that the institutional logics and legitimacy lens 
were epistemologically and ontologically compatible (and thus, methodologically), and were ideally 
suited for conceptualizing the technological and organisational interest and value gaps, and 
implementation strategies that emerge during IT adoption. Accordingly, the first phase of data 
collection at iSource was conducted with this conceptualization and positioning in mind. However, 
these discussions also revealed that my attempt to position these findings in the IT adoption and 
technology strategy literature was too broad. The idea of mobilizing legitimation strategies to address 
legitimacy gaps lead to me to consider the cultural fit and alignment literature. At this point my advisor 
also suggested that computerization movements literature would be a good way to conceptualize how 
competing actors attempted to legitimate ESN use in different ways. After testing the suitability of 
these bodies of literature with two extended abstract workshops I found that that my initial work could 
make the biggest contribution to the diffusion literature. My advisors and other professors showed a lot 
of interest in my idea to position IT legitimation as a novel concept of internal IT diffusion.  
Specifically, my review of this literature yielded a number of a number of gaps in terms of how new 
artefacts and practices can be proactively aligned with pre- existing organisational structures as they 
are translated into front- line practices (Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 2010; Reay et al., 2013; Nielsen, 
Mathiassen and Newell, 2014). Further exploration of this avenue revealed a wealth of methodological 
research into the rhetorical legitimation and rhetorical diffusion of new ideas and artefacts, which were 
well aligned to my initial conceptualization of institutional IT legitimation (Suddaby and Greenwood, 
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2005; Green, 2004; Harmon, Green and Goodnight, 2014). Accordingly, I collected and analyzed the 
rest of my data at iSource with this new rhetorical legitimation lens in mind. 
4.2.2 Access to iSource 
In the Spring of 2011, iSource’s CEO announced to the surprise of media and executives the world 
over, that they would completely replace all email communication with an enterprise social media 
solution in 3 years. They dubbed this ESN project as their no-email initiative. In the world of Enterprise 
Social Media iSource was considered to leading this digital revolution worldwide. This was evident 
from the time I started my initial desk research into internal social media adoption since the majority 
of the newspaper and practitioner articles I came across would extol the virtues of iSource’s ESN 
efforts. In fact, proponents of ESN at Banksi often referred to practitioner media reports of iSource’s 
ESN story as the “gold standard” for ESN implementation. 
I first established contact with iSource in the Spring of 2013 when I was lucky to attend a university 
alumni event where an alumni colleague put me in contact with one of the global executives of 
iSource’s ESN project, John. John signed off and arranged access for my study within a few weeks 
since he was quite excited about the prospect of supplementing the plethora of practitioner and media 
articles about the project with an academic perspective. I got a strong indication that iSource was ideally 
suited for my study after my first discussion with John, and one of the no-email initiative’s 
ambassadors. He reported that from 2000 to 2013 iSource had grown exponentially with the 
acquisitions of larger and smaller technology firms to become one of the largest IT services firms in 
Europe. Over this time, iSource’s strategic team (scientific community) developed an organisational 
goal of radically improving its current business areas by improving the quality and reliability of their 
products and services. They were also conscious of the fact that they needed to improve the connections 
among over 90, 000 employees in 52 countries, many of which were still working within the boundaries 
of their acquired firms. With this, the scientific community made the decision to adopt ESN to keep 
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employees engaged and motivated, to transform employee collaboration, and importantly, to develop 
ESN implementation as a new consulting offering. At the time of my initial entry into the field, iSource 
was in the last year of their 3 year deadline and was on track to achieve their objective. 
On my first visit to iSource’s UK HQ, I also observed that their working environment was in keeping 
with their recent award from the “Great Place to Work” survey and their goal of being the go to firm 
for cutting edge digital solutions, with vibrant open office spaces, cutting edge conferencing rooms and 
company branded iPads for employees. My visit also coincided with one of the weekly “no-email day” 
initiative. Employees (iSourcers) reported that “no- email day” was intended to be a day where 
iSourcers made a special effort to not send emails. As the day progressed however (and on return visits), 
I observed that no-email day had a number of objectives. Throughout the day, members of the no-email 
steering team organised meetings to conduct ESN training and update iSourcers on the no-email 
project’s overall success. Almost every formal and informal meeting space, such as the canteen and 
bathrooms were plastered with posters and videos highlighting specific ESN features, the latest email 
usage survey results and job specific use case videos. At this point I knew that looking into how 
iSource’s espoused strategic objectives were bound up with ESN usage and engagement strategies 
across acquired firms and departments would be a highly interesting empirical case of intra-
organisational technology diffusion.  
I also found that iSource’s approach to ESN adoption and the nature of their progress from 2011 to 
2014, was in keeping with my “extreme case” selection criteria and was ideal for extending my findings 
at Banksi. Unlike Banksi, the ESN project at iSource was viewed and implemented as a large scale 
change management programme. From its inception, the project was strategically directed by a steering 
team of scientific community members from key organisational groups, on which my project sponsor 
John, served as the head of change management. I immediately recognized that members of this 
scientific community and the supporting change hierarchy would be ideal informants to explain how 
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ESN spread between different organisational groups. The scientific community importantly conducted 
an academically supported investigation of how email was being used with the key takeaway being, 
that 80% of iSourcers thought that email use was causing them to ‘waste time not doing their real jobs’. 
The results of this survey were broadcasted across the world and within the company via whitepapers 
and screens in each office with rhetoric such as email is “digital pollution”, “encroaching on our 
personal lives”, and “we need to eradicate email pollution”.  
Despite this sharp rhetoric, John commented that the actual objective of no-email was not to totally 
eradicate email but was rather, to nudge iSourcers to collaborate “smarter” and more effectively by 
choosing the ESN communication or collaboration feature that was best for the task at hand. 
Additionally, John described their ESN promotion strategy as very consumer-oriented and compared 
it to advertising apple products. He described training material such as videos, manuals, and games 
targeted to specific job roles, and he talked about iSource’s decision to purchase a company with an 
existing ESN product rather than developing an ESN from scratch or purchasing an off the shelf 
solution. With this I could see a wealth of empirical connections to my conceptual model. Especially 
since organisational actors employed a high degree of clear and readily observable symbolic actions 
and rhetorical justifications to justify ESN infusion. 
From my initial discussions I also learned that from 2011 to 2013 ESN adoption level at iSource was 
surveyed at 20% and despite being successfully piloted with outsourcing consultants the early adopters 
were mostly members of iSource’s “scientific community” and support departments. On exploring this 
trend in more detail I came across a company survey that pointed to a strong correlation between high 
ESN engagement and the actions of team leaders to explain the overall value of ESN in terms that 
individual stakeholder groups understood. I immediately saw a connection to my pilot study where 
institutional entrepreneurs employed linguistic legitimation actions to infuse ESN into the front- line 
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practices of employees. I therefore decided that iSource would be an ideal case to further explore 
whether these findings were transferrable in a different context.  
Finally, although I was granted as much access as possible after signing a confidentiality agreement, I 
had limited opportunities for observation since many of the key informants were mobile or worked in 
different countries. However, I was able to refine my interview and observation protocol after the 
Banksi pilot study, and thus, use my access to conduct focused and in-depth interviews and 
observations. I also took advantage of this access by scheduling multiple rounds of follow-up 
interviews and collecting as much relevant documentation as possible. Particularly, after the pilot study 
I realized in-depth shadowing of employees was not necessary. Moreover, interviews and document 
analysis became the most appropriate sources of data after I shifted my empirical focus to the role of 
rhetoric in legitimating ESN. This approach was also the better option considering the timeline for 
completion of my thesis. I also benefited from playing an advisory role for a master’s student and 
iSource employee who was collecting data for his thesis on barriers to ESN adoption at iSource. Based 
on this student’s interview transcripts, open surveys and observational notes, I re-interviewed 
employees based on their candidness and relevance to my study. 
4.3 Data collection and Analysis 
Due to the dynamics of how and when I gained access to these organisations data collection and 
analysis were first conducted at the Banksi pilot site. So, some aspects of my data collection and 
analysis at iSource were refined based on my experiences at Banksi. Overall,  I followed the 
‘retroductive’ strategy that is recommended when conducting research with an interpretive 
epistemology but critical realist ontology (Walsham, 2006, Bhaskar, 1975). This strategy is also highly 
fitting for contemporary institutional studies like this one (Leca and Naccache, 2006).  From my review 
of the methods literature I found Pan & Tan’s (2011) structured-pragmatic-situational approach to be 
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highly fitting to this philosophy and area of research. In this vein data collection and analysis is 
conducted in an intertwined cycle of deductive high level theoretical conceptualisation, data collection, 
and inductive analysis. However, in this section I will discuss data collection, analysis and theory 
development separately for descriptive clarity. 
4.3.1 Data collection 
Observations 
Consistent with my theoretical framework’s focus on surface communications, the interpretive 
component of my data collection is comprised of interviews and document analysis. However, 
consistent with my critical realist ontology, it is important to go beyond actors’ discourses and observe 
their actions and practices to understand how events related to the research phenomenon unfold and are 
connected (Leca and Naccache, 2006). Observations are also crucial to the study of institutional logics 
since logics encapsulate ‘both symbolic systems of meaning and related material practices’ (Cloutier 
and Langley, 2013). Material practices may be instantiated in language and discourse but also in 
everyday work routines, hierarchical structure, policies, and other organisational objects like 
technology (Czarniawska, 2008). With these observations I hoped to gain an understanding of how this 
highly institutionalized environment functioned and how employees used ESN and other alternative 
tools to connect and communicate.   
I used ethnographically-informed techniques that required the penetration of iSource’s official lines 
and observation in iSourcers’ natural context (Van Maanen, 1979; Zilber, 2002). My observations were 
focused on actors’ everyday working practices, particularly relating to how employees and senior 
managers used ESN, and the role that they played in its assimilation. I observed actors everyday 
working practices, collaboration patterns, and ESN usage patterns. With the limited observation 
opportunities available I tried to observe the general working environment and the artefacts associated 
98!
with the job roles. Observing in this way provided valuable background information for asking more 
targeted questions when I conducted interviews. These limited observations were more than sufficient 
since most of the job roles I was interested in did not involve unusual practices such as those associated 
with Banksi’s mobile sales employees. 
With respect to my time in the field, I conducted data collection from February 2013 to August 2013, 
then again from February 2014 to August 2014. Most of this time was spent conducting formal 
interviews and document analysis, but whenever possible I asked to observe team’s during the “no-
email day” initiative. Using this strategy I was able to observe 7 teams within the UK from iSource’s 
scientific community, technology support, sales and various consulting branches. Where possible and 
with the permission of actors I also made digital recordings of informal discussions. Since many of the 
iSourcers that I was interested in observing were located overseas or often spent their time at customer 
sites, my observation periods were generally very short, lasting an average of 1.5 days for each team. 
In order to maximize the range of activities observed with the limited time available for observation I 
paid special attention to in-office employees that looked the busiest or those that seemed engaged in 
unfamiliar tasks.  
Observation opportunities during “no-email days” were especially very rich since employees were 
often engaged in face to face and teleconference team meetings, and training sessions. Team meetings 
were helpful for understanding team priorities, how they worked and collaborated together with staff 
within and outside of their functional departments and at customer sites. For example, there were 
frequent disruptions due to miscommunication with staff from other departments that could not be 
immediately resolved since they were communicated over the phone. Consultants would also 
frequently complain that it was difficult to find specific information on the ESN because there were 
many communities and that were not relevant to their work. Training sessions on the other hand were 
particularly useful since they were often very open, collective and candid discussions of employees 
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concerns with phasing out email use, barriers and advantages to using ESN and novel collaboration 
tools, and how and when to use ESN tools.  These visits were also very useful for collecting documents 
for documentary analysis. 
Documentary data collection  
My observations were closely supported by high levels of micro-level documentary analysis to identify 
historical institutional structures and specific strategies emerging around collaborative work practices 
and ESN use (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000). The documents that I collected at iSource particularly 
helped to illuminate the organization’s governing logics and work practices, ESN adoption motivation 
and objectives, adoption strategies, and further helped to validate my interview and observational 
accounts.  
The discourses that develop around an empirical phenomenon, whether developed by organisational 
actors or external actors reflect structures that interact with and have causal power to shape events 
during the social construction of empirical phenomena (Archer, 2002; Alvesson and Karreman, 2000). 
In this regard my approach to document collection is consistent with Alvesson and Karreman’s  (2000) 
view that researchers should “study talk versus using talk as an indicator”  and be sensitive to the 
framing power of text and context.  Texts help to construct empirical phenomena when actors 
intentionally use them to advance their own ideologies/logics or interests (Fairclough, 2005). The 
objective of document analysis at iSource was therefore to explore how texts are involved in the process 
of internal IT diffusion and the tensions between the two. My documentary analysis is therefore similar 
to studies looking at, 
'structure as a historical accomplishment in local settings rather than structure as an eternal property of 
formal organisation(Barley, 1986; 1990a) … the vocabulary of motives rather than motivation(Mills, 
1940), … talk as an administrative device rather than as a carrier of abstract principles of administration 
(Gronn, 1983) … symbols as agents of change and stability rather than as expressions of corporate culture 
(Gioia et al., 1994) ‘(Alvesson and Karreman, 2000, p. 153) 
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At iSource I collected and analyzed a fair amount of documents relating to company history, business 
and technology strategy, work practices and policies, collaboration, and social media and ESN use. I 
sourced many documents from sources external to the organisation such as practitioner publications, 
popular press accounts, and industry analyst reports. These provided rich historical context of the 
political, economic and technological institutional pressures that helped to shape these organisations as 
a whole and their business and technology strategies.  
A larger proportion of documents were sourced from within the organisation throughout my time in the 
field. These ranged from internal memos, meeting minutes, information packs, and newsletters to 
professional and user generated audio and video and blog posts at iSource. This also included 
photographs that I took of whiteboards, posters, flipcharts and signs. Together with iSource’s wealth 
of regular ESN adoption surveys and usage metrics, these documents were a very useful for 
understanding engagement patterns. Practitioner articles and case studies also proved to be an 
unexpected useful source of data owing to the large amount of firm-level interest in iSource’s ESN 
implementation. In particular, I collaborated and shared documents and interview informants with the 
lead researcher of two recently published Gartner studies that were on-going during my research period.  
Whenever possible I requested digital copies of documents and I was able to obtain digital copies of 
most of these documents to aid in faster and more comprehensive computer assisted data analysis. 
Collected documents were added to an Evernote database alongside my observation and interview data. 
For each document I recorded meta-data on where and when I collected it, document type and purpose. 
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the documents collected at iSource.  
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Table 4.1 Documents collected 
Document type Document content Number of 
documents 
Email, internal memos, 
newsletters 
work practices, governing logics, group interests and 
objectives, ESN adoption motivation, objectives and strategies 
20 
Meeting minutes work practices, governing logics, group interests and 
objectives, ESN adoption motivation, objectives and strategies 
5 
Corporate  
Information packs  
group interests and objectives, governing logics, ESN adoption 
motivation, group objectives and strategies 
10 
Photographs work practices, governing logics 3 
Audio and Video, Blog posts work practices, organisational objectives and strategies, ESN 
adoption motivation, objectives and strategies  
17 
Practitioner publications Company history, organisational objectives and interests, ESN 
adoption motivation, objectives and strategies, group objectives 
and strategies 
10 
Popular press Company history, organisational objectives and interests, ESN 
adoption motivation, objectives and strategies 
21 
Industry and organisational 
reports 
Company history, governing logics, organisational objectives 
and interests, ESN adoption motivation, objectives and 
strategies 
11 
Total  97 
 
In order to trace how actors were involved in the ESN diffusion process I also recorded where each of 
the internal organisational documents originated, when and how they were created and their 
organisational reach. While there was a relatively even distribution of documents originating from 
iSource’s technology support, sales and management consultancy departments, there was an expectedly 
larger number of scientific community documents. Evernote was enormously helpful for organising 
documents alongside the timeline of ESN adoption. Tagging these documents in this way enabled me 
to re-create and understand key events that I missed prior to and during the first 2 years of the no-email 
project. This organisation also helped to better supplement gaps in iSource’s ESN journey that emerged 
due to my limited observation opportunities, and time and financial constraints. However, my main 
source of data for mapping the ESN journey was semi- structured interviews of key iSourcers. 
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Interviews 
Apart from observations and document analysis, a substantial part of my time in the field was spent 
conducting semi- structured interviews in two phases. My first phase of interviews was conducted from 
February 2013 to August 2013, to understand the teams (structure, practices, rituals, heritage), actors’ 
motivations for using ESN and how they used ESN. I conducted a second phase of interviews from 
February 2014 to August 2014 to learn about actors interpretations of ESN barriers, significant events 
and assimilation strategies that I identified during observations and document analysis (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985). In this second round of interviews, I also conducted follow up interviews with most 
participants from the first round to learn about their respective teams’ ESN assimilation progress since 
the previous year. In the second round I also asked about specific events regarding the firms’ past 
experiences with ESN. These past accounts were important in shaping their current predispositions, 
and asking about specific events was a key tactic to overcome the limitations of retrospective accounts 
(Newman and Robey, 1992).  
 
Table 4.2 Number of Interviews by Interviewee Role 
Interviewee Role First Round interviews Second Round Interviews 
Scientific Community 5 6 (3) 
Technology Support 5 7 (3) 
Sales  8 4 (4) 
Management consultancy 10 5 (5) 
Subtotal 28 22 
Total 50 (3 informal) 
 
Although my interviews were generally open ended according to the flow of the conversation, I used 
an interview protocol that was based on insights from my pilot study and my observations and data 
collection as a guide. The majority of my interviews were conducted via the ESN’s integrated social 
video collaboration feature and lasted from 1 hour to 3 hours. Although conducting interviews using 
this tool were not as immersive as face to face interaction, I was able to get a good feel of some of the 
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ESNs functionality as some informants made use of the whiteboard, presentation, screen sharing 
features.   A total of 30 of the 50 audio or video recorded interviews were transcribed, and 3 informal 
interviews were recorded and not transcribed. Table 4.2 shows the number of interviews by department. 
The bracketed second round interviews indicate follow up interviews from the first round, which were 
not included in the total to give an accurate representation of unique interviews. 
I started by interviewing informants who could provide an overview of ESN adoption at the company 
in order to validate and modify my assumptions of the phenomenon at an early stage. Also, because of 
my position as an external researcher, these initial interviews were also very helpful for identifying 
who I could subsequently speak with to get information on specific aspects of the research 
phenomenon. Subsequent informants for the scheduled interviews were mostly middle and senior 
managers from key operational departments, particularly those that I identified as early and late 
adopters of ESN. Middle and senior management were targeted because our analysis of the literature 
suggested that this group was most likely to engage in entrepreneurial resistance or promotion activities 
in response to the introduction of new technology. This selection strategy was especially appropriate 
for iSource since the early to middle stages of no-email engagement was driven by a steering team of 
senior, middle and departmental managers who volunteered or were appointed to be responsible for 
increasing ESN engagement rates within their departments and throughout the company.  
Many managers were also survivors of the many acquisitions throughout iSource’s history and were 
thus highly aware of the shifts in the company culture and integration efforts. Some of these managers 
were also senior and junior members of a multidisciplinary scientific community that was instrumental 
in originating, devising and coordinating the no-email project and strategy. This team crucially put me 
in touch with especially vocal project managers and shop floor employees that they recruited onto the 
steering team as the project matured. These local steering team members were responsible for a lot of 
the hands- on training, support and communications to justify and motivate iSourcers to engage with 
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ESN, especially in the latter stages of the project (2013-2014). As I spoke with these local steering 
team members I was able to learn about their experiences and understandings of translating the 
scientific community’s higher level strategies and objectives to ground level employees in specific 
functional groups of business.  
4.3.2 Data Analysis and Concept Development 
Analytical Approach 
I systemized and ensured rigor in my analysis in 4 steps. First, I maintained a structured audit trail using 
endnote archival software to manage data and my emergent understandings, maintaining records of all 
interviews, documents, observations and even email exchanges. Second, I organised all data in the 
qualitative analysis software NVivo in order to efficiently index, search, theorize, code and re-code as 
patterns emerged in my data. Third, I followed as far as possible, the logic of systematic coding 
advanced by Pan and Tan’s (2011) structured- pragmatic- situational case study approach. I used my 
early observations, interviews and document analysis to validate and modify my literature- informed 
conceptualization of the research phenomenon. I then organised my data in a way that reflected this 
preliminary theorizing. 
From this base, I constructed the initial theoretical lens described in Chapter 3 to act as a sensitizing 
device to guide subsequent data collection and analysis (Klein and Myers, 1999). Because my field 
study of iSource was conducted after Banksi, I started my data collection and analysis at iSource using 
the same conceptual model as a sensitizing device but conducted further analysis separately. I then used 
process and rhetorical analysis methods respectively to iteratively and systematically re-organise, code, 
and examine the data for related propositions, contingent conditions and constructs to develop new 
conceptual categories (Langley, 1999; Pettigrew, 1990; Heracleous and Marshak, 2004; Suddaby and 
Greenwood, 2005). I continued this until I had ‘theoretical confidence’ that my model accurately 
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described the empirical reality of the research sites and substantively contributed to both theory and 
practice (Klein and Myers, 1999). Finally, I validated selected findings with research participants to 
ensure that my findings were as accurate a reflection as possible of actors lived experiences (Neuman, 
2006). 
Retroductive theorizing 
My analysis followed a process of retroductive  theorizing (Bhaskar 1975;  Archer et al., 2013; Leca 
and Naccache, 2006). In this process, researchers depart from a specific guiding theory that together 
with knowledge of the research phenomenon reflects their a priori knowledge of the phenomena. 
Driven by the guiding theory, data is organised, coded and re-coded as researchers clarify and question 
the basic conditions for the guiding theory or a priori assumptions (Danermark et al., 1997; Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967; Ragin, 1994). My analytic progression over the years was a process of reflectively 
engaging with a host of theories that could potentially explain or address the empirical dilemma and 
iteratively developing novel theoretical insights from the interplay of refining literature and the coding 
schema. 
Based on observations and discussions at practitioner conferences and the pilot site, the dilemma that 
initially grabbed my attention was both theoretical and empirical as I was interested in how ESN was 
appropriated differently across departments in large, mature organisations. Combining this with 
practitioner insights on ESN adoption as a base, I hypothesized that this phenomenon was influenced 
by the differences in working practices in these different departments. I therefore initially located my 
research within the adoption literature and used institutional logics as my guiding theory for empirical 
research. Since institutional logics is thought of as a meta- theory it is an ideal initial guiding theory 
since it is developed and insightful enough to be appropriate for the intra-organisational level of 
analysis and the empirical realities of the research settings, but broad enough to allow for theoretical 
shifts based on empirical insights (Seo and Creed, 2002; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2012).  
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I considered alternative theories, such as legitimacy, computerization movements and translation 
throughout my data collection and analysis; not with the intention of retrofitting data to theory, but in 
order to best explain my empirical observations (Yin, 2013). After several iterations between this and 
my pilot study’s data and theory I started to explore translation and rhetorical legitimation of ESN 
between departments, as a theoretical lens. This avenue refined my interest to conceptualizing the 
phenomenon of assimilation and appropriation of ESN as a process of internal-organisational diffusion. 
Since my data and this phenomenon are tied to an evolutionary process, specifically the spread of ESN 
technology and practices across organisational units over time, understanding the phenomena was 
attained through a focus on the process of new practice emergence and change and not just on the end 
results. For this reason, after my first stage of data collection I followed Langley, 1999 rationale that 
infers that researchers may gain a better understanding of a given problem by longitudinally organising 
observations of change. This helped to (1) provide a clear picture of the process of ESN assimilation 
alongside wider organisational objectives and changes, and (2) allowed me to structure my interviews 
chronologically with key ESN events at the research sites. At this stage it became apparent that different 
organisational groups did indeed have significantly different work practices, and possibly cultures that 
conditioned their motivation for using ESN tools. 
To probe this suspicion we analyzed the data from both cases using Nvivo in 4 iterative stages 
condensing, visualizing, clustering and comparing the empirical data with my conceptual framework 
(Easterby Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012; Pan and Tan, 2011). The first two stages were primarily 
aimed at isolating what Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) refer to as the “manifest content” or  ‘elements 
that are physically present’ in the data (Berg, 2009, p. 269) such as empirical features of the rhetorical 
legitimation lens outlined in Table 3.3. The last two stages were more focused on isolating the “latent 
content” or implied categories of meaning (Berg, 2009) (or Table 3.3’s implications) that underly the 
visible manifest themes. 
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To isolate “manifest content” I first went through each document, transcribed interview and field note 
and wrote ‘thick descriptions’ identifying the key points relating to actors everyday practice and values, 
areas where competing actors problematized ESN adoption and proposed solutions, and their 
impressions and justifications for ESN appropriation (Pettigrew, 1990). For each summary I also 
assigned a description that outlined actors and organisational groups general positions on ESN and their 
underlying rationale. In Nvivo this process produced 221 distinct data segments of at least three 
paragraphs.   Here I was more concerned with capturing the range and essence of arguments at key 
points in ESN assimilation rather than identifying specific categories. I discussed these summaries with 
my advisors and the colleague who I worked with in the field at Banksi to probe their accuracy with 
our field experiences of ESN appropriation, improve them, and consolidate them into one story that 
resonated with our understandings of the events and actions in the data. This enabled me to challenge 
my taken-for-granted assumptions and also confirmed my suspicions that the degree of ESN technology 
appropriation across organisational groups was very closely related to the constellation of 
organisational institutional logics.  
In the second stage I followed Langley’s (1999) strategy of visually mapping the data segments to 
construct a chronological timeline of decisions, activities and key events relating to ESN appropriation. 
In this timeline I also included key events around ESN appropriation by the retail banking and corporate 
HQ divisions of Banksi’s wider banking group since, other than the banking fraud, interviewees 
consistently mentioned that these events motivated their decision to adopt ESN. At this point the 
conceptual framework was also applied to this mapping to foreground the different competing 
discourses, justifications and positions around ESN appropriation. I observed that the ESN 
appropriation activities and decisions along this timeline were aimed at attending to 3 main challenges 
that I coded as on-going events 1) constructing an intra-organisational theorization for ESN; 2) 
persuading organisational actors to use ESN; and 3) appropriating ESN to allow collective meaning 
making amongst organisational actors. These observations are the basis for Figure 5.1 of ESN’s 
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diffusion timeline in chapter 5, where I highlight key events and the intra-organisation theorizations 
around ESN.  
The next step in the second stage was to analyze these events to identify distinct ESN justifications and 
appropriation activities. My goals in further analyzing these framing practices and their influence on 
internal ESN diffusion was to capture (1) the structural elements of rhetorical arguments, and prepare 
the data for further analysis of (2) the deep structures or institutional logics, and (3) the structure and 
type of rhetorical strategies that key stakeholders in different organisational groups drew on and 
deployed to direct ESN diffusion. I pursued the first goal by open coding the data segments to generate 
clusters of mundane practices and phrases, referential texts, and words. In both field studies, clusters 
of repetitive phrases and practices emerged and were coded according to the rhetorical argument 
elements highlighted in Table 3.3- data, claims and warrants. Institutional studies demonstrate that 
these readily observable clusters of discourse are the institutional vocabularies or structures of words, 
practices and meanings that are used to manipulate and articulate the standards of legitimacy (norms 
and values) of institutional logics (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). These 
vocabularies therefore reflect the backings or underlying institutional logics behind distinct rhetorical 
arguments.  
Accordingly, for the rest of this stage I focused on clustering latent content to understand the 
mechanisms underlying actors framing practices and other symbolic actions.  I outlined the content of 
rhetorical backings using the taxonomy of institutional elements in Table 3.2 as a guide to map 
emerging institutional vocabularies and practices to common principles, material manifestations, 
assumptions and identifying characteristics. In both cases three distinct institutional logics emerged, 
market, community and professional logics. I further validated this finding through discussions with 
Banksi’s executives during follow up meetings with the key project stakeholders. Vocabularies and 
practices reflecting market logics espoused the ideals of profit maximization as organising principles, 
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and increasing numbers and sizes of customer accounts, efficiency and control as behavioural norms. 
Community logics were typified ‘principally by relations of affect, loyalty, common values, and/or 
personal concern’ (Brint, 2001), mutual monitoring and social ostracism practices as behavioral norms, 
group membership and belief in reciprocity and trust as identifying features, and collaborative 
engagement as a material manifestation. The professional logics espoused increasing sales of product 
and services and enhancing employees’ reputation as organising principles, accountability to customers 
and professional associations as behavioral norms, standardized and high quality products and services 
as identifying characteristics, and professional accreditation and customer feedback as material 
manifestations.  
At this point some the majority of segments early in the timeline had occurrences backings, with 
marked and community logics, warrants, data and claims, while later segments generally exhibited 
backings with a professional logic, data and claims. I discussed with my supervisors whether this was 
an indication that different communities of actors exploited resources and mechanisms around these 
different institutional logics over time to shape their ESN justification and appropriation actions. While 
we all agreed that this was a likely scenario I was advised to probe the data to trace how and why, some 
structural elements were suppressed, and different logics proved to be more salient to ESN legitimation 
at different points in the internal diffusion process. Further probing revealed that changes in salient 
institutional logics corresponded to different types and sequences of rhetorical appeals and legitimacy. 
After researching the literature around these emerging concepts I coded the data segments according 
to the rhetorical form and sequence principles outlined in Table 3.2. Segments were first open coded 
according to types of rhetorical appeals, pathos, logos or ethos, specific instances of Suchman’s (1995) 
everyday strategies for gaining specific types of legitimacy, and branches of rhetoric, “audience”- 
context of the argument, “kairos”- time sensitivity, and “decorum”- fittingness of the argument to both 
audience and moment. In the next stage of cross-coding I initially used the rhetorical appeal codes to 
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extrapolate corresponding forms of legitimacy for each segment using the academically established 
mapping that indicates pathos and logos appeals help to gain pragmatic legitimacy and ethos appeals 
help to gain moral legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Scott, 2001).  
Cross-coding forms of rhetorical appeals with Suchman’s (1995) legitimation strategies (last row Table 
3.2) broadly verified this mapping with a list of appeal-legitimacy codes: pathos- pragmatic, logos- 
pragmatic, and ethos- moral strategies. Each of these lists comprised of material and symbolic actions 
such technological or work process customizations, and steering committee actors discursive 
justifications for changes.   Cross-coding appeal-legitimacy lists with branches of rhetoric helped to 
pinpoint the audience and chronological sequence of rhetorical-legitimation actions.  
As recommended by Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) I forced myself to code each argument into just 
one category based on which form of rhetoric was the most prominent. Regarding retrospective 
interview accounts, one very important form of filtering conducted at this stage involved making a clear 
distinction between quotes of “what the participant actually communicated at the time, and what was 
the intention behind their communication”, which I categorized as “non-recall” versus “what they now 
believed was the effect of that communication”, which I grouped as “recall”. This was an important 
distinction to make since one of the main aims of my research was to illustrate what rhetoric managers 
actually used at the time to justify ESN. Accordingly, “what they now believed was the effect of their 
communication” was  inconsistent with this aim, especially since this retrospective belief could have 
been coloured by any number of social factors and cognitive factors, the most likely being recall 
inaccuracies (recall bias) (Newman and Robey, 1992). Although I categorised a relatively similar 
number of pragmatic and moral (ethos) arguments as “recall”, I categorised a disproportional number 
of pragmatic (pathos and logos) arguments, including the majority of documentary evidence, as “non-
recall”. This had a significant effect on my resulting findings (chapter 6) and model (chapter 7), where 
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I concluded that, although some justifications may have had the effect of indirectly gaining moral 
legitimacy over time, the actual justifications employed at the time, appealed to pragmatic legitimacy.  
In my final stage of validation, I transposed these categories onto my chronological timeline of ESN 
appropriation events to better understand the general sequence of rhetorical legitimation actions. Again, 
using Table 3.3 as a guide I looked for changes in the form of rhetoric and legitimacy and movements 
between inter-field and intra-field rhetoric. I also sought independent reviews from my advisors and 
staff from both case companies. Selected findings around employee engagement and knowledge 
management that broadly conveyed the outcomes of my analysis were met with agreement from 
Banksi’s senior Internal communications and human resources staff.  Similar findings around ESN 
adoption strategies were also met with agreement from the head of iSource’s change management 
group. Moreover, practitioners that I engaged with through my involvement in the digital workplace 
group (DWG) network frequently expressed that they experienced similar ESN diffusion dynamics in 
their respective firms, particularly with respect to my finding that pragmatic justifications are often 
more convincing when trying to sell ESN to their colleagues. 
4.4 Limitations to the Approach 
So far, my discussion of my approach to ESN adoption at iSource has touched on a number of 
methodological tradeoffs, such as only interviewing members of the steering team. More generally, an 
important limitation of this study was its basis on a single site study, which arguably makes the study 
less generalizable. A breath of similar or different case sites would provide a more accurate picture of 
what contextual factors helped to shape the trajectory of ESN diffusion. I attempt to offset this 
limitation by providing a detailed descriptions of the case site (chapter 5), and explaining as far as 
possible in my analysis, the context in which communications are embedded (chapter 6). My 
description of the institutional logics that structure communicative practices at iSource is also intended 
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to enable readers to identify similar institutional logics in other organisations and fields, where my 
findings will most likely be applicable. It is my hope that readers use these institutional descriptions 
and thick descriptions to identify whether my findings could be applicable to their individual contexts.  
In addition, I interviewed mostly members of the change team in order to understand how internal 
diffusion could be shaped from the top-down, and so, there was less of a focus on how front- line 
employees responded to the change team’s communications. Such data could provide clarification on 
a number of change team members’ belief that their pragmatic strategies had moral effects on front- 
line employees over time. In the future, studies can build on the understanding of internal diffusion 
developed here by conducting a more extensive and detailed examination of rhetorical diffusion 
dynamics. 
!  
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Chapter 5 Findings 
 
In the previous chapters I outlined (1) a conceptual lens that illustrates my understanding of how the 
internal diffusion of technology is constituted of rhetorical, legitimation and institutional logics 
dimensions, and (2) a chronological approach for using this lens to analyze ESN framing (rhetorical-
legitimation) contestation between different communities of actors in empirical contexts. The 
description of my empirical analysis in chapter 4 also suggest that over time there were overlapping 
states of isolated ESN infusions (or limited diffusion) before ESN eventually became widely diffused 
throughout the organisation.  
In distinct infusions, different communities of iSource employees (iSourcers) appropriated ESN in 
ways that aligned with their own practices and objectives, and contrasted with the practices and 
objectives of other communities. Gradually, ESN diffused widely as these communities collectively 
agreed on practices and objectives with which to align ESN appropriations. My objective in this chapter 
is to chronologically illustrate how and why ESN was appropriated and infused in varying ways by 
different communities of iSource employees (iSourcers). I do this by describing the salient 
organisational groups and their practices and objectives, their motivations and justifications for ESN 
appropriation, and the form and function of each community’s ESN appropriation. 
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5.1 Groups and Values at iSource 
At the time of my study in early 2012 and 2013 iSource was recently acknowledged by the “Great 
place to work” survey as a top 5 employer of young professionals in several countries throughout 
Europe. The organisation had also recently merged with an equally large technology infrastructure 
company to cement its place as a global technology services giant, and the one of the biggest in Europe 
with close to 88,000 employees in 11 global business units (GBUs) (spanning over 40 countries), 
helping to generate 8 billion euros in annual revenue. For the most part, this position was not achieved 
through organic growth but rather through mergers intended to capture new customers and business, 
and build new competencies. As a result, iSource encapsulated complex hierarchies of highly 
institutionalized multi-disciplinary teams of individuals who gradually developed similar cultural 
characteristics around distinct geographical regions, departments and roles. In particular, iSource’s 
cultural landscape encapsulated three distinct “logics of action” that influenced how iSourcers judged 
and prioritized the suitability and importance of emerging ESM objectives and practices. 
Similar to a quilt that was stitched together from oddly shaped pieces of fabric, iSource grew through 
a rapid series of mergers to encapsulate a complex web of primarily three highly institutionalized 
communities of actors- business technologists, consultants, and senior management. In the early years 
(1990 - 2002) most iSourcers were technologists in IT solutions and outsourcing in the financial and 
manufacturing sector. At this time, employees valued building, implementing and maintaining high 
performing systems, then selling this as a service to local clients. In a relatively small local market, 
employees prioritized enhancing their technical skills by learning and sharing knowledge in their tight 
knit community.  
In 2002, iSource became the 2nd largest European provider of IT services when it acquired two large 
consultancies to keep up with clients increasing willingness to pay for integrated strategic consulting, 
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and traditional technical systems management and integration services. While consulting and technical 
employees initially worked closely together, their ties were increasingly strained as iSource continued 
merged with other companies though to 2006, and won contracts for a host of larger consulting projects 
throughout Europe and China. Valued competencies also shifted towards project management, selling 
IT services and nurturing profitable client relationships. Technical staff acquired from mergers were 
mostly grouped and located into in-house operational and support functions according to a wide range 
expertise like database management, outsourcing, systems development and management, and security, 
to name a few. They inevitably developed strong “communal” ties as they worked to balance concerns 
of enhancing and expanding their skills to develop and maintain systems whilst being pressured to work 
more efficiently to support consultants. For the consultants however, constantly moving between teams 
and projects strained their communal ties and reinforced “market” values of making customer 
engagements more profitable. 
By 2010, iSource’s place as a global player in IT services was cemented. With this, their focus shifted 
to enabling more organic growth in order to address the negative consequences of their long history of 
mergers. Senior management therefore established strategic objectives to nurture a company culture 
where employees were motivated, happy and engaged in order to retain and attract younger and more 
talented millennials. For them, fitting this square peg into the round traditional business objectives of 
delivering quality and secure services to improve its bottom line and expand all areas of its business to 
improve its top line, was an unusual dilemma.  
In 2008, a community of about 100 multi-disciplinary business area experts, and senior CIOs and CTOs 
were formally assembled as a “scientific community” to address this dilemma. The scientific 
community created a “future strategy” model in 2009 which highlighted that social networking could 
greatly benefit iSource and its employees as a potentially high profit business area, and a collaboration 
medium. Further research in line with this thinking lead the scientific community to conclude that 
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iSource’s traditional ways of working, particularly around email, were hindering productivity and 
employee engagement. Accordingly, the scientific community assumed the responsibility of steering 
the no-email initiative when it was formally announced in 2011. 
5.2 The ESN Project 
Throughout adoption, implementation and use of the cloud-based social collaboration platform, 
orangeESN, iSource went against the commonly observed industry ESN assimilation norms. According 
to practitioner press, the firm not only dedicated an estimated 500 times more financial and human 
resources to ESN than the average company, but also departed from the ESN implementation norm of 
mobilizing grass-roots adoption or aiming to “improve productivity”. Rather, iSource’s ESN project 
was steered in a top down manner and was focused on cultural transformation.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 iSource’s ESN Timeline 
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As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the steering team guided a process of internal diffusion where distinct 
communities of iSourcers adopted and engaged with ESN when justification strategies and material 
features were in alignment with the aims and means that they held as legitimate and salient at a 
particular time. This process was gradual, and enacted through a combination of the steering team 
constructing, mobilizing and reformulating new ESN features and justification strategies at various 
points, and the ability of competing communities of iSourcers to make collective sense of ESN’s role 
and usefulness.  
Following the CEOs announcement that iSource would completely phase out the use of email in 3 
years, senior managers in the scientific community and smart work committee favoured ESN 
appropriation ideas aimed at supporting “the fight to eradicate iSource’s email pollution”, and sought 
to position ESN as a way “to work smarter together” throughout their ESN journey. However, the 
traction gained with their early justification efforts was lost after they decided to adopt an 
underdeveloped ESN solution (orangeESN) over a world-class solution that was hugely successful as 
a pilot.  Nevertheless, the company’s merger with a large IT firm saw an influx of new business 
technologists who gravitated to appropriating orangeESN’s open and unstructured features as a way to 
“find and share expert knowledge with other technologists”.  
As orangeESN’s features became more developed and streamlined, performance incentives were 
instituted with the central focus of engaging reluctant iSourcers with orangeESN.  iSource consultants 
gravitated to these new developments and favored ideas for appropriating ESN to “get the right 
information at the right time”. Although these developments successfully raised engagement levels, 
infrastructure and privacy issues towards the end of the 3 year deadline caused a drastic decline in ESN 
use across the organisation, and this situation continued even after these issues were addressed.  
The steering team’s investigation attributed this stagnation to a loss of trust in the system and more 
importantly, that some to the observation that extrinsically motivated communities of iSourcers were 
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only extrinsically motivated to use ESN to meet ESN use meet management KPIs, while those pockets 
of more intrinsically motivated users preferred to share in isolation from iSourcers that didn’t share 
their values or aims. This provided the impetus for the steering team to come up with more innovative 
ways of encouraging business technologists, consultants and senior leaders to reach a common 
understanding of how to appropriate ESN in ways that help them “to work smarter together”. By mid 
2014, these initiatives were reported as successful at generating tremendous amounts of intrinsic 
motivation for using ESN across the organisation, with a 65% reduction in email traffic and close to 
90, 000 iSourcers actively participating in orangeESN online communities.  
5.2.1 The “No-Email” Decision 
iSource’s decision to adopt ESN was formally announced in 2011 when their CEO announced that 
“email was on its way out” and iSource would be a no-email company in three years. He justified this 
action as an important step towards tacking the information overload problem that was actively 
hampering collaboration and idea generation at iSource. At the time, iSourcers’ activities and 
behaviours were highly contingent on their indifferent belief that emailing was inherently efficient, 
without much thought to how it not only hindered job satisfaction but also hampered efficiency and 
productivity by adding additional steps to existing task workflows (see Appendix A). Following the 
CEOs announcement that iSource would completely phase out the use of email in 3 years with the “no-
email” programme, many iSourcers expressed the opinion that alternative technologies like ESN would 
promote more micro- management, information overload, and time wasting.  Senior managers in the 
scientific community and smart work committee recognized that they would need sustained and 
persuasive justifications in order to encourage iSourcers to join “the fight to eradicate iSource’s email 
pollution”. 
The head of the global change team would often reference Heath and Heath’s (2010) behavioural 
change metaphor of “speaking to the elephant and the rider” to describe the “no-email” strategy as 
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‘winning hearts and minds’. This strategy relied on making informal and formal verbal and written 
appeals to create and drive cultural transformation around ESN. An important part of this strategy was 
to mobilize early communications to create a sense of urgency for change around the negative 
consequences of email misuse. For this, the team invited academic and practitioner researchers to help 
them conduct an analysis into corporate email use in general and specifically by iSourcers, and later 
experimented with the yammer social platform to co-create three whitepapers from the research results. 
The whitepapers outlined in Appendix A were the first piece of widely publicized “no-email” texts and 
were central to initially motivating iSourcers to join the fight to eradicate emailing pollution”.  
The first whitepaper outlined the nature of email technology and email misuse, providing statistics on 
how email was affecting work practices and job satisfaction at a field level and at iSource. One survey 
of approximately 2000 iSourcers showed that on average, iSourcers spent between 5 to 20 hours dealing 
with about 1000 emails every week, of which approximately 180 emails were spam. Approximately 
82% of participants also reported that they experienced difficulty keeping up with daily email, and 
spent more than a quarter of their day managing email. According to the change manager this survey 
and others showed that ‘overall employees were unhappy about wasting this time’. The second 
whitepaper positioned alternative practices and technologies such as ESN as suitable solutions to 
support iSource’s cultural shift to more organic and collaborative practices, and away from the 
cumbersome and closed collaborative practices that are reinforced through email.  
The final whitepaper surmised that a structured change management programme would be critical to 
achieving “second- order change” or shifting employee mindsets from iSource’s deeply ingrained 
email-driven practices. The whitepaper also importantly positioned “no-email” as a key strategic 
business objective under iSource’s  “healthy and smart work” programme. This programme was which 
was focused on enhancing service delivery, and organically expanding its business by winning new 
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contracts and growing existing contracts. This strategic positioning was the basis for iSource’s 
significant financial and human resources investment into the programme.  
5.2.3 The “No-Email” Steering Team 
One of the first and most important of these investments was the formation of a global steering team 
for no-email. The no-email steering team was comprised of CTOs, CIOs and other senior managers 
that were members of the scientific community (SC). Figure 4.2 provides an illustration of  the steering 
team’s roles and their broad responsibilities. The smart work committee and scientific community 
believed that this steering team was the best way to ensure that no-email justification strategies 
remained focused on people, processes and technology throughout its internal diffusion. Departing 
from this goal and the “elephant and rider” metaphor, the scientific community’s stance was that the 
steering committee should drive adoption on two levels, emotions and rationale.  
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Figure 5.2 iSource’s ESN Steering Network 
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Accordingly, as the programme evolved, the steering team extended deeper into front-line functions, 
and its role became more defined in order to construct and execute justification strategies more 
effectively. Specifically, the global change team, ambassador network, and champion network were 
focused on winning iSourcers minds by appealing to their rationale through the creation, dissemination 
and refinement of information that iSourcers needed to enact new ESN-driven practices. Community 
support professionals and community managers on the other hand were primarily focused on winning 
hearts by appealing to iSourcers’ emotions with hands-on training and practical use cases and examples 
of how they could use ESN to work smarter. 
5.2.4 ESN evolution 
Following the “no email” announcement, some senior managers in the scientific community and smart 
work committee expressed concern that the 3-year plan was unrealistic and ESN did not have a place 
in the business. They constantly grappled with their own reservations, and those of key communities 
of iSourcers when they encouraged iSourcers to usefully engage with ESN. Consequently, the ESN 
steering team often employed communications around distinctly different ESN ontologies in order to 
coordinate, standardize and encourage ESN engagement across other senior management, business 
technologists, and consultants. Table 5.1 illustrates key features of the different ESN ontologies that 
were communicated by the steering team and appropriated by different communities of actors over 
time. 
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Table 5.1 ESN Ontologies 
Level of 
strategy 
Design 
element 
Business Technologists Consultants Scientific community 
Organisation Project 
approach 
Bottom up inclined: Grass 
roots, loosely-structured 
initiative where ESN 
naturally spreads across 
groups 
Top down inclined: 
Measurable purpose, 
objectives, strategy 
Middle management driven: 
Project managers, team 
managers, communications 
managers e.g. Personal 
assistants chosen as project 
champions and power users 
Release 
approach 
Viral rollout Phased roadmap Demand driven 
Vision Community vision and 
objectives- mutual trust, 
support, intense knowledge 
sharing 
Commercial vision and 
objectives- profit 
maximization, productivity, 
efficient access to 
information 
Professional vision- 
responsibility for providing 
high quality service to 
customers 
People/ 
Participation 
Content Unstructured, un-moderated 
communities and content 
seeding 
Moderated content and 
communities to prevent 
information overload 
On-demand content- Focus 
on content needed for job. 
Moving content needed for 
job from traditional 
locations, such as legacy 
systems, shared drives, 
email and external sources  
to the ESN. Client focused 
communities. 
Incentives  Incentive is usage. No 
formal or informal 
recognition 
Incentivized usage Incentive is usage, 
Recognition through 
gamification and V.I.P 
access. 
Reputation Open and Collective: 
Reputation is judged on 
number of posts, followers, 
or likes  
Objective: Reputation is 
judged on commercial value 
of contributions, and 
rewarded financially 
Selective peer review: 
Reputation is judged on 
usefulness of contributions 
People Middle managers as no-
email champions 
Senior managers as no-
email champions 
All shop floor employees 
can become champions  
Promotion Informal  training and 
advertising to appropriate 
ESN to ”openly share 
expertise and knowledge” 
Formal training and 
advertising to appropriate 
ESN to ”find the right 
information at the right 
time” 
Formal and informal 
WIIFM advertising to 
appropriate ESN to ”work 
smarter” 
 
Presence Synchronous interaction, 
limited asynchronous tools. 
E.g. Instant messenger, 
video calls 
Asynchronous interaction 
only e.g. blogs, wikis, 
discussion forums 
Employees should be able to 
access all applications 
needed to work in a variety 
of contexts. Synchronous 
and asynchronous 
interactions e.g. expertise 
location, ideation, and 
connections to other 
enterprise systems 
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Sharing Exchange: Information 
push- Provide users with as 
much information as 
possible to do their jobs e.g. 
departmental pages, 
watercooler space, 
unstructured content 
Accountability: Every voice 
counts, minimal moderation 
Exchange: Information pull: 
Users should be able to 
efficiently locate needed 
information and knowledge 
e.g. Focus on filtered search 
and information architecture 
Accountability: All content 
is strictly moderated 
Exchange: Important 
corporate news is 
mandatory, but users can 
subscribe for everything 
else e.g. RSS, social 
tagging, Gmail-style smart 
lists 
Accountability: peer 
moderation 
Training Peer to peer training Middle managers conduct 
majority of training 
Middle managers conduct 
majority of training 
 
Scientific Community Infusion (“H1”) 
Despite some early reluctance, senior managers on the global change team were among the earliest 
adopters of ESN since the scientific community’s research identified social technology as a major 
source of future strategic advantage and revenue. For many senior managers, early adoption was an 
opportunity to further explore their reservations and shape the trajectory of a technology that seemed 
to be inevitable.  In this regard, the change team purposely used web 2.0 mashups to draft the key no-
email whitepapers and a document of 50 ESN requirements. They also worked with the smart work 
committee on initiatives aimed at understanding email usage patterns (e.g. surveys, interviews, external 
research), creating a sense of urgency around no-email transformation (e.g. smart-inbox, whitepaper), 
and experimenting with solutions to support no-email transformation (e.g. orangeESN, jiveESN). With 
the exception of the smart inbox initiative that appealed to iSourcers’ emotions, the scientific 
community viewed these early initiatives as primarily rational justifications aimed at motivating 
iSourcers to “join the fight against iSource’s email pollution”.  
The scientific community were also instrumental in overseeing the pilot of jiveESN for 3 months with 
around 2000 iSourcers. This pilot helped the team to create an 80 page ESN operating manual, and 
importantly yielded a number of success stories among business technologists. These success stories 
helped the team to understand how to generate value for iSourcers using ESN, or as one member 
explained it helped them to understand ‘when does it work, why does it work, why does it work here 
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and not there’ (Head of Knowledge Management). Change team members reported that the customer-
facing successes from the H1 pilots were particularly powerful emotional justifications for showing 
other iSourcers how they could use ESN to work in better ways than with email.  
Although the jiveESN pilots were largely successful, the change team made the crucial decision to 
adopt orangeESN as iSource’s ESN solution in the third quarter of 2011. For iSourcers, this was an 
especially strange decision since orangeESN had only met 27 of the 50 ESN requirements outlined in 
the second whitepaper, while jiveESN met all the requirements. At the same time, ‘[orangeESN] had 
basic social media features that were more suited to open and unstructured practices and viral 
engagement’ (Global Sales Director, Change manager), which was not well suited to large firms (as 
highlighted in third whitepaper), or iSource’s plan to fully assimilate and market ESN in 3 years. For 
instance, many iSourcers complained about information overload as a result of not being able to filter 
posts in the “watercooler” space, and not being aware of duplicate communities until it was too late 
(see Table 5.1, Column 3 for early features). ‘After the launch, it was more a content push… but we 
learned a lot about early adopters and content generators, and what we had to do to engage late 
adopters’ ([orangeESM] CEO). Further, selecting and eventually purchasing orangeESN’s parent 
company was not just a means of transforming iSource’s internal culture and practices but also gave 
them ‘the opportunity to control the future development of the product and gain a competitive 
advantage over other consultancies in the social technology market’ (Head of Change Management). 
The team therefore decided that the best way forward was to recruit employees to extend the reach of 
the steering team in order to exert more control over the project. 
The first extensions were no-email global business unit (GBU) managers and ambassadors. Based on 
the global change team’s overall strategic guidelines, GBU managers were appointed to be single points 
of contact for the no-email programme within the cluster of countries that made up a GBU. Each GBU 
manager was also tasked with recruiting a network of no-email ambassadors. Ambassadors were not 
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expected to be ambassadors for the company or the change team, but rather, they were ambassadors for 
the the no-email programme, and the related ESN tools and practices. In this role they were tasked with 
dedicating a minimum of 1-2 hour per week to training and supporting 500 to 1000 shop floor iSourcers, 
and providing feedback up the chain on the outcomes of no- email justification actions. This team 
formed the strategic core of the steering team. 
Business Technologists Infusion (“H2”) 
On the heels of a recent merger with a large IT company in 2011, iSource was engaged in a number of 
organisation wide initiatives to integrate the disproportionate influx of new business technologists into 
iSource’s community.  With this, the SC team surveyed that most of their early users were business 
technologists who were drawn to orangeESN’s online communities. The H1 pilots also showed that 
“watercooler spaces” or ESN communities were natural sites for collaboration and the primary sources 
of value creation in orangeESN. The team were confident that orangeESN communities could usefully 
support the organisational integration efforts that were underway at the time. As a result, much of the 
SC team’s early justification actions were focused on motivating the use of orangeESN communities 
among the growing population of business technologists.  
However, some business technologists were concerned that ESN’s open sharing ethos would 
undermine the communal ties, trust and satisfaction among employees by creating more opportunity 
for micro-management. Despite this resistance, the majority of technologists were advocates of ESN 
features and practices that were un-moderated, un-incentivised and grounded in the communal trust 
among employees. The steering team therefore aligned their early actions and communications to 
practices that were in line with technologists’ communal values such as, un-moderated ESN 
communities, synchronous and push sharing with instant messaging and unstructured content, content 
seeding, peer-to-peer training and promotion, and little focus on incentivised use (see Table 5.1 Column 
3).  
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In line with this focus on communal values, the change team also created the community support 
professional (CSP) role to support ESN community engagement in each GBU. The call for CSP 
volunteers was targeted to senior members of staff who were not members of the scientific community, 
and were dedicated experts and consultants in social media, ESN tools and collaborative practices. 
These CSPs were specifically responsible for designing GBU- specific strategies to ignite and nurture 
collaboration in ESN driven online communities. As a group of disruptive thinkers, CSPs were 
instrumental in testing orangeESN functionality in order to establish collaboration patterns that would 
benefit teams working in communities on a specific business activity.  
They also moderated and manually created orangeESN communities based on employee requests, 
collected success orangeESN success stories in an online wiki of “lighthouse communities”, and invited 
other CSPs from around the world to an online CSP community (CSP network) to share knowledge 
and experiences and co-create training material. CSP network discussions and experiments led to a 
decision use a departmental engagement approach to drive participating on orangeESN’s online 
communities. Teams and departments were thought to be the “low hanging fruit”. CSPs therefore 
encouraged team leaders and managers to create communities for their departments and teams, invite 
their team members and key contacts, and shift all their communications to these communities. 
Soon, the CSF online community grew to be a widely distributed and well connected community of 
mostly iSource business technologists. At the same time, internal surveys showed that iSourcers from 
the largest and most important technical teams, database and security, were increasingly creating intra-
departmental and team communities to “openly share expertise and knowledge with colleagues” (e.g. 
SAP expert community). With these successes, Gartner reported that the new orangeESN update that 
was rolled out at the end of 2012 (now compliant with all 50 technical requirements) was now ranked 
as one of the industry’s top collaboration tools. New features included email-like smart-lists, dashboard 
and tabs to help organise content and de-clutter orangeESN’s newsfeed. OrangeESN’s community 
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workflows and policies were also streamlined to enable automated (bottom-up) but managed 
community creation and management.  
Consultants Infusion (“H3”) 
These successes were short-lived.  A mid 2012 survey of orangeESN community engagement revealed 
that of the 2800 formed communities, only 800 were active. Usage levels from the consulting group 
had dropped significantly and active communities were dominated by iSourcers from the steering 
committee and technical support teams. Many consultants believed that ESN had no place in the 
business, and would likely fuel inefficiencies like information overload and time wasting that is 
experienced with public social media platforms like Facebook. However, the ESN advocates in the 
consultant community were less concerned with ESN as a whole, and specifically concerned with how 
ESN was configured and used by business technologists. Instead, they advocated for features and 
practices to be tightly moderated, financially and socially incentivized, and grounded in commercial 
and productivity objectives. In response, the steering team re-fined their actions and communications 
to efficiency seeking practices like tightly moderated ESN communities, financial incentives for 
participation, asynchronous and pull- sharing with micro- blogs and structured search capability, and 
formal training and promotion (see Table 5.1 Column 4). 
In line with this efficiency seeking focus, the change team decided to increase the local leadership 
around the new orangeESN features. They on-boarded no-email champions and community managers 
in order to construct and mobilize more targeted justification actions to motivate late- adopting and 
skeptical iSourcers, such as consultants, who were too busy to invest time to learn and experiment with 
orangeESN or were skeptical of its benefits. The no-email champions were recruited for individual 
GBU countries, with the aim of having at least 1 champion for every 15 employees in a specific business 
unit. The call for no-email champions volunteers specified that they needed to be iSourcers in middle 
management positions and/or members of iSource’s “young leaders” community, who were willing to 
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volunteer their time to have a little more training on ESN features and practices. No- email champions 
trained other project leaders and departmental managers on how they could use specific ESN features 
to work more effectively, and encourage project managers to participate in communities with increased 
communications such as phone call campaigns.  
Unlike CSPs who relied on iSourcers intrinsic motivation, champions advocated for tangible incentives 
and bonuses to motivate project leaders to get training and set up communities. Team leaders who did 
not attend orangeESN training sessions would not receive their full yearly bonus, and iSourcers in 
project communities would receive an additional team incentive for reducing their internal email traffic 
by 10% every quarter. They challenged to suitability of CSPs departmental approach to orangeESN 
community engagement and instead advocated for the prioritization of a client- based approach where 
iSourcers were encouraged to create communities around client accounts rather than just departments 
and teams. An important outcome of the client-based advocacy was to appoint dedicated community 
managers within each country. Community managers were tasked with the day to day management and 
support of all online communities within their country. In this role they decided on whether to approve 
or decline applications for new niche (not project or department based) or duplicate communities by 
reviewing information like the community’s originality and purpose. 
By September 2012, the extended steering team had managed to certify over 100 business processes as 
email free, onboard over 50, 000 iSourcers into the orangeESN platform, and lower the number of 
emails per inbox by 30% as compared to levels surveyed at the start of the no-email campaign. 
Crucially, 35% of these figures were generated by iSource consultants using ESN to “find the right 
information at the right time”. 
Wider Diffusion 
However, during late 2013 to early 2014, the ‘gift’ of growing community activity was ‘cursed’ by 
scalability issues. Although the steering team on-boarded over 50, 000 active users by 2013, they soon 
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realized that their actions only encouraged extrinsically motivated ESN engagement and superficial 
behavioural change. This was especially evident when there was a prolonged drop in engagement after 
the combination of user growth and the ESN platform’s cloud architecture lead to increasing concerns 
about performance and privacy.  
OrangeESN’s cloud architecture could not cope with increasing user numbers, and this lead to slow 
page loading times, broken links and accessibility issues. iSourcers also increasingly used these issues 
as an opportunity to express their concerns about the cloud architecture’s privacy and security. 
Research by the steering team attributed user inactivity to superficial changes in iSourcers’ behaviours 
and practices rather than technical issues. For example, extrinsically motivated sales consultants from 
different service and product lines were being selectively transparent in order to have a competitive 
advantage over competing sales teams by contributing just enough to get their team incentive. At the 
same time business technologists that were more intrinsically motivated were using ESN to primarily 
collaborate with other business technologists in their private departmental ESN spaces rather than in 
more open competency based communities. After assessing the failures and consolidating the successes 
that they had with the technologist and consultant communities, the steering team decided to focus less 
on the immediate needs of the individual communities of actors, and instead look for configuration and 
promotion compromises. The resulting communications promoted features and practices that were 
grounded in enhancing service quality such as, client- focused communities, on-demand content and 
sharing with tagging and Gmail- style smart-lists, peer moderation, and financial and social incentives 
with gamification and access to V.I.P spaces (see Table 5.1 Column 5).  
In line with this customer- focus, the change team created new incentive systems, redefined community 
features and policies, and encouraged more local ownership, in order to increase the value and reach of 
their communications. The result was a four pronged metric based approach. They sanctioned leaders 
that continually engaged in unwanted collaborative behavior, and awarded managers and leaders 
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bonuses and incentives based on a broader range of activity focused KPIs (daily, monthly, quarterly 
iSourcer posts/views, responses, visit trends, original posts, comments on others posts) rather than the 
narrow objectives of reducing email usage and attending ESN training sessions. They also refined the 
scope of orangeESN community purpose statements to cover three areas, (1) the purpose for iSource 
as a whole (2) the purpose for members of the community (3) the purpose or benefits for individual 
members. The team also used digital and physical gamification methods to onboard “orange heroes” 
and “tribe leaders” in order to encourage local ownership across all communities of iSourcers. Top 
community leaders and community contributors could become “tribe leaders” and “orange heroes” 
based on a combination of achieving certain KPIs and user endorsements.  
Tribe leaders and orange heroes also coordinated and ran global best practice webinars and practical 
training, such as the “What’s in it for me” workshop (WIIFM), where iSourcers from different 
departments discussed how to collaborate in a way that was open and multi-disciplinary, and still aimed 
at a specific purpose. Workshops participants were encouraged to create YouTube video diaries and 
testimonials of their no-email journey’s and how they used orangeESN to work smarter. These videos 
were added to the orangeESN “training vault” and were instrumental in helping front-line employees 
to train each other. 
OrangeESN adoption levels in mid 2014 had surpassed previous highs recorded in 2013. Organisation-
wide mail traffic fell by 65%, with over 210 business processes certified as email free. Approximately 
100,000 technical, consulting and scientific community iSourcers were now working together in over 
10, 500 primarily competency-based and customer- integrated communities, aimed at helping iSourcers 
to “work smarter together”. 
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5.3 Summary of Case 
With this success, no-email was often praised in the business world as one of the most successful ESN 
initiatives to date, and was thus the subject of a number of practitioner best practice studies. The 
majority of these studies highlighted that iSource was able to successfully change their corporate 
culture using ESN because of three key actions: creating a sense of urgency, committing substantial 
financial and human resources, collecting success stories. A commonly mentioned theme connecting 
these factors in these studies was, having clear and compelling communication and justifications. In 
particular, a Gartner study (Appendix A4) that was also ongoing at the the time of my research 
explained that iSource’s no-email success was due to the following: 
Changing corporate collaborative culture requires special attention to justifications to highlight sense of 
urgency issues, demonstrate commitment and spread success stories, - ‘By gaining management 
engagement, senior leaders are delegating employee level justification to individual managers who 
interact more frequently at team or one-on-one levels. Managers are expected to translate the general 
aspects of a broad culture change effort into specifics that will resonate with individual employees. 
Managers are often not prepared to meet this expectation and will need assistance.  
Similarly, the head change manager explained the no-email engagement strategy as follows: 
‘Most of our time and effort was dedicated to providing guidance and leadership, and nudging our 
colleagues to experiment and use orangeESN, than on planning, prescribing and executing our ideas for 
what orangeESN should look like and how it should be used’ 
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Importantly, the Gartner study also suggests that iSource’s various professional, market and community 
objectives played a substantial role in their no-email journey and the appropriation of orangeESN: 
‘First, because [iSource] is a professional services organisation, employee productivity is the foundation 
of business performance. And the business is highly collaborative by nature. The CEO and chairman, is 
relentless with the no-email campaign and believes driving higher productivity and advancing the 
capabilities of the company's workforce through social collaboration are absolutely critical to its future 
success.  
Second, it intends to offer a set of professional services for helping clients become highly collaborative 
organisations. So it believes success with its Zero email campaign will give it a competitive advantage in 
sales and delivery, because the company has done it.  
Third, it purchased the enterprise social networking/collaboration platform to use internally and offer 
externally as a product. [iSource] believes that using [orangeESN] for its internal no- email campaign 
effort will forge the product under an intense fire and provide it with a differentiated story against 
competing platforms.’(Gartner, 2014) 
Accordingly, in the next section I intent to shed light on how iSource’s conflicting cultural demands 
and change managers’ “heart and mind” justifications gradually shaped and shifted isolated ESN 
infusions to widespread diffusion and ESN success. 
! !
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6 Analysis: from Infusion to Diffusion 
 
In this section I will illustrate in detail how ESN was popularized and standardized through focused 
communicative actions at iSource. I draw on the rhetorical legitimation approach outlined in chapter 3 
to illuminate internal diffusion as a dynamic process of mutual interplay between institutional logics 
and rhetorical legitimation. I use the case of ESN evolution outlined in the previous chapter to illustrate 
in detail how the spread of ESN within iSource is process of internal diffusion, shaped by historically 
constructed organisational complexity on one hand and mutually reinforcing rhetorical justifications 
on the other. The combined actions of these dimensions gradually shaped and unfolded four main ESN 
infusions that culminated in widespread diffusion. 
Firstly, in the aftermath of the CEOs announcement that iSource would completely phase out the use 
of email in 3 years, senior managers in the scientific community and smart work committee favoured 
“professional” justifications aimed at encouraging iSourcers to “work smarter by eradicating email 
misuse”. Next, following the introduction and purchase of an ESN solution (orangeESN), community 
support professionals (CSPs) favored “community” justifications aimed at pragmatically legitimating 
the appropriation of ESN to help iSource business technologists “openly share expertise and 
knowledge”. Thirdly, following the institution of performance incentives and new features aimed at 
engaging reluctant consultants and late adopters, no-email champions favoured “market” justifications 
aimed at pragmatically legitimating the appropriation of ESN by consultants to “find the right 
information at the right time”.  
Finally, infrastructure and privacy issues with orangeESN caused a drastic decline in ESN throughout 
the organisation, just a few months before the 3 year deadline. This provided the impetus for change 
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managers and local shop floor employees to employ justifications to pragmatically legitimate the 
appropriation of ESN to “work smarter together” in order to deliver more innovative solution to 
customers. These justifications generated wider diffusion within iSource, as business technologists, 
consultants and senior leaders were able to reach a common professional understanding of ESNs use 
and importance. In this chapter, I will detail the dynamics of each of these infusions to illuminate the 
enabling and precipitating mechanisms that condition and trigger rhetorical processes of internal IT 
diffusion. 
6.1 Enactment of Community, Market and Professional logics 
!
‘Our organisational culture is quite fuzzy, you have lots of latitude to choose, some of our employees have 
an incredibly regulated user experience and their desktop environments will be identical from desk to desk 
to desk around the world, and in other areas of our our business you can have a different look and feel 
from the person sitting next to you. This is our differentiator, it can have advantages and disadvantages 
but we’ll take those because it gives us greater connections to the trends in our industry’ (orangeESN 
CEO) 
As this quote suggests, iSource’s culture is quite complex and iSourcers operate quite fluidly to balance 
competing objectives, values and philosophies. In my analysis I found that iSourcers specifically 
balance the concerns of distinct community, professional and market logics that shape what structures, 
behaviours and objectives are viewed as legitimate at any given time.   
At its core, iSource’s “regulation model” still inspires a community logic among iSourcers that is 
manifested in a common identity and principles, allegiance to the community and oneness of purpose. 
Some collective responsibilities are formally enacted by iSource’s corporate values, code of ethics, or 
the association of business technologists, and underpin performance assessments within iSource. 
However, most mutual obligations are unwritten. They rest in community members’ shared 
expectations of appropriate behavior and are enforced by the expected social and professional costs of 
their contravention: ‘if you can’t be relied on then you won’t be included in the big projects, and you 
won’t get anywhere in the business’ (Database management CIO). As a result, they inform various 
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aspects of iSourcers’ behaviour, from their socializing habits, to their everyday decisions, to their dress. 
Within these communities however, iSourcers in project teams also subscribe to market and 
professional logics.  
Under a “market” logic, iSourcers operate independently and opportunistically for the purpose of 
performance review bonuses, work incentives, and revenue generation, and are directly and indirectly 
accountable to iSource’s shareholders. These operating principles tie iSourcers to pursuing the firm’s 
larger interests, such as stellar share price performance, consulting industry reputation and profits. 
Under a professional logic they operate responsibly and mindfully for the purpose of continuous 
product and service improvement, personal development, and professional certification, and are 
accountable to iSource’s external clients and partners, and iSource employees. Subscribing to a 
professional logic commits iSourcers to pursuing the firm’s interests, in terms of superior product and 
service offerings, customer satisfaction, and work practice standards. The coexistence of community, 
market and professional logics poses conflicting demands, as iSourcers work on projects and make 
decisions on new ideas as members of the iSource community (iSourcers), and employees in profit 
seeking and service(product) improvement project teams. 
6.1.1 Straddling Different Logics 
Under a community logic, iSourcers have a shared identity and legitimize their development and 
support behaviors by counting on reciprocal commitments. For example, members acknowledge their 
collective destiny and do not keep expert knowledge on key IT systems to themselves, trusting that 
their other business colleagues will reciprocate:  
Work in IT security and most backend departments only gets done effectively when, ‘We give and take 
here [IT security], if I help you with configurations and stuff for your security protocol when you’re in 
jam and it wasn’t really my responsibility, I expect that you will do the same when I need it. And most of 
the time it works out that way’ (IT Security Manager) 
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However, these community values often clash with behaviors prescribed by market logics, such as 
when members are expected to help colleagues on projects that do not directly or indirectly benefit 
them: 
The “working together” values in the regulation model makes sense but ‘ At the end of the day we target 
focused because we are cost focused, for example, from the start of the [no-email] programme we have 
been setting targets, [no- email] in 3 years, 20% reduction in email in the first year, 60% in the second 
year,- we are a target focused company…so you have to weigh the benefits with the losses when deciding 
how much to help others. When I have pressing deadlines of my own, I have to say sorry you know “I 
know you got me out of a jam last month, but I just can’t do it”. Otherwise I help “John” and I don’t meet 
my targets and that’s the bottom line’ (Sales Manager) 
Community and market logics also clash with professional logics, such as when members are asked to 
support “off the reservation” projects: 
As much as I like to encourage out of the box projects I always say ‘If there’s no clear customer or 
colleague benefit then don’t do it… period’ (Head of Strategy) 
Logics also serve as the grounding for behavioral norms, directing iSourcers strategies and focusing 
their attention. Under the community logic, iSourcers are guided by principles that afford them personal 
stature and reinforces the community reputation. For instance, they take pride in their ability to 
demonstrate a high level of knowledge and technical skill on projects or services (products) that do not 
necessarily provide quick wins or significant profit. One iSourcer described her coding of database 
scripts as ‘kind of like a pet project’ (IT technologist) to us. Such grounds for action often clash with 
market logic prescriptions, which are focused on enhancing the company’s market status and 
profitability: 
‘As [iSource] employees we always strive to deliver every single solution, internal or client side in a way 
that makes optimum use of our resources,... maximizes our return, and generates some new business‘ 
(Technology Consultant) 
And professional prescriptions, which were geared towards increasing customer satisfaction levels and, 
the quality of products and services: 
‘Yeah, I think everyone has this impression that consulting is like the book house of lies, but internally 
you know, we don’t ever have a meeting, or any casual conversation in the lunch room or anything… 
where we don’t talk about delivering the best solution for customers…creating better value for customers 
is our business’ (Head of Consulting) 
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These logics remained consistently salient over the course of ESNs diffusion within iSource, and were 
particularly demonstrated through homogenous primary themes in different communities of iSourcers’ 
rhetoric. Different themes emerged as more prominent at different times, but were always expressed in 
service of aligning ESN with the values, aims and means of one or more of these logics. 
6.2 ESN Diffusion as Rhetorical Legitimation 
 
‘When we explained that it was necessary to use orangeESN in order to do our work better some people 
said okay yes, but I don’t have time for it or I don’t have priority for it. And others were eager to be the 
first who did it because they are always the first or the best at adopting new technology or because they 
want to win more accounts. So we tried to attract different types of people by explaining it to different 
groups in a different manner’ (Head of Collaboration) 
As this quote suggests, the diffusion of ESN within iSource can be conceptualized by not only 
examining the means and ends of ESN appropriation as institutional logics, but in the interplay of 
legitimation processes at the linguistic level of rhetoric across ESN infusions across iSource’s scientific 
community, business technologists and consultants. The logic, legitimating rhetoric, central ESN 
features and key audience of each of these infusions is illustrated in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1 Institutional-Rhetorical legitimation  Relationships Across ESN Infusions 
  Community OrangeESN Market OrangeESN Professional OrangeESN 
Ideological goals 
as logics, standards 
of institutional 
legitimacy, 
working practices, 
norms mediating 
behaviour 
Reinforcing community ties, 
loyalty, common values 
Trust and reciprocity among 
employees 
Collaborative engagement  
Common identity and group 
membership  
Profit maximization 
Number and size of customer 
accounts  
Efficiency and control 
Self-interests, individualism  
Improving expertise to 
fulfill customer needs 
Customer satisfaction 
Maximise profit through 
collaboration and 
engagement 
Accountability to customer 
and wider professional 
associations 
Framing as 
legitimating 
accounts 
Pathos and logos appeals to 
exchange, influence and 
pragmatic legitimacy 
Theorization: “openly share 
expertise and knowledge” 
Pathos and logos appeals to 
exchange and influence 
pragmatic legitimacy 
Theorization: “find the right 
information at the right time” 
Frame: Increased 
productivity and efficiency 
Email de-legitimation 
Primarily logos appeals to 
exchange pragmatic 
legitimacy. Underlying 
pathos appeals to exchange, 
influence and dispositional 
pragmatic legitimacy 
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Frame: Open collaboration 
helps to strengthen communal 
ties 
will help to win more 
accounts 
Theorization: “work smarter 
together by eradicating 
email misuse” 
Frame: Email overload is 
polluting working 
environment 
OrangeESN legitimation  
Pathos appeals to exchange, 
influence and dispositional 
pragmatic legitimacy 
Theorization: “work smarter 
together by focusing on 
customer needs” 
                                    
Frame: Social media can 
help to make lives 
(employees and customers) 
easier 
ESN Ontology See Table 5.1 See Table 5.1 See Table 5.1 
Diffusion Limited 
Predominantly Business 
technologists, senior managers 
HR, IR 
Minimal adoption consultants 
Limited 
Predominantly consultants, 
sales managers, senior 
managers 
Reasonable adoption by 
business technologists 
Widespread adoption by 
business technologists, 
consultants and senior 
managers 
Audience Business technologists 
 
Consultant service lines 
Sales consultants 
All communities of 
iSourcers 
 
In this section I will show how ESN evolved over time, by detailing the role that competing institutional 
logics (Ideological goals as logics) and rhetorical accounts (justifications) had on the diffusion 
outcomes and material features (ESN ontology) of different target audiences. On the surface these 
elements were somewhat indistinguishable since they occurred over a relatively short time period and 
were entangled in a cumulative web of inter-relations. However, my analysis of the content, structure 
and sequence of rhetorical justifications over time indicated that these these elements converged around 
relatively consistent and sequential legitimation phases: (1) Framing ESN rationale (2) Advertising 
potential value of ESN and (3) Motivating engagement around ESN.  
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6.3 The Scientific Community Infusion (H1) 
6.3.1 Guiding Logics and Target Audience 
The general organisational reaction to the CEO’s no- email announcement in 2011 was initially of 
uncertainty about new collaborative technologies, and a proliferation of arguments defending 
“emailing” as a legitimate and fundamental way of working at iSource. Recalling the general 
organizational reaction on the day of the announcement, the Head of Change Management explained 
‘The [no-email] announcement caught us completely by surprise, and to be completely honest we 
wondered if he was serious… we could not imagine working without email. A lot of senior iSourcers were 
skeptical about [ESN]… was it really a business tool like email or would our shop floor employees just 
waste time on Facebook all day talking about their weekend and. sharing cat video’ 
 Typical arguments at the time were mostly unsupported claims, loosely grounded in different logics, 
which made the case that the practice of emailing was indispensable (claim) since it enabled them to 
communicate with colleagues and clients, and work effectively (warrant):  
Responses to 2010 survey question asking, ‘Why is email important to your work?’ 
“Community” Response: ‘I use email for everything, … I wouldn’t be able to keep in touch with 
colleagues without it ’(int) 
“Professional” 2:’We can’t get rid of any email, it’s my life’(Int) 
“Market” Response 3: ‘Email is the main way that I assign, co-ordinate and check progress on activities 
in my team… I don’t know how we would get anything done without it’(Int) 
Response 4: ‘Email is an institution. It has been here forever, it’s a good tool ’(Int) 
Email was so institutionalized across all iSource groups that the scientific community (SC) decided 
that they would need to construct a compelling and robust rationale in order to convince iSourcers to 
change their email practices. In this regard, from the time the scientific community was formed in 2008. 
their rationale for replacing email with ESN technology was driven by professional logic principles of 
continuous product and service improvement and being accountable to external clients and partners, 
and iSource employees. The quote below from iSource’s Head of Innovation was typical of their 
rhetoric prior to the formal announcement of the no-email programme: 
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Our research showed that social networking was at the heart of our mid-term business strategy so ‘We 
looked at the codification of social relationships beyond just a medium of communication yeah….and we 
looked at social graphing and we looked at social networking, and how to market social networking and 
how, different businesses could benefit from all of these new ideas. And from that investigation we came 
to the conclusion that email was pretty much a dead form of communication... it is fundamentally flawed.‘ 
The aims and means of the professional logic remained salient to the members of this community 
throughout their tenure as no-email project leads (global change management team), and bounded their 
engagement strategies, prioritization of material features and assumptions of appropriate behaviours 
around ESN appropriation. Along these “professional” lines, members explained that reducing email 
overload was strategically necessary for enhancing iSource’s competitiveness and long term survival 
(“professional” backing and warrant). These “professional” claims consistently made reference to the 
first whitepaper and even used similar language,  such as explaining that ‘employees in larger 
companies are struggling to deal with higher volumes of email’ (first whitepaper), that had negative 
consequences for ‘all iSourcers, regardless of whether they were consultants, technologists, senior 
managers and even partners and customers’ (Head of Cyber Security). 
To justify their “professional” email overload claims, SC members employed inter-field syllogisms 
(arguments with warrant, data and claims) aimed at pragmatic legitimacy. These justifications 
consistently and effectively employed an ordered sequence of primarily logos, and underlying pathos 
appeals to explain no-email’s rationale, advertise its value and motivate engagement around alternative 
ESN-driven.  
6.3.2 Rhetorical Justifications 
Rational Framing for No-Email 
Members reported that they frequently explained that no-email would ensure competitiveness and 
survival by enabling iSourcers to collaboratively create more value for their colleagues, partners and 
customers, alike (“professional” claims). They supported these claims with logos appeals to pragmatic 
legitimacy, which highlighted that reduced email use would enable more effective collaboration, 
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productivity and customer satisfaction (exchange legitimacy). They also appealed made underlying 
pathos appeals to iSourcers’ desire to enhance their work satisfaction. This is illustrated in a 2011 radio 
interview where one of iSource’s COOs explained the no-email vision by stating: 
‘Our vision with no-email is to move forward as a real tier one player by developing new leadership 
behaviours, new coaching, more collaboration. With more effective collaboration, we will have better 
quality for our customers, more, value creation in our proposals, so more growth, more satisfaction- more 
satisfaction for the customers, more satisfaction for us as employees’ (COO, Radio4 Interview, 2011) 
In the language of the first whitepaper, SC members reported that they consistently explained that 
‘email overload was a consequence of undesirable email practices’ (email misuse) and ‘a general 
pattern of employee indifference to these consequences’ (first whitepaper), rather than the email 
technology itself (claim). They primarily employed logos appeals to articulate that common 
antecedents of email overload, such as using email for “chat” were taking away from the time available 
to address work related tasks (exchange legitimacy). iSource’s consulting VP illustrates these 
justifications to explain the business case for no-email in a 2011 blog post:  
‘Of course it’s not the software but the user that is the problem, and there is no question that bad habits 
are a big contributor to email overload. Opened up first thing in the morning, it can be a constant 
distraction, with the urge to check and respond to messages preventing us from concentrating on more 
important ’(Consulting VP, 2011) 
Similar justifications explaining that iSourcers needed to “work smarter” or radically change their 
behaviors in order to reduce email overload, employed primarily pathos appeals to pragmatic 
legitimacy on the basis of iSourcers’ “personal responsibility” in causing email overload (influence 
legitimacy). This was clearly evident in the following quote from orangeESN’s CEO, as he explained 
why iSource’s no-email initiative was also a behavioral transformation effort: 
‘Our business plans say that we are primarily technology experts, so it’s not good enough to be a victim 
of the technology, it’s not good enough to say that the technology itself is the problem you know. A bad 
worker blames their tools… This is really about attitudes and values, email can be useful, the problem is 
that email evolved into something that is misused, which is something that hurts the company, could only 
be addressed by radically shocking our culture’ (orangeESN’s CEO) 
In many cases these pathos appeals to “personal responsibility” for causing email overload were 
blended with logos appeals to reinforce appeals on the basis of how email misuse was driving inefficient 
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and ineffective work practices (exchange legitimacy). iSource’s chief psychologist illustrates these 
justifications as he explained the business case for no-email in a 2011 blog post:  
‘We now use emails as chat to avoid calling our colleagues on the phone or just walking on the shop floor 
to discuss with them. So there is something in the area of human interaction, by comfort, by habit whatever 
is the reason we transferred some of the communications that should really be interpersonal and 
synchronous into this more or less synchronous [asynchronous] environment… So really it is hurting the 
company, that we are not delivering as good as we can, and as uh, as good management, as good 
leadership, coaching as we should. So, Naturally, it’s up to us to get involved in solving email overload’  
(Chief Psychologist, 2010) 
Senior managers started to use these inter-field syllogisms and pragmatic appeals to explain the 
business case for no-email immediately following their 2009 “future strategy” research report. They 
continued to justify no-email as necessary for iSource’s long term survival and competiveness 
whenever they discussed the email overload business case in meetings, presentations, publications and 
interviews throughout the duration of my research (through to late 2013). In the next phase of 
justifications, SC members would highlight what reduced email misuse (and its negative consequences) 
meant for day-today work, and how it could enhance iSource’s long term survival and competitiveness.  
Advertising Potential Value of “No-Email”  
!
Shortly after constructing the rationale for no-email, SC members reported that they invested a great 
deal of time and effort to highlight the “professional” (iSource’s long term survival and 
competitiveness) value of reducing email misuse. These inter-field justifications were “professionally” 
focused on highlighting that reducing overload would enhance the quality and value of products and 
services for consultants, technologists, partners and customers alike. Members frequently used these 
arguments to highlight that email misuse was undesirable because it eroded employee productivity and 
job satisfaction (claim).  They supported this claim by collecting data on the negative consequences of 
email use. For the scientific community ‘while [iSourcers] indifferent attitude to email misuse was an 
impediment, it was also an opportunity’(Head of Change Management). The SC team’s decision to 
invite ‘respected’ academic and practitioner researchers to survey iSourcers’ email usage patterns 
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(second whitepaper), proved to be a clever and effective way to support their justifications, since 
iSourcers’ indifferent attitude led them to make unsupported arguments in defense of email. 
Their justifications employed logos and pathos rhetoric that emphasized pragmatic legitimacy. An 
email circulated to all iSourcers in 2012 demonstrates how their arguments blended logos appeals for 
time saving (exchange legitimacy) with underlying pathos appeals, conveying that email use was “not 
in their best interests” (dispositional legitimacy): 
Our survey shows ‘… on average we receive 70 emails per day, … about 56% of respondents spent more 
than 2 hours of their work time dealing with emails, more than 2 hours! These are raw facts. We also 
asked respondents, “how do you feel about this? Is it normal or is it hurting you?” And the answer, 80% 
said we are wasting time with email, we have better things to do and we should be doing our job as 
engineers, as project managers, as team leaders, more efficiently. This is not the best way to use our 
time… 80% of your colleagues are victims of their email. This really means that there is a problem’ (Smart 
work committee, email, 2012) 
Similarly, SC members consistently referenced their qualitative survey data to highlight that emailing 
was not fit for the purpose of career focused knowledge workers who valued more engaging and 
meaningful work. These justifications used similar logos appeals and the surface and underlying pathos 
appeals: 
Our own research and comScore data shows us that ‘young millennials and knowledge workers prioritize 
career opportunities that allow for learning and development. They also want to do meaningful work. 
There’s little more dispiriting than knowing you’re wasting your talent and your company’s time on low-
value tasks, or getting to the end of a productive day, only to be greeted by a bulging inbox.’ (Consulting 
VP) 
SC members also used similar rhetorical appeals to convince well connected and respected employees 
such as leaders and influencers, of the value of no-email. They reported that their aim was to highlight 
that email misuse was encouraging poor leadership behaviours, which were consequently affecting the 
quality of services and products, and iSourcers’ wellbeing: 
‘Email hurts us because, indeed this is helping poor leadership, poor management. Leading behind email 
is pushing very bad attitudes, attitudes like you send an email to cover your ass and, do as if something 
has moved on the subject, but in fact sending an email doesn’t move the subject, it just moves a few 
electrons. This is leading to poor leadership behaviors, poor coaching, poor collaboration, and ultimately 
poor quality of service and products. That is what hurts the company’ (Head of Consulting Architecture) 
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These pragmatic inter-field justifications were most prevalent in the period immediately following the 
draft of the second no-email whitepaper in early 2011. SC members continued to use similar arguments 
to highlight the possible benefits of the no-email initiative in their internal and external presentations, 
meetings and interviews throughout my research period. In the next stage of justifications, SC members 
turned their attention to illustrating how iSourcers could use alternative technology and behaviours to 
reap some of the benefits highlighted in this stage. 
Motivating Engagement around “No-Email” Solutions 
Shortly after the formal announcement of no-email I observed an important shift away from SC 
members explaining the value of eliminating undesirable email practices to encouraging iSourcers to 
make the first steps to actually changing their behaviour. These justifications were consistently 
grounded in “professional” concerns, supported by scientific data, and primarily focused on 
encouraging iSourcers to just try alternative email practices and later, alternative technology, without 
any prolonged commitment.  
In order to motivate iSourcers to eliminate the undesirable practices that created email overload, the 
scientific community developed and communicated “smart-inbox” guidelines on how iSourcers could 
manage their inbox more effectively.   
They highlighted that smart-inbox was based on Wotzlawick’s industry leading change management 
framework, and was specifically an attempt at first order change aimed at motivating iSourcers ‘to start 
changing now and practice the new, desired attitude internally with [their] colleagues’ (third 
whitepaper). They also cleverly and consistently made primarily logos and underlying pathos appeals 
to pragmatic exchange legitimacy by explaining the guidelines as “behavioral principles” for using 
email more effectively to “get things done” (efficiency claim) and relieve stress (emotional claim). For 
example, when iSourcers googled “getting things done” and “email” (as instructed in third whitepaper), 
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the top hits linked to blog posts where SC members graphically illustrated smart-inbox techniques and 
its positive results: 
To become more effective using email- set a zero email ambition to declutter your inbox. Pick up the phone 
or go and talk to colleagues. Switch off the new email alert and set allocated times in your diary to look 
at email … ‘As a result of actions taken time spent on email dropped significantly and thereby gaining a 
few extra hours a week, but more importantly my inbox was not out-of-control anymore and delivering a 
great peace of mind. Maybe the GTD system will also work in your situation, maybe you already 
implemented another system to make you more effective.’(Scientific community member Blog post, 2011) 
SC members used similar justifications to illustrate how they used ESN mashups of Yammer social 
networking, mindmeiester mindmapper, and confluence wiki, to seamlessly and effectively brainstorm, 
organise and visualize ideas for creating a requirements document for an ESN solution. These 
arguments employed logos and pathos appeals to pragmatic exchange legitimacy based on time savings 
and innovation outcomes (exchange), and emotional need for “recognition” respectively (exchange). 
This is illustrated in the third whitepaper as follows:  
To reduce email overlook experiment with a social business network like [jiveESN] to generate creativity 
and innovation… ‘With these tools the team was able to complete the task without email or formal face-
to-face meetings, involve more people in the process, and deliver the end product in less time that would 
normally be required… the requirements document [was] finished in 2.5 weeks and included input and 
assistance from more than sixty people. [The steering committee] were impressed by the speed and quality 
of the result, as well as the lengthy list of contributors, resulting in an unanimous positive decision and a 
go for the next phase in the project.’ (Third whitepaper, 2012) 
Members indicated that one of the most important actions emerging from the third whitepaper and the 
ESN requirements document were the jiveESN pilots with 2000 iSourcers from different departments 
around the world for 3 months. These pilots helped them to understand and document (ESN manual) 
how to best create value in ESN, and generated disproportionate number of success stories among 
business technologists. However, in the spirit of their “professional” focus they prioritized the 
communication of customer facing success stories over business technologist-centric success stories. 
These arguments primarily employed logos appeals to exchange pragmatic legitimacy by 
communicating the efficiency benefits to services and products offerings. Logos appeals were often 
blended with underlying emotional (pathos) appeals to iSourcers’ desire for “satisfaction” and 
reassurance that they can use ESN to do their everyday work (exchange). The following quote by the 
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Head of Change Management uses Heath and Heath’s (2010) “elephant and rider” metaphor to 
demonstrate how these success stories were used at this time: 
‘So we could speak to the elephant and say hey Mr. elephant you are really a pro on service delivery, yes 
cool, we know that you want to do it good, and you know how to do it good. But I can tell you that one of 
our outsourcing customers wrote to us to say that they were much more satisfied with our services while 
we used the community to work internally. By sharing in the community the problem and the workaround 
with everyone around the world we were able to minimize the disruptions. And of course when we tell that 
to the elephant he is very happy, he is proud, he is keen to do the transformation. He is not keen to do the 
trans because the use case blah blah blah, does this and that. He is moved by the fact that he is even better 
and his customer is telling him he is doing a good job.’ 
These pragmatic justifications became more prevalent in mid 2011, following the formal release of the 
three no-email whitepapers. Justifications were primarily focused on building and assessing iSourcers’ 
desire to support and participate in future no-email change initiatives. Throughout my research period, 
SC members mobilized these arguments with the intention of encouraging iSourcers to begin 
experimenting with new tools and behaviours in service of the no-email business case and benefits. 
However, these justifications became significantly less prevalent from late 2013 to 2014, as change 
managers shifted their justifications to encouraging more customer-focused ESN appropriation. 
6.3.3 Diffusion Outcomes 
To summarize, the primary objectives of this infusion were to build and assess iSourcers’ awareness of 
the need for moving away from iSource’s email driven culture, and their desire to support and 
participate in future change initiatives.  These objectives were achieved through consistent and 
concerted logos appeals and underlying pathos appeals over three legitimation phases. 
“Rationale framing” justifications were intended to ensure that all iSourcers knew that email overload 
was a deeply ingrained behavioral problem that was affecting efficiency and job satisfaction. They also 
wanted to convey that “working smarter” required the eradication of undesirable email practices. This 
rationale was central to the mobilization of justifications to advertise no-email’s value and motivate 
engagement around no-email solutions. “Value Advertising” justifications were intended to ignite 
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interest for eliminating undesirable email practices in order to enhance the wellbeing, productivity and 
quality of products and services for knowledge works and potential leaders. “Motivating engagement” 
justifications were aimed at convincing iSourcers that alternative tools and behaviours could help them 
eradicate undesirable email practices and work smarter to enhance their job satisfaction, collaboration, 
productivity and leadership skills. Over time, the justifications over these phases fostered meaning 
making around the commonly communicated theme of “eliminating undesirable email practices”. 
For iSourcers, this theme was an internally constructed and locally focused internal theorization for de-
legitimating email. This theorization and the justifications around it, were importantly shaped by the 
ability of SC members to recognize and exploit opportunities in the institutionalized arguments that 
iSourcers used to defend the use of email. Specifically, SC members exploited email proponents’ 
tendency to employ unsupported justifications to defend email, when they decided to support their 
arguments with internal and external data on email misuse. This research revealed that email misuse 
was negatively affecting collaboration, productivity, job satisfaction and leadership skills in iSource, 
and was thus, the primary driver for their “professional” focus and target audience. In this vein, SC 
members decision to enlist the help of academic researchers, and internal leaders, and young millennials 
helped to make their arguments more credible or legitimate with iSourcers.  
While these email de-legitimation justifications were met with some resistance, they were relatively 
effective at gradually disembedding iSourcers from their institutionalized email practices. Responses 
to a survey conducted in 2012 demonstrated this shift away from institutionalized email practices: 
Responses to 2012 survey question asking, What role do you think email should play in your work? 
Response: ‘We shouldn’t be using email internally at all, we should just use it to communicate with clients 
and partners’(int) 
Response 2:’It’s clear that email is polluting our working environment, it’s a beast that needs to be tamed. 
We as [iSourcers] need to mindful about the purpose of each email we send, we should only send email 
when we absolutely need to’(Int) 
Response 3: ‘We can’t completely stop using email, it still has a purpose. But as a technology company 
we need to reduce the noise that comes with email, the email overload. We need to get away from the 
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behavior where we sent email and think that the recipient takes action based on receiving that. Social 
tools can help a great deal here, and then we can see how email fits in’ (Int) 
The survey responses indicated that iSourcers had some understanding of the value of changing their 
practices, and were beginning to envision alternative ways of working smarter around the theme of 
“eradicating undesirable (“unprofessional”) email practices”. The ethos of this intra-organisational 
theorization remained salient throughout the no-email journey. It was specifically used to promote 
“professional engagement” from business technologists and consultants when orangeESN was 
eventually rolled out. 
6.4 Business Technologists Infusion (“H2”) 
6.4.1 Guiding Logics and Target Audience 
Prior to the launch of orangeESN towards the end of 2011, the change team (SC members, GBU 
managers and ambassadors) decided to focus their attention on driving engagement among business 
technologists. Business technologists had recently become the largest demographic of iSource 
employees (after merger), and were the earliest and most successful adopters of ESN communities 
during the pilots. Their goal was to use orangeESN to support the organisational activities underway 
to integrate new technologists into the company, and in doing so, ensuring iSource’s medium term 
business strategy of integrating cutting edge technology. The team did however express concern that 
orangeESN’s currently limited functionality (only meeting 27 of 50 ESN requirements) would likely 
engender an undesirably slow and capricious viral engagement process that was not aligned with their 
“professional” aims. As such, they employed persuasive appeals to firstly onboard “well connected”, 
senior technologists with expertise in social media and collaboration, into the steering team as 
community support professionals (CSPs). Potential candidates from each country were all trained and 
encouraged to experiment with “professional” ESN ontologies in order to develop GBU specific 
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strategies for onboarding and sustaining “professional” engagement from their front- line colleagues 
with orangeESN communities.  
Change team members made the case for ESN by employing intra-field syllogisms (building on “H1” 
professional justifications) that were “professionally” focused on carefully positioning ESN as an 
important “people” project for enhancing the quality and value of products and services for consultants, 
technologists, partners and customers alike (professional backing and warrant). Change managers also 
made concerted efforts to frame “professional” justifications around the idea of “survival” in an 
apparent effort to appeal to business technologists. In line with this, The Head of Knowledge 
Management explained that: 
‘The transformation to providing better quality products and services relies on leaders and managers, top 
managers, intermediate managers, and first level managers, they need to become coaches for their team 
members. We are completely aware that we are a people company, our asset is our people and what 
develops our people is our managers, so we need to develop our managers in order to survive in the long 
term.’ 
However, business technologists work in developing IT solutions, and supporting consultants, and 
internal and customer facing IT systems, followed community values, aims. Most technologists viewed 
ESN as a natural complement or even a replacement for the internal forums, shared drives, and weekly 
meetings that they had always used to collaborate and share knowledge. A minority community of 
particularly French-based technologists did express concern that ESN’s unstructured and open ethos 
would lead to increased micro-management and employee dissatisfaction: 
“Yes on one hand you may have a bit more sharing with ESN on the shop floor, but at what cost? ... Maybe 
unhappier employees... You could have a situation where there is more blurring between home and work 
life than with email. I think people in general check their social media more than email you know, so 
managers will expect iSourcers to be always available, and know when they are online or not. ” (Database 
Developer) 
The majority of technologists did however justify ESN appropriation as necessary to enhance iSource’s 
social order by helping all iSourcers to “stay in touch and share expert knowledge with technologist 
colleagues” without the fear of being sanctioned for wasting time. They also frequently expressed their 
feeling that social tools with open and unstructured architectures were somewhat well suited to their 
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culture and way of working. The CSPs that helped to generate early ESN engagement would express 
these views when they discussed the role of orangeESN: 
My interpretation of zero email is that ‘it is all about improving collaboration in the business, getting rid 
of the noise that comes with email overload, have people communicating more, and also having better 
visibility of information that would be useful to them in their day to day jobs. Now on the wider scale of 
iSource, just in the UK we’ve got about [more than 50] offices give or take, we have a large number of 
distributed employees. So when we work, it’s usually in remote teams, so we’re not always in the same 
place, we rely more on technology to improve collaboration, it is paramount, you know. You can’t just get 
out of your chair, get in your car and drive a hundred miles down the road to see somebody you know. 
And that’s where our communications tools, forums, messengers, yammer helped us a great deal. And 
that’s were orangeESN fits in’ (Cyber Delivery manager, CSP) 
 
As a result, the predominantly “community” embedded CSP members employed inter-field 
justifications (challenging professional logics) that were still responsive to “professional” objectives, 
but aimed at positioning orangeESN as imperative for nurturing a more collaborative “digital first” 
culture where employees would not be sanctioned for “over collaborating” (community backing and 
warrant). Both change and CSP team members consistently employed an ordered sequence of primarily 
pathos, and underlying logos appeals to explain orangeESN’s rationale, advertise its value and motivate 
engagement around specific ESN features.  
6.4.2 Rhetorical Justifications 
Rationale framing for orangeESN 
Change team members carefully referenced the “working smarter” metaphor from the previous infusion 
to highlight that iSourcers, particularly those recent arrivals from the merger, would ensure their job 
security (intra-field professional claim) if they used ESN to enhance their productivity, collaboration, 
satisfaction, and actively reduce their email misuse. The primary type of rhetorical appeal employed in 
these argument was a pathos appeal to pragmatic legitimacy based on iSourcers desire to enhance their 
collaboration and leadership skill in order to remain a part of iSource (“survival”). The following shows 
how a change manager (Knowledge Management Director) used this rhetoric in their justifications:  
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 When we spoke with technologist we explained that ‘making the investment in enterprise social tools and 
transforming our behaviours was imperative to our long term survival, and to operating without 
downsizing or outsourcing some departments. Our research indicated that outsourcing and downsizing is 
the trend now in large IT firms, and that we absolutely needed to dramatically enhance the way we lead, 
and collaborate to solve business problems in the near to long term’ 
 
Change managers also explained that using ESN would allow technologists to enhance the quality of 
iSource’s products and services for their colleagues, partners and customers. These justifications 
primarily employed emotional (pathos) appeals to CSPs desire to be empowered to help lead the drive 
towards the strategic no-email target, as demonstrated in the words of the [orangeESN] CEO: 
‘It was also imperative to reaching no-email, that leaders get involved in this change because the change 
is about human behaviours, and our leaders played a big part in coordinating and shaping the behaviours 
of other colleagues around the [jiveESN pilots]… As part of the steering team we would provide some 
guidelines on what to do and how to do it, but it was really left to them to experiment with the tool and 
see its benefits, and then devise and drive engagement from their reports in their GBUs. And we had a 
tremendous response!’  
Contrastingly, CSPs reported that they carefully referenced research reports on industry trends towards 
using more consumer driven technologies like social tools, to explain that orangeESN would help 
technologists to connect and collaborate openly with each other ,without the fear of sanctions 
(community claim). Members reported that they expected that technologists would relate to the open 
and unstructured ethos of the web 2.0 architecture since it fit the way that technologists worked. Their 
arguments therefore employed primarily pathos appeals to pragmatic legitimacy based on 
technologists’ desire to “belong” to a community and for job satisfaction that comes with collaborating 
without the threat of sanctions (exchange legitimacy). These justifications proved to be very effective 
at the time, as demonstrated in the following quote from a CSP technologist: 
We generated a great deal of intrinsic motivation because ‘You know they bring in these tools and they 
say you can use it to share anything you want, but when you do, you’re punished. I think that’s the 
corporate culture in which we work today. The idea with enterprise social networking is to move beyond 
this way of working using social tools to help us stay in touch and share knowledge in our departments in 
a more open way, and there’s no consequence of being punished. So employees can experiment with these 
social tools to find a pattern of work that gives them more satisfaction and helps them to produce their 
best work… People need to have that feeling of community and ESN is the focal point for that feeling of 
community…’  (Knowledge Management Manager) 
152!
Change team members initiated their respective advocacy for professional and community oriented 
ESN business cases, during the jiveESN pilots in the second quarter of 2011. While the change team 
would go on to shift the grounding of their justifications, CSPs continued to employ similar orangeESN 
justifications in their formal and informal communications throughout my research period, but with 
much less frequency towards the end of 2013. Change managers and CSPs used the next legitimation 
phase to highlight what the open sharing of expertise and knowledge meant for iSourcers’ day-to-day 
activities, and how using orangeESN in this way would ensure their job security and iSource’s survival. 
Change managers particularly used this advertising stage to speak directly to CSPs needs in order to 
onboard them onto the steering team. 
Advertising potential value of orangeESN  
!
Change managers reported that they frequently used survey data and success stories from the jiveESN 
pilots and their own ESN experiences (data) to explain to CSFs and technologists that business 
technologists who use orangeESN communities could collaborate and innovate more effectively to 
solve business problems (intra-field professional claim). The primary rhetorical appeal employed was 
a logos appeal to pragmatic legitimacy based on CSPs and technologists need for more effective 
collaboration and innovation (exchange legitimacy). The following quote from a change manager with 
responsibility for communication and collaboration demonstrates these rhetorical elements in his 
description of orangeESN’s role at iSource at the time: 
With the jiveESN outsourcing pilot we saw that the social network enabled more effective innovation 
through better collaboration since ’people would go to the community and ask questions about some 
business issue, whether it was hey, I’m having some issues with some internal system or company policy, 
or does anyone know how I can tweak this system to align more with what this customer needs. And the 
idea is that because everyone is part of it you might go on and see something that you can answer, and 
you go on and answer it and self-regulate that way, and people will chip in and out when they know 
something, when they see fit’ (Blog Post, Communication and Collaboration leader) 
Change managers also made more direct appeals to CSPs by highlighting that leading orangeESN 
engagement by example would help them to become more effective leaders. They did this by blending 
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underlying logos appeals with surface pathos appeals, on the basis of CSPs desire to be recognized for 
their leadership expertise, and desire to be “empowered” to help lead a business critical initiative. In 
an interview response regarding the actions taken to convince CSPs, a change manager (knowledge 
manager) explained the following: 
‘we highlighted that the days of the manager managing from behind a screen are numbered because they 
need to be more responsive, and foster autonomous decision making. Without the involvement and support 
from departmental managers and team leaders we won’t be able to build on the positives we saw with the 
Yammer watercooler space. The leaders that do participate will see like we did, that orangeESN will help 
them to develop better reputations as manager coaches, who collaborate much more effectively and 
empower their team members to make informed decisions regardless of their position in the organisational 
chart. This kind of decision making is what will lead to more innovation and creativity, and keep us at the 
top of the IT sector’ (Knowledge Manager) 
On the other hand, CSPs continued to co-mingle community and professional concerns as they 
consistently explained to technologists that using orangeESN communities like an office “watercooler” 
would increase the intensity of knowledge sharing and thus, the possibility for innovation within their 
departments and teams (professional-community claim). They consistently supported these claims by 
highlighting the scientific community’s yammer ideation. These justifications also employed primarily 
logos appeals to pragmatic legitimacy based on iSourcers’ need to increase the intensity of knowledge 
sharing and innovation. They also made underlying emotional appeals to iSourcers’ desire for job 
satisfaction (exchange) and empowerment (influence legitimacy) that came with having the freedom 
to use orangeESN in any way, without the fear of sanctions. The excerpt below from a CSF’s blog post 
at the time demonstrates the rhetorical arguments that they used to explain orangeESN’s value:  
‘With enterprise social networking platforms like [orangeESN], virtual meetings, chat and document 
sharing tools, businesses are set to transform how they communicate and work across previously siloed 
departments and virtual teams. It’s these social networks and communications platforms which hold the 
key to unlocking our true potential – enabling us to share knowledge widely, find the right experts both 
internally and externally… Like the scientific community demonstrated with their Yammer mashup, 
[orangeESN] communities is about empowering and connecting people, offering them a platform that 
allows them to effectively discuss anything at any time without the fear of sanctions’ (CTO blog post, 
2012) 
Change managers and CSPs initially started to employ distinct professional and professional-
community arguments to explain orangeESN’s value after the scientific community decided to rollout 
orangeESN instead of jiveESN in the third quarter of 2011. Again, CSP justifications remained 
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somewhat opposed to change managers purely professional objectives, and strongly grounded in 
professional-community logics until the last quarter of 2013. Over time, CSPs justifications had the 
unintended consequence of also convincing change managers to support the appropriation of 
orangeESN in line with professional-community interests. Change managers also managed to 
successfully recruit about 100 champions in 1 month. With this, they decided to prioritize orangeESN 
rollout in departments where CSP support was strong in order to benefit from higher levels of guidance 
and support for their justifications.  
Motivating engagement around orangeESN 
After orangeESN rollout, managers gradually shifted their justifications away from encouraging 
iSourcers to try incrementally different practices (e.g. smart inbox) and explaining the potential value 
of orangeESN, to encouraging iSourcers to actually begin using this radically different technology as 
their main collaboration tool. Change managers justifications also shifted to promoting co-mingled 
professional-community interests.  
They promoted “community” interests when they used the scientific community’s use of Yammer to 
brainstorm, organise and co-create requirements for the ESN platform, as an example of how CSFs 
could use orangeESN to curate and share “digital first” practices (orangeESN best practices) and 
“lighthouse communities” (orangeESN community success stories) from around the organisation 
(Appendix B2). They also supported these claims with pathos appeals to pragmatic legitimacy, 
concerning being empowered to lead a strategic business initiative. The Head of Marketing illustrates 
this rhetorical argument structure in his reflection on the steps that change managers employed to 
initiate orangeESN growth: 
We explained to CSFs that an orangeESN community was ‘sort of like a garden, and actually we have a 
very large garden, so we want them to just concentrate on the pieces of the garden where the flowers are 
flourishing and the fruit is very healthy to see what is going on there, and we have then to even more 
improve, and then cascade it down by bringing information to community leaders and managers, and 
hopefully some of them will learn and improve their approaches’ 
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Change managers also promoted “professional” interests when they explained that iSourcers were more 
likely to reap benefits from communities and reduce email misuse, if CSPs supported them by providing 
training and guidance (e.g. community must have a clear purpose) (professional claim). They supported 
this claim with evidence from the jiveESN pilots and change managers own experiences with ESN. 
Their justifications also employed blended pathos appeals to CSFs desire to be empowered to lead a 
strategic business initiative, and logos appeals to CSFs need to increase the intensity of knowledge 
sharing, creativity and innovation within their individual GBUs. For example, the Head Change 
Manager explained that the scientific community’s ideation network was successful because it had the 
specific purpose generating ideas for reducing email:  
One focus for us when onboarding CSPS was to show them that communities needed a purpose in order 
to be effective ‘Over the period of the pilot we found that the spaces that were popular were areas that 
had a specific use case, or purpose, in achieving a goal- like our scientific community where we invited 
[iSourcers] to give us ideas on how to reduce email misuse.  So what I mean by that is if the goal was to 
have an area to talk about a particular issue or project or provide an information on a particular initiative, 
that worked well. As opposed to just creating a space for a department or a team, because it’s a 
department, that didn’t work. So, we said to them that they would be the ones approving all requests for 
spaces within the GBU, so they could take the first steps to ensuring the users collaborate well and 
generate new ideas by helping to refine and focus the purpose statements’ 
In line with change managers’ intentions, CSPs created their own orangeESN community (the CSP 
network) to experiment and share ideas and best practices on better ways to drive engagement with 
other iSourcers. Over time, this CSP network became the main CSP onboarding medium as CSPs 
invited other senior managers who were interested in orangeESN communities and success stories. By 
mid 2012, the CSP network grew to about 300 members around the world. These new CSPs 
“community”-focused intra-field arguments were primarily aimed at justifying a departmental 
engagement approach.  
CSPs used their own success with the CSP network as well as “lighthouse communities” from the 
jiveESN pilots to illustrate that iSourcers could enhance their collaboration, innovation and job 
satisfaction when they created as many open communities as possible, to collaborate and share 
information within their teams, functions and departments. These explanations primarily employed 
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pathos appeals to pragmatic legitimacy based on iSourcers’ desire to “belong” of the iSource 
community, and for empowerment (influence legitimacy) and job satisfaction (exchange legitimacy) 
as a result of being able to use orangeESN communities in any way, without fear of sanctions. The 
following quote from a poster created by CSPs to spread awareness of their departmental community 
approach illustrates these rhetorical elements:  
‘Departmental spaces are for most of the collaboration, where all people working on a project or whose 
expertize can create value are required /invited to collaborate. – it is up to the managers to create these 
collaborative environments and grow these collaborative environments by inviting their colleagues.  It’s 
your responsibility to lead by example… Who wants to be isolated in the old ways of working while others 
around them benefit from the new ways of working, sharing openly and creating more value.  There will 
be new emulation in teams, each of us will collect (sic) a better reputation as a manager.  Walking away 
from our old ways of working and collaborating more with colleagues will add towards a better work life 
balance, with fun and team work. Visit our CSP network to see how we did it.’ (Training Document, 2012) 
Within departmental communities, CSPs created a social ideation page for iSourcers to openly share 
ideas that could be of benefit to other members of the community. They explained that sharing openly 
in these communities could deliver mutual work benefits. They further justified this claim by 
employing logos appeals to suggest that “open sharing” itself was a positive outcome to pursue because 
of its mutual benefits. This is clearly illustrated in the purpose statement displayed on the Social 
Ideation Page: 
‘Feel free to ask questions, post ideas and/or share your specific knowledge which could be of benefit to 
all members of your network’ 
CSPs also used training opportunities to promote the professional objectives of reducing email misuse 
and creating communities with a clear purpose. They specifically illustrated that departmental leaders 
who had high levels of training and active participation, were more likely to reap benefits from 
departmental communities (professional claim). They supported these claims with a practical two-page 
community training guide (Appendix B1) based on jiveESN’s “lighthouse community” best practices 
and their own experiences, that simply illustrated how managers and team leaders could create and 
grow communities with a purpose. The Deal Solutions Manager explained that: 
‘This two-pager identified three benefits of using ESN tools for key job roles and outlined 5 or 10 things 
that iSourcers in each job role should do in the first weeks of being part of a community.’  
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The justifications around this initiative primarily employed logos appeals to pragmatic legitimacy 
based on iSourcers to improve the intensity of knowledge sharing and innovation gains (exchange 
legitimacy).  They also employed emotional appeals to iSourcers desire to be empowered to lead a 
strategic business initiative. The following excerpt from the 2- page training manual demonstrates how 
CSFs integrated community and professional aims and means in the justifications that they used to train 
departmental managers and team leaders: 
‘After creating the departmental community, it is up to managers and leaders to transform them into 
beneficial collaborative environments by engaging contributors to collaborate in the community and 
driving innovation and results from the community activities. As a community leader you will perform a 
lot of your usual communication and sharing via the space… Managers may become effective community 
leaders by inviting their team members and main contacts, publishing that you have created the 
community to surrounding spaces and to your network. Post it also in the watercooler with a description 
of the purpose. You can start publishing content by posting links to reference documents, posting key 
previous emails, creating reference pages for milestones, dashboards with targets, and who does what… 
Saying “Good job” or “Thank you” or “Let’s improve this” in [the] space is effective.’ (Collaboration 
Training Presentation, 2012) 
 
Similar “professional-community” grounded arguments were evident in the purpose statement of the 
community that CSFs later created to invite iSourcers to contribute their own success stories and 
testimonials. In this purpose statement, CSFs advised iSourcers to structure their success stories in a 
way that simultaneously reinforced logos appeals to iSourcers’ need for enhanced collaboration and 
innovation gains, and emotional (pathos) appeals, concerning their desire for job satisfaction and 
“belonging”: 
‘Welcome! You can post here all your Success stories about Social collaboration. If, you’re just here to 
have a look, take time to find one which will inspire you for your future ways of working as a manager, 
or as part of a team, to fuel collaboration and [“smart working”]. Please use the template to post your 
success story, try to quantify all business benefits- customer success, employee connectedness (to the 
company, to colleagues...’ (Success Stories Community) 
CSPs also led by example by creating communities for key teams within their GBUs in order to 
demonstrate to managers how they could go about creating and nurturing communities in line with 
professional-community objectives. They chose teams that were, large in order to drive awareness and 
engagement to a larger audience; and flexible in order to change their workflows around the 
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community. They were then able to generate initial engagement from team members and demonstrate 
collaboration benefits by communicating that the community was the platform for keeping up to date 
with on-going and future workflow changes and collaborating with like-minded colleagues to improve 
the process. These justifications employed logos appeals to iSourcers need for more streamlined 
workflows (exchange), and their need to increase the intensity of knowledge sharing. Their appeals 
also employed underlying emotional appeals to their desire to have a say in their workflow changes 
(influence). A database manager illustrates these justifications in his description of how CSPs created 
these team communities, using the example of the DB architect community: 
In order to drive engagement at the beginning we tried to communicate any changes in process or when 
we updated our processes, For example‘ we have frameworks that DB architects work within, so an 
architect needs to understand a customer’s requirements, so they need to take them and catalogue them 
and come up with a solution for them and  then a design, and then get the design approved and technically 
assured by the business and then send it through to the customer… When we originally set up the 
community for the architects we were changing the way that they did that and improving that. So that 
became a communications mechanism. We announced to everyone that this was the space where they 
could find out what stage we were at, where the documents are, where the templates are, you know, and 
leave your feedback on the processes. So we got feedback from anybody who’s using that process back 
into the community so sharing it with not just the other architects but the people that were designing the 
process in the first place to get that fed back into any improvements.’(Database manager) 
After orangeESN was rolled out in the last quarter of 2011, both change managers and CSPs employed 
professional-community justifications in their blog posts, training manuals and interviews. While 
change managers justifications shifted in 2012, CSPs continued to use similar professional-community 
justifications until late 2013.  
6.4.3 Diffusion Outcomes 
The primary objectives of this infusion was to make iSourcers aware of the need to adopt and engage 
with orangeESN, and build their desire to actively participate in orangeESN communities, as a way to 
support iSource’s larger behavioural transformation efforts and “community” objectives. Unlike the 
previous infusion, change managers and CSPs pursued these objectives with more focus on concerted 
pathos appeals appeals, but also employed underlying logos appeals over three legitimation phases.  
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In “rationale framing” and “advertising value”, change managers and CSPs contested professional and 
community interests. However, the gradual intra-field to inter-field shift in change managers 
justifications indicated that CSPs professional-community interests were gaining legitimacy over 
purely “professional” justifications, and thus, had more overall impact over the three phases. Along 
these “professional-community” lines, CSPs intention in “rationale framing” was to conveyed that 
collaboration for the benefit of job security (and business survival) meant appropriating ESN to openly 
share expertise and knowledge. Similarly focused justifications in “advertising value” were intended 
to highlight the value of “openly sharing expertise and knowledge”, and simultaneously, build interest 
for appropriating orangeESN to increase the intensity of knowledge sharing and innovation. These 
justifications gradually fostered meaning making around the common theme of using orangeESN to 
“openly share expertise and knowledge”, particularly within the business technologist community. 
This theorization and related justifications were importantly shaped by the ability of CSPs to recognize 
and exploit opportunities to build on the professional justifications of change managers and the previous 
email de-legitimation infusion. CSPs specifically recognized the opportunity to build on the 
professional objectives of enhancing collaboration, innovation and job satisfaction for iSourcers, 
partners and customers, to instead promote more community oriented objectives of increasing the 
intensity of knowledge sharing, innovation and job satisfaction within iSource’s departments and 
teams. A consequence of building on these arguments that they also used a number of the successes 
and research reports from the email de-legitimation infusion to cleverly and effectively support their 
justifications. A more important consequence however, was the gradual de-legitimation of professional 
objectives that resulted in change managers eventually encouraging the appropriation of orangeESN in 
line with professional-community objectives. 
The loss of legitimacy for professional objectives caused a drift towards more viral engagement 
strategies from this period to the second quarter of 2012. With this, change managers and CSPs devoted 
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significant time and energy to encouraging iSourcers to create and invite colleagues to as many open 
communities to collaborate and share information within their departments, teams and other functional 
areas. Change managers effectively on-boarded over 200 CSPs in a matter of 2 months, and together 
they encouraged the creation of over 3000 communities where technologists were appropriating 
orangeESN to “openly share expertise and knowledge”. Aside from successful team communities like 
the architect community, the SAP competency community that was uniquely organised around an area 
of expertise, was also a notable success in this phase: 
‘In March, the [iSource] SAP Practice launched a new Expert community Ask the SAP Expert on 
[orangeESN]. Today, we have more than 450 members. People start to find their way into this space and 
asking the community for help.  I would like to welcome and invite all the iSource technologists to join 
this community. Let us start using it and enhance the social collaboration within the SAP community.’ 
(SAP Director) 
Like the SAP community, there were a number of other clear successes like the social helpdesk, social 
ideation communities (Appendix B3) that also grew virally to have positive business impact. However, 
the second quarter of 2012 saw many reports of low levels of engagement within departmental and 
team communities. Change managers also reported that ‘CSFs had a lot of requests for spaces and 
approved most of them, so we had a lot of duplicate spaces’. These successes and failures would be 
instrumental to shaping the future trajectory of the no-email initiative.   
6.5 Consultants Infusion (“H3”) 
6.5.1 Guiding Logics and Target Audience 
A Gartner survey conducted in the second quarter of 2012 showed that despite the spike in new 
orangeESN communities among business technologists in H2, only 800 of the 3000 communities were 
active. Less than 10% of these active communities were populated by iSource consultants. These 
surveys highlighted that consultants were skeptical about orangeESN’s benefits, too busy to invest time 
to learn how to use orangeESN, and needed clearer objectives: 
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[While demonstrating [orangeESN] features]… “Social media like [orangeESN] don’t really have a place 
in the business, it doesn’t add anything that email doesn’t already do… Some talk about the email 
information overload problem, but with social media it’s easier to get distracted and inundated with things 
like this watercooler page, the most common posts here are about what everyone did on the weekend or 
their new dog. It has nothing to do with the business or our objectives”(Sales consultant) 
With 1 year left in their original three year no-email deadline, the steering team decided to focus their 
attention on driving engagement with iSource consultants. The change team had recently updated 
orangeESN to be compliant with all 50 ESN requirements and were confident that with the right 
communications, they could drive increased engagement from late adopting consultants.  
In a similar strategy to “H2” infusion, they decided to increase local leadership around the new 
orangeESN updates in order to provide more attention to focused strategies. They accordingly 
employed frequent and concerted strategic communications to firstly onboard and motivate iSourcers 
into the no-email steering team as no-email champions. They expected that these champions would 
apply similar communications to drive engagement with “shop floor” consultants. Their aim was to 
have at least 1 champion for every 15 employees in each GBU. Ideal champions were iSourcers who 
were in middle management positions and/or members of iSource’s “young leaders” community. 
Importantly, change managers highlighted that volunteers did not need to have expert knowledge of 
enterprise social media or collaboration since all champions would be receive training material and 
hands on training sessions from either CSFs, country managers or ambassadors. 
Change team members made the case for ESN by employing intra-field syllogisms (building on their 
“H2” professional-community logics), which were focused on “co-mingled professional-community” 
interests. Their professional justifications promoted orangeESN’s role in enhancing the quality and 
value of products and services for technologists, consultants, partners and customers alike. Unlike H2’s 
professional justifications, these justifications seemed to frame point to center on the idea of 
“competitiveness” in an apparent effort to appeal to consultants. However, change managers also 
employed a comparative amount of “community” justifications that positioned orangeESN as a key 
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vehicle for fostering a more collaborative “digital first” culture, where iSourcers could openly 
collaborate without the fear of sanctions. This co-mingling of professional-community interests is 
illustrated in the following quote: 
‘We explained to champions that we are going to move to a new way of working for our business, and for 
more open collaboration, and for better connections than we have now, and now is the time to step in. 
You have a choice of course but the success of move depends on your involvement in leading, supporting, 
showing the right way forward’ (Head of Social Collaboration) 
However, with the new orangeESN update, “market” interests and objectives became especially salient 
to iSource consultants. Consultants frequently expressed disagreement with the prevailing ESN 
ontology of “openly sharing expertise and knowledge”, and actively advocated for more focused 
objectives that positioned ESN as a way to “get the right information at the right time”.  This 
philosophy was frequently expressed by the no- email champions that helped to generate orangeESN 
engagement with iSource consultants: 
The departmental approach was not at all efficient, ‘everyone had the freedom to start an orangeESN 
community whenever they wanted, log in, create a profile, see what’s happening there and we see the 
same effect like we saw in Yammer and these other free tool. People are looking around  but they don’t 
see it as a place that is useful to be, because they are busy and have to get to their targets one way or 
another, and you don’t get to your target when you are looking around in an empty spaces. Everyone is 
talking about how [orangeESN] gives you all this information but there is no information so it’s not for 
me, I don’t have time for this nonsense, so that makes it difficult to experience [orangeESN] as a useful 
tool … But we all agree that we need better access to information’ (Offering Manager) 
With this, champions advocated for the development and deployment of clearer ESN use incentives 
and targets, new email-like smart-lists and tabs to de-clutter orangeESN’s newsfeed, and refined 
community workflows to enable more streamlined community creation and management. Throughout 
this advocacy, they consistently employed inter-field pathos and logos rhetorical justifications (against 
professional-community logics), which on one hand, were responsive to “professional” interests. 
However, justifications were also “market” –focused on positioning orangeESN as a platform for 
ensuring competitiveness by enhancing employee productivity and revenue. 
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6.5.2 Rhetorical Justifications 
Rationale framing for orangeESN 
In the language of the “H2” infusion, change managers frequently explained that orangeESN would 
help to ensure iSourcers’ job security and iSource’s long term competitiveness (professional claim). 
These claims were often combined with “community”-focused justifications that explained that 
participation in orangeESN communities was important for remaining connected to other colleagues, 
collaborating and sharing more knowledge. They consistently supported these justifications with pathos 
appeals to champions desire to “belong” to a community (exchange), and underlying logos appeals on 
the basis of enhanced innovation exchanges, as illustrated by the Head of Change Management in the 
following quote: 
‘We had to frame orangeESN a little differently with the late adopters or laggards. We showed them that 
according to our research and lighthouse successes, business social networks are here to stay, you can 
ignore them and you will be left out of the group, your colleagues will move on. And eventually, the bottom 
line is that you will have to go because you are not contributing to helping us remain a top tier player. 
Or, you can embrace the change, take control and help to drive more effective collaboration and 
innovation in your teams’ 
 
On one hand, champions embraced the view that orangeESN would enable iSource to be more 
competitive and ensure job security for all iSourcers. On the other however, they consistently explained 
that iSourcers who embraced community objectives and aims ran the risk of generating inefficiencies 
and wasting time, and instead advocated for a “market” grounded rationale that was more focused on 
measurable outcomes. In line with this view, they made the case that iSourcers could use orangeESN 
to improve their access to information and knowledge, and their ability to achieve KPIs (market claim). 
They justified this claim by employing blended logos and pathos appeals to pragmatic legitimacy based 
on iSourcers need to be more productive, and their desire to be recognized for reaching KPIs and 
increasing revenue, as the following quote by a Sales Director: 
‘The reason we have so many dormant communities right now is connected to our early approach where 
we set the objective as just being able to collaborate. I mean, there’s nothing wrong with just saying it 
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will help collaboration because some people can understand that and are convinced by that, but for a lot 
of us that is a very fuzzy hook, you know, collaboration for what, for what purpose?… So the sort of what’s 
in it for me is not directly related to money or profit in the business, and if I want to show consultants and 
senior people that it is useful to have social collaboration, then I have to express it in terms of money- 
getting access to information the information and knowledge you need to reach your KPIs, or promotion 
opportunities, those are other ways of measuring money. So, the employee who is promoted for the results 
that he gets in the business is more looking forward to seeing results because that’s what’s in it for him, 
and they are willing to sacrifice their satisfaction, because he believes that his satisfaction is coming later 
when he has a better job or more money’ 
Justifications aimed at making professional-community and professional-market business cases for 
orangeESN initially emerged after the Gartner survey revealed low community adoption levels in the 
second half of 2012. While change managers’ justifications eventually shifted from being grounded in 
professional-community objectives, champions continued to employ professional market justifications 
until the last quarter of 2013. While change managers justifications eventually shifted from being 
grounded in professional-community objectives, champions continued to employ professional market 
justifications until the last quarter of 2014. This professional-market logic would go on to shape how 
orangeESN was advertised and appropriated amongst consulting iSourcers. In the next stage in 
particular, change managers shifted their justifications to reflect professional-market intentions when 
they highlighted what using orangeESN to “find the right information at the right time”, would mean 
for iSourcers’ everyday activities, and how using orangeESN in this way would ensure iSourcers job 
security and competitiveness. 
Advertising potential value of orangeESN 
In this phase, there was an observed intra-field to inter-field shift in change managers’ justifications, 
as they moved away from “professional-community” interests and instead promoted co-mingled 
“professional-market” interests. These professional-market justifications were often blended to 
consistently convey that orangeESN was a people project, aimed at generating measurable 
enhancements in the value and quality of products and services for iSourcers, partners and customers. 
With this new focus, change team members reported that they dedicated a lot of time and effort to 
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explaining the potential benefits of using orangeESN in order to onboard champions and other 
iSourcers.  
Members reported that they would often use “H2” lighthouse successes like the SAP community, and 
social helpdesk to highlight that orangeESN had the potential to enhance champions and iSourcers 
access to important information and knowledge, and thus, could help them to effectively reach their 
KPIs (claim). These justifications primarily employed logos appeals to pragmatic legitimacy based on 
champions need to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of accessing information and knowledge. 
The following quote from the training presentation for champions demonstrates this: 
One of the benefits social collaboration will bring is ‘productivity, [in] connecting people with relevant 
knowledgeable peers and content, [and thus] drive efficiency of business functions and [enable them to] 
leverage information for business optimization and raise processes agility’ (Champion Training 
Presentation) 
Change managers also frequently used training presentations as an opportunity to make emotional 
appeals to pragmatic legitimacy based on champions desire to become better leaders: 
Another benefit of social collaboration is regarding ‘employee satisfaction, in enabling more agile, 
responsive, efficient and effective leadership’ (Champion Training Presentation) 
Change managers were also keen to highlight that orangeESN communities were already starting to 
have a significant positive impact on reducing email misuse. To support these justifications, change 
managers launched an initiative to award “email-free” certificates to business and work processes that 
did not generate any email. They created momentum around this project by firstly eliminating 
automated and system generated email, and highlighting that they had redesigned over 65 processes to 
be email free. They integrated these results with their latest survey on internal email use to make logos 
appeals to iSourcers need enhance the overall efficiency and effectiveness of their activities, and 
emotional appeals to their desire to enhance iSource’s reputation in the market. A Consulting VP 
demonstrates this in his illustration of how a group of consultants effectively appropriated a 
departmental community for the purpose of ‘doing more with less’: 
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‘A department with over 280 consultant across UK GBUs have been implementing their “going more with 
less” change programme to increase productivity using orangeESN communities and new practices. Since 
December this has resulted in a 64% reduction in internal email usage. This is a fantastic achievement. 
To me it’s critical that we are seen by the market to make progress with our [no-email] story. This kind 
of progress will generate client interest that we can steer towards our “doing more with less” and 
“workforce operations” solutions’ 
Champions employed similar “professional-market” justifications to motivate engagement from front-
line iSourcers. Members reported that they strategically chose non-departmental “H1” and “H2” 
lighthouse successes to explain that orangeESN had the potential to increase productivity and revenues 
by reducing the “cost” (time and effort) of accessing information and reaching KPIs. Importantly, they 
would often compare these successes to the dormant departmental/team communities to explain that 
communities were more likely to generate measurable benefits when they helped iSourcers to manage 
multiple sources of information. These justifications primarily employed logos appeals to pragmatic 
legitimacy based on iSourcers need to effectively access to the right information in order to meet their 
KPIs and customer needs. The quote below from a programme manager and champion illustrates these 
arguments and particularly exemplifies how champions view of value and benefit differed from that of 
CSFs in “H2”: 
‘I do understand why some [iSourcers] would be hooked to [orangeESN] just on the promise that it will 
make them happier and less stressed but other [iSourcers] like the sales consultants need a hook that is a 
bit more tangible. And with H2 we saw a huge drop in usage after about 4 months so I think just saying it 
will make you happier isn’t enough. That’s why we went a bit further to explain that when you use 
[orangeESN] communities with a clear purpose you can be much more productive. We supported this 
with some testimonials from spaces like the SAP expert community where [iSourcers] were saying that 
when they use the SAP community to get answers, they get a wider variety of answers from [iSourcers] 
around the world in a much faster time’ (Programme Manager, Champion) 
In addition, champions also frequently used jiveESNs (from “H1”) customer facing success stories to 
make direct emotional (pathos) appeals to iSourcers’ desire to satisfy their KPIs and be recognized for 
their work. This is demonstrated in the following testimonial from a champion’s training presentation: 
A team of 20 [iSourcers] used a community to find solutions for their outsourcing client’s problems‘ In a 
period of 2months we minimized the mean time to find an expert on a given subject moved from 2 days to 
2 hours, significantly minimizing client disruptions when they had a problem. This was really big for us, 
our managers were impressed, the customer was impressed and [iSourcers] we are now the example in 
our GBU’ (Bid manager, Champion) 
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As a result of champions contestation of professional-community justifications, there was an important 
shift in change managers to promoting professional market concerns. Both change managers and 
champions initiated these professional-market justifications in tandem with the launch of the email-
free certification programme in the third quarter of 2012. They continued to use these justifications in 
their formal and informal communications to advertise the value of orangeESN until the end of 2013. 
These justifications crucially helped to onboard close to 1000 champions in about 2 months. In the next 
stage, they turned their attention to building on this momentum by encouraging iSourcers to appropriate 
orangeESN in ways that help to reap some of the benefits highlighted in this stage. 
Motivating Engagement around OrangeESN 
In this stage change managers shifted their justifications towards encouraging champions to lead by 
example in order to encourage reluctant iSourcers to use and appropriate orangeESN as their main 
collaboration platform. As part of this, change managers were keen to firstly rebrand orangeESN as a 
“serious” business social network rather than a “social media” platform to demonstrate that it was a 
business tool for improving iSourcers access to information and knowledge, and improving their ability 
to reach their KPIs. They did this by primarily employing pathos appeals to champions desire to be 
recognized for satisfying KPI targets and increasing revenue: 
‘We don’t position [orangeESN] as social media but as a business social network. Which means that it 
replaces internal email and all kinds of collaboration and communication related to our jobs is moved 
from email to the social network because we want to have people see each other’s information, contribute 
to it, learn from it, and exploit it to hit your targets and make money for the company. Which is more 
business related and less like the usual talk that you have on Facebook or google plus or whatever you 
use. Tools like Facebook, why should we duplicate them in our company, If you want to chit chat with you 
colleagues then you use Facebook’ (Head of Marketing) 
After re-branding, change managers actively encouraged champions and managers to lead by example 
by contributing their own testimonials of how they used orangeESN communities to “work smarter” 
and reduce their email misuse. These justifications employed pathos appeals to champions desire to be 
empowered to help advance a strategic business initiative, as illustrated in a slide used to explain the 
success story community to champions: 
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 ‘You want to be part of this adoption of smarter ways of working into the company. You want to  inspire 
others through your leadership, to contribute their own success stories. That is what this community is 
about!! Let your colleagues know how you are using orangeESN spaces to deal with the No-email 
challenge, encourage them to discover and contribute their own stories of how they started on the Journey 
to No-email’ (Champions Network Presentation, 2013)  
Change managers were very serious about encouraging iSourcers to contribute their “working smarter” 
success stories and explained that champions who did not help to advance the strategic business 
initiative of reducing email misuse through orangeESN use would not be able to work effectively with 
their colleagues, and would additionally be removed from their leadership positions. These 
“threatening” justifications primarily blended pathos appeals to champions’ fear of being removed from 
leadership and desire to “belong” to the leadership community, with logos appeals to champions need 
for more efficient access to information and knowledge:  
‘As junior leaders at iSource and members of the future leaders group, our champions know the 
importance of being part of a team and working across boundaries ... With over 2000 communities already 
created, and many managers only collaborating within orangeESN, it was inevitable that if they ignore 
orangeESN they would fall out of the loop, out of the culture, out of the leadership group’ (COO, 
Communication) 
They also consistently explained to champions that based on “H2”, they found that training and guiding 
iSourcers on how to create, use and nurture communities was essential to ensuring that orangeESN was 
used in the right way. They supported this claim by creating training KPIs and awarding bonuses to 
managers and champions who attended training sessions and trained others. These justifications 
primarily employed blended logos appeals to champions need for more efficient and effective 
innovation practices, and pathos appeals to their sense of responsibility as leaders, and their desire to 
be recognized for satisfying their KPIs, as illustrated in the following quote: 
‘We expect that our champions will act as “intrapreneurs”, taking responsibility for driving innovation 
and turning ideas into profitable services or products. To do this they need to lead the change in the 
organisation by driving effective engagement in [orangeESN] communities. One way of doing this change 
is through training and support…   To be absolutely clear that we are damn serious about adopting 
smarter ways of working using [orangeESN], training team leaders and other managers is part of the 
bonus of all champions and top managers. They will have their H3 bonus if and only if they achieve this 
objective, that more than 95% of managers in their GBUs are trained. This is not about a tool, this is 
about transforming the way that we work to be smarter ’ (Client Engagement Director) 
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By mid 2013, change managers successfully on-boarded about 2500 champions around the world. 
These champions justifications were aimed at encouraging iSourcers to appropriate orangeESN 
communities based on their potential to produce measurable business benefits, particularly enhanced 
revenue and productivity. Members reported that they frequently used customer facing successes from 
“H1” and “H2”, like the jiveESN pilots, to demonstrate to reluctant leaders and managers that unlike 
the dormant departmental communities in “H2”, communities can be appropriated in ways that help to 
reduce the time and effort required to reach KPIs and access knowledge and information. In line with 
this, they advocated for an alternative community engagement approach based on customer projects, 
rather than on departments and teams. They specifically encouraged iSourcers to create communities 
around specific client projects, and invite iSourcers from around the world to contribute, discuss and 
take action on client opportunities. These justifications primarily blended logos appeals to iSourcers 
need to efficiently access information to reach KPIs and enhance their revenues, with pathos appeals 
to their desire to be recognized for their contributions to the company. These rhetorical justifications 
are illustrated in the following quote where a Business Information Manager presents the idea for client 
facing communities, which were later widely appropriated: 
‘For a big client there are several service lines enforced. Normally they are competing with each other 
because they have their own P&L so we brought these people together in a community so they would 
share what is happening at the client side, where are the opportunities, what everyone is doing, we get a 
more clear view of what is happening at this client by making use of the space. You just have to take into 
account that it can happen that there are lots of different sales people handling a single account yeah. So 
[with orangeESN spaces] you would be working in a more streamlined and transparent way thereby 
satisfying your P&L much more effectively and creating more opportunities for the company. Normally, 
we had a CRM system where you can put in this information but it was not always very solid’ 
In training sessions, champions encouraged team leaders and managers who to manage all communities 
as business, especially departmental/team communities. This objective was partly achieved by 
streamlining the community creation workflow so that communities with similar keywords and 
purposes would automatically be integrated into existing communities. Champions also specifically 
explained to managers that a community would only be approved if it had clear purpose and clear ways 
of measuring its progress towards that purpose. They explained that less duplication and clearer 
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purposes would foster easier access to relevant sources of information. They convinced managers of 
these claims by employing logos appeals based on their need to effectively access information to reach 
their KPIs and enhance their productivity, and pathos appeals to their sense of responsibility as leaders: 
‘Each project manager, each team leader, should run their team as a business. We expect each manager 
to be business developers, working and meeting their budgets, being sharp with reporting and everyday 
management. These behaviours need to be transferred to the online community, so if community leaders 
want their community to be responsive to clients and KPIs they must design and lead their communities 
as business developers, so they should  define clear purpose statements and community tags, conduct due 
diligence on whether there is a community out there that suits their team’s needs  … This way they can 
continuously improve client satisfaction and business unit performance’ (orangeESN Training 
Presentation, 2013) 
Champions also encouraged engagement with orangeESN communities by advocating for the 
definition of KPIs and incentives for using orangeESN. As a result the change team specified that 
leaders who did not attend orangeESN training sessions would not receive their full yearly bonus. 
Additionally, all iSourcers would receive an additional incentive for reducing their internal email traffic 
by 10% every quarter. Champions justified these orangeESN KPIs by blending rational(logos) appeals 
to iSourcers need efficiently reach their KPIs and emotional appeals to their desire to be recognized 
reaching their KPIs. This is demonstrated in the following quote by a Sales Performance Manager: 
‘What we are trying to enforce within our community landscape is making everything measurable, If you 
can’t measure it, you can’t manage it. People at iSource are used to only moving based on financial 
targets because we are a cost focused company.  So with orangeESN you cannot expect that they will start 
using it if they are not given specific incentives and KPIs.’ 
In line with their arguments for running communities as businesses and making everything measurable, 
champions also advocated for setting quarterly email reduction targets within consulting teams in order 
to drive more orangeESN engagement. Accordingly, champions in each GBU set targets in the 
consulting departments to decrease email use by 60% from November 2012 to June 2013. These 
communications primarily employed pathos appeals to consultants’ desire to win and be recognized 
for their accomplishments (exchange), and logos appeals to consultants need to reduce inefficiencies 
(email misuse) (exchange). One champion reflects on how these justifications effectively drove 
orangeESN engagement in a UK consulting location:  
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Since we were an organisation with an international footprint ‘When we kept track and invested in getting 
email reduction numbers, we also made them visible to encourage country by country comparisons. And 
then people took the initiative to say hey, we need to beat Germany, lets reduce our email. That’s what 
helped us in consulting. We had a target to reduce email by 60% and we reached that target, we reduced 
email significantly and that was something we were proud of because we knew we reduced email 
inefficiencies and did better than the others’ (Consulting Business Information, Champion) 
Change managers and champions first started to use these professional-market justifications to 
encourage orangeESN participation after the software was updated in the last quarter of 2013. They 
continued to use similar rhetorical arguments in the majority of their communications until the last 
quarter of 2014.  
6.5.3 Diffusion Outcomes 
Like the previous infusions, the goal of this infusion was also to increase iSourcers awareness of the 
need to adopt and engage with ESN, and build their desire to actively participate in orangeESN 
communities, as a way to support iSource’s transformation efforts, and “market” objectives. The 
change team and champions did this by mobilizing concerted and consistent pathos and logos appeals 
over three legitimation phases. 
In “rationale framing” and “advertising value”, change managers and champions contested 
“professional” and “market” interests. Like the previous infusion, the intra-field to inter-field in change 
managers justifications signaled that co-mingled “professional-market” interests were gaining 
legitimacy and having an overall greater impact over “professional-community” interests. Accordingly, 
champions “professional-market” intentions “rationale framing” was to explain that appropriating 
orangeESN to openly collaborate without a purpose was inefficient and ineffective. Instead, they made 
the case that orangeESN could ensure job security and competitiveness by enabling iSourcers to “find 
the right information at the right time”.  
In “advertising value”, both champions and change managers had the “professional-market” intention 
of highlighting the value of “finding the right information at the right time”, and accordingly, building 
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interest for appropriating orangeESN to increase productivity and revenues. In “motivating 
engagement”, their combined justifications were aimed at encouraging the appropriation of orangeESN 
to “find the right information at the right time” in their day-to-day work, in order to increase 
productivity and revenues. These justifications gradually fostered meaning making the theme of using 
orangeESN to “find the right information at the right time”, especially within consulting departments.  
Champions constructed this theorization and the justifications around it by exploiting the opportunity 
to build on the previous infusion’s professional-community justifications, and events. They specifically 
used the professional-community objectives of enhancing knowledge sharing, innovation and job 
satisfaction for iSourcers, as the foundation to promote their market interests of reducing the time and 
effort required for consultants to find relevant information and knowledge. They also used a number of 
key “H2” failures like the dormant departmental communities to de-legitimate the viral appropriation 
of communities for open collaboration.  
The combination of these de-legitimating justifications together with justifications building on “H1” 
and “H2” successes helped them to instead legitimate the appropriation of customer-centric and 
departmental/team communities with clear strategies, purposes and measurable goals. This outcome 
was directly in line with their larger professional-market objectives of appropriating orangeESN to 
enhance revenue and productivity. Another important consequence of the way that they constructed 
and mobilized their justifications, was their ability to quickly compel change managers’ to support their 
professional-market interests for orangeESN.  
The loss of legitimacy for professional-community objectives resulted in the restoration of increasing 
top-down engagement strategies from this period until about the third quarter of 2013. By this time, the 
drift to professional-market justifications produced a 30% reduction in emails per inbox (as compared 
to levels surveyed in 2011), and over 14, 000 unique consultants posting to orangeESN communities 
at least once per week.  Additionally, there were close to 60, 000 iSourcers (35% of which were 
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consultants) participating in over 4500 client-based communities to “get the right information at the 
right time”. Similar to the previous infusion however, consultants also created a number of successful 
competency (expertise) based communities. For example, consultants reported that the contract 
management community enhanced the productivity and management of what was previously an 
“inefficient and unstandardized” process for customizing contracts to local needs: 
‘The community environment allows for a level of mass collaboration among more than 100 people that 
is not achievable with email. The community collectively creates, adjusts and determines exceptions to 
contracts. As a result, the new contracts and new contracting processes better serve local operations. So 
the number of customized, nonstandard contracts has dropped by more than 50%, saving the productivity 
cost of downstream triage and corrective actions. As an added benefit, relations between [legal] and the 
local offices have never been better.’ (Gartner research) 
There were also frequent references communities like the social project management hub and social 
procurement community (Appendix B4), which were also created with the purpose of solving an 
existing business problem, and ignited by orangeESN KPIs. However, change managers were 
compelled to rethink their engagement justifications in order to repair orangeESN’s reputation after a 
technical failure caused a significant decrease in orangeESN’s momentum.  
6.6 Wider Diffusion 
6.6.1 Guiding Logics and Target Audience 
Towards to end of 2013, the performance of the orangeESN platform dropped significantly since its 
cloud architecture could not scale with the increasing number of new users (over 70, 000). At the same 
time the change team also reported that consultants, technologists and other senior managers were 
increasingly reporting concerns with the fact that their sensitive work data was being stored in the 
cloud. Subsequent surveys revealed that there were less than 3000 unique posts per week compared to 
highs of 14000 in 2013. Even after relocating the orangeESN database to more secure and reliable in-
house servers, usage levels remained low and continued to decline. One technology consultant 
explained her frustrations saying: 
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“After a couple months of having to use different log in options, not having access, waiting 10 minutes 
for pages to load and other things, I just didn’t try to go to it anymore because it was so unreliable… Even 
when I did use [orangeESN], I’d also been sending all my messages and documents by email, especially 
the really sensitive ones. Email is much more reliable right now, … and better for sensitive data, much 
more than [orangeESN]” 
 
Overall, iSourcers trust in orangeESN was very low and change managers acknowledged that they 
needed to take urgent action in order to meet their 3 year deadline. Internal research by the extended 
steering team concluded that the root cause of the low engagement was a lack of intrinsic motivation 
across business technologists, consultant and other senior managers for professional objectives of 
enhancing the quality and value of services and products for customers, iSourcers and partners alike. 
This was especially evident in the client-focused communities where iSourcers who were more focused 
on satisfying orangeESN usage KPIs were being selectively transparent at sharing information with 
their colleagues at the expense of the customers: 
‘Three or four years ago before we launched no-email we discussed the idea of motivation and what drives 
it. And we came to the conclusion that we wanted to encourage [iSourcers] to be intrinsically motivated 
to change their behaviours and use the business social network. But over time as we explained 
[orangeESN] in different ways to different groups we moved away from that, to having today a lot of 
individuals only using [orangeESN] because of some external motivation or incentive. For example, in 
the sales communities everyone we have sales people from 3 or 7 different teams going into the same 
client account, each of these teams has their own P&L and [orangeESN] KPIs so they share just enough 
information, they might just copy and paste something from google or whatever to meet their [orangeESN] 
KPIs but don’t share useful information in order to get more from that client than the other team and 
reach their P&L targets.’(Head of Marketing) 
Early adopting business technologists were also displaying low levels intrinsic motivation for 
professional objectives since they primarily collaborated amongst themselves in their department and 
team spaces.  
In the following months, change managers reported that their goal was to restore trust in the orangeESN 
platform and generate more intrinsic motivation for participation. They did this by employing strategic 
communications and actions to directly onboard shop floor employees from these groups into the 
steering team as local leaders or “orange heroes” and “tribe leaders”. This enabled the change managers 
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to dramatically extend the reach of their “professional” agenda, and influence the actions of CSPs and 
champions from the ground up. More importantly, they refined their “professional” agenda to be 
directly focused on customers. Rather than positioning orangeESN as a survival (as with technologists) 
or competitive imperative (consultants) as with the previous “professional” agendas, they instead 
dedicated more focus on explaining that orangeESN use would help enhance the quality of product and 
services for customers. Members reported that based on their observations of what worked and didn’t 
work in the previous infusions they realized that communities and teams with a strong customer focus 
were especially effective and vibrant. Moreover, a survey of iSourcers views on “smart work” 
conducted at the time revealed that regardless of whether members spoke about orangeESN’s role in 
decreasing email misuse, or enhancing collaboration and productivity, the common theme was a 
customer focus. 
As these refined “professional” justifications helped to gradually increase the number of local front-
line leaders, CSPs and champions justifications also shifted to reflect a purely customer focused 
“professional” logic. Local leaders helped CSPs and champions to provide crucial support and guidance 
to members of local orangeESN communities by primarily offering informal day-today training to 
support change managers’ more formal training sessions like the Pitch workshop.  Zero heroes and 
tribe leaders were also the earliest contributors to the video training community where everyday 
employees could contribute video testimonials of how they use orangeESN for their day-to-day 
activities. These actions and the strategic communications around them, created more opportunities for 
distributed (inter-group) collective meaning making among business technologist and consultants, and 
crucially led to the growth of professionally focused competency-based communities. To justify this 
refined professional focus, Change managers and local leaders (orange heroes and tribe leaders) 
employed inter-field syllogisms, which primarily made pathos appeals to pragmatic legitimacy in 
explaining orangeESN’s rationale, highlighting its value, and motivating engagement around its form 
and function.  
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6.6.2 Rhetorical Justifications 
Rationale framing for orangeESN 
Change managers a result used general references to the communications around “H2” SAP and 
contract management communities to explain that orangeESN was proven to help iSourcers deliver 
more innovative and “smart” solutions to customers. They further justified this business case with 
iSourcers by employing purely emotional (pathos) appeals to iSourcers sense of responsibility to 
deliver better products and services to customers. For example, a video message frequently broadcasted 
in informal meeting spaces around iSource highlights this customer focus: 
 ‘At the end of the day, regardless of where you work in [iSource] you should be doing something that will 
help deliver a better service for customers. And when your customer is happier then you are obviously 
doing a better job yeah… Serving the customer better should be all iSourcers number one priority, and 
we know from success experiences that that [orangeESN] has helped us to be more collaborative, 
productive and deliver more innovative solutions to customers. this is how we work smarter!… So as an 
iSourcer its your responsibility to find a way to use [orangeESN] to do just that, because we know and 
you know that it is possible.’ (Video Advertisement) 
Change managers also refined their justifications to emphasize that at its core, working smarter is about 
customer satisfaction. In these arguments they primarily employed pathos appeals to pragmatic 
legitimacy based on iSourcers desire to be recognized for their contributions to the iSource community. 
For example, this message was consistently communicated to explain the purpose of the newly- 
introduced “what’s in it for me” (WIIFM) training workshop: 
‘It’s not enough to say that we are working smartly because we have changed our behaviours and adopted 
orangeESN to reduce email overload, or helped our colleagues solve a problem, or improved the 
efficiency of our work processes and workflows. Our no-email journey so far has shown us the most 
successful and recognized communities are those that have had a significant customer impact… These 
stories have also shown us that job satisfaction, increased revenue and profits are best measured by with 
customer impact’ (Knowledge manager, CSP) 
Change managers initially started to communicate this customer focused message about a month after 
the orangeESN database was relocated internally in 2013. This message was consistently reinforced 
throughout 2014 in their presentations, meetings, training and interviews. While their target audience 
was not specifically CSPs and champions, they did adjust and fine-tune all their communications and 
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awareness campaigns involving CSPs and champions (such as WIIFM workshop) to reflect this shift 
to more professional means and aims.  
This rationale was crucial for shaping the content of future advertising and motivation communications. 
In the next phase in particular, change managers focus was to demonstrate to iSourcers what “working 
smarter” looks like in practice, or how orangeESN could be used to enhance customer satisfaction.     
Advertising Potential Value of OrangeESN 
Members reported that they carefully drew on success stories like the SAP community to highlight that 
the collective intelligence that comes with having more visibility of experts and information would 
enhance individual iSourcers’ ability to meet customer needs. The idea of collective intelligence 
benefits simultaneously appealed to business technologists who valued collaboration and open sharing 
of expertise, and consultants who valued productivity and being able to access the right information at 
the right time. These arguments also employed rhetorical appeals to iSourcers’ desire to “belong” to 
the iSource community and be recognized for their contributions to the community. The Head of Cyber 
Security explained the value of collective intelligence as follows: 
‘If you think about how we use orangeESN in our personal capacity, we use it for sharing information, 
for finding out what’s going on, for telling people what’s going on. And if you translate that into the 
business side and going the extra mile for customers, regardless of which part of the business you’re in, 
it makes sense for building a network of relations and knowledge with colleagues around the world, and 
using those connections to deliver more innovation to customers. For instance, this week I did a 
presentation at a client site on big data. I immediately went out to the community and said right, give me 
some cool stories from all over the world, I mean I know a whole pile of things but I know there will be 
other things out there, tell me what they are? And I know the communities where people will be actively 
watching that, and I know they will respond, and I can probably predict some of the people who will 
respond, and I can guarantee that they’ll be some people who will respond that I’ve never heard of before.’ 
 
Change managers also advanced the customer focused view that working smarter with orangeESN can 
improve the bonds and social relations between iSourcers and their customers, and consequently lead 
to more innovative customer solutions. These communications coincided with a new organisation wide 
initiative to encourage more innovation by increasing the opportunities for internal collaboration, and 
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partnering with third parties on new and existing products and services. Members used the successful 
customer focused communities from the previous infusions to explain that working smarter also meant 
shifting the iSourcer-customer relationship from supplier-customer to equal partners. These 
explanations also mostly employed pathos appeals to iSourcers’ desire to be recognized for their 
innovation contributions: 
‘We now have more of an emphasis on driving innovation on a customer level, whereas previously, its 
wasn’t that there was less drive to do it, but it was less clear how to achieve until now. With the support 
of orangeESN communities we now have a lot of innovation reviews where we all share the latest, greatest 
of xyz, service offerings, what’s happening in the market place. we want to do a lot more partnering with 
organisations who will go to market with us on certain services. There’s a lot more happening in that 
space than I can recognize previously. Just recently we’ve started to check that iSourcers innovation 
contributions either yearly or half yearly, and recognise and reward them for that. That has happened at 
least 3 or 4 time in the past year in my department’ (Network Service Unit Manager) 
Change managers also spent a lot of time and effort explaining that iSourcers who tapped into the 
collective intelligence and innovation benefits would gradually develop the entrepreneurial skill and 
profile that is required to become iSource leaders. These justifications were directly related to their 
primary objective of encouraging more local leadership. Again, the primary form of rhetorical appeal 
employed was a pathos appeal to iSourcers desire to belong to a community of internal entrepreneurs, 
and become leaders, as demonstrated in the following quote from the Head of the Smart Work 
Committee: 
The aim is to use orangeESN to help deliver more innovation to customers because over the year we have 
lost that entrepreneurial spirit in identifying need sand delivering services to customer, ’As we are getting 
bigger as an organisation and more global, the responsibilities to make those decisions are being taken 
away and put into a global organisation to consolidate and get the right people looking at the right thing 
and standardizing on service offerings and technologies like orangeESN, to match that. When we rolled 
out orangeESN we purposely adopted a top down approach to development and communication  to drive 
that standardization and the efficiencies that come with it, but we lost some of that agility and the ability 
to respond to requirements and think out of the box because, our change team and the employees as a 
result were limited by the toolbox that was given by the global people, which may not necessarily put 
iSourcers in the best position to meet customers’ requirements. What we want to get to is a position where 
all shop floor employees embrace an entrepreneurial spirit and takes risks to innovate, take direct 
responsibility for turning ideas into great customer products, and really lead the change in the 
organisation to get buy in and ensure orangeESN success… Essentially leaving it up to them to use the 
range of orangeESN technologies in whatever way best allows them to tap into knowledge around the 
organisation meet customer needs.’ 
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Change managers started to frequently communicate these messages prior to the formal launch of the 
orange hero initiative in early in 2014. Similar to the rationale arguments, these justifications were also 
continually expressed in training material like the WIIFM workshops, presentations and meeting 
throughout 2014, but became less prevalent as the orange hero community grew. In the next stage, 
change managers looked to build on this momentum by encouraging iSourcers to begin appropriating 
orangeESN in order to reap some of the benefits highlighted in this stage. 
Motivating engagement around orangeESN 
Justifications in this stage were focused on encouraging technologists, consultants and senior staff to 
appropriate orangeESN to work smarter towards enhancing customer satisfaction. Along these lines, 
change managers redesigned training videos to be less employee specific in order to drive the 
innovation and customer focus to a wider range of shop floor employees (Appendix B5). These videos 
were frequently displayed in formal and informal meeting spaces across the world and were also easily 
accessible on orangeESN. Members reported that they purposely created a single two minute video for 
engineers, team leaders, project managers and service delivery managers role because iSourcers could 
relate to at least one of these roles. 
The justifications in each video were also carefully constructed to ensure that ‘each video spoke to 
iSourcers hearts and minds by using cartoons and humour, but also absolutely serious, by illustrating 
how orangeESN fits in, and improves each role’s workflow and ability to reach client objective’ (Head 
Change Manager). These videos therefore employed primarily pathos appeals to employees desire for 
enhanced job satisfaction, as illustrated in this excerpt from the bid manager training cartoon: 
‘At her desk, Kim has identified the need to involve Kirpal to make a decision on the pricing principle. 
This is easy with [orangeESN]. She simply adds Kirpal to the recipient list of her collaborative posts. He 
now has access to all the information required for the decision. With all this going on, the end of the 
working day arrives quickly. Kim checks the percentage completion of the deliverables with a glance on 
the status tracking page in the [orangeESN] bid space. She can go home now feeling confident. Things 
are under control’ (Bid manager Use Case Video) 
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Another key goal of these videos was to improve the reputation of orangeESN by demonstrating how 
orangeESN was “in iSourcers best interest”, and suggesting that it was a necessity in both their work 
and personal lives. Change managers did this by employing pathos appeals to iSourcers’ desire to have 
reliable and high performing technologies to support their work. This was especially illustrated in the 
conclusion to each of these videos, as illustrated in the following excerpts: 
‘Kim is looking forward to the weekend, she has invited friends over to watch the grand prix. She realizes 
that [orangeESN] tools are like the tools used by a pit team to find tune a formula one car in super quick 
time. Or in Kim’s case, develop a winning bid.’  (Bid Manager use video) 
‘John leaves work. Infront of the theatre where he is meeting his girlfriend [Kate] he checks his phone in 
the [orangeESN] watercooler space for comments and ratings on the latest avengers film. Kate seems 
happy with this choice. Thank you [orangeESN] for super powers !’(Engineer use video) 
At the same time, change members introduced the “What’s in it for me” training experience (WIIFM) 
where CSPs and champions worked with 4 teams of iSourcers to design orangeESN workflows.  
Workshops were purposely comprised of senior and front-line iSourcers from different consulting and 
technical departments in order to create opportunities for learning and discussion between teams that 
would not normally collaborate. Workshop trainers explained that the purpose of the WIIFM was to 
enable iSourcers to envision usage patterns that were uniquely suited to their context and needs and 
would put them in a better position to deliver more innovative solutions to customers. Change managers 
believed that this claim was more professional than their less successful attempts to push a well-being 
and job security agenda, since it was more inclusive of all stakeholders needs.  
In most cases change managers did not support these justifications with specific pieces of evidence 
since they knew that iSourcers were highly aware of success stories from the previous infusion. Instead, 
they justified these claims with pathos appeals to iSourcers’ desire to be recognized for delivering 
innovative customer solutions and for enhanced job satisfaction. The following quote for the Head of 
Business Information illustrates how trainers explained the WIIFM workshop to iSourcers: 
So we had to find good reasons in the area of what is important for all [iSourcers], ‘An [iSourcer] who 
is promoted for the results that he gets in the business is more looking for a tangible results because that’s 
what in it for him, and he may be less interested in having fun at work because he doesn’t get paid for 
having fun. On the other hand, other [iSourcer] get satisfaction from collaborating openly, being able to 
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work together, unique their expertise to help others, and come up with smarter solutions… I think that if 
you conceptualize these cases, it’s the same as what’s in it for me,  the button or carrot that’s in it is the 
same, because it’s just that you are recognized for something and you want to know that it will help you 
deliver better service to your colleagues and customers, and that social media can have a place to support 
you to do it better.’ 
Change managers also focused training sessions on encouraging iSourcers to create more competency 
based communities. Change managers noted that over the previous infusions, communities like the 
SAP and contract management were operating in ways that were aligned to their customer focus by 
continually delivering innovative solutions to customers. They also encouraged iSourcers to create 
customer integrated communities, that offered clients the opportunity to be community members and 
collaborate directly with relevant iSource team members. Change managers justified both of these new 
communities as ways to help shift the customer-iSourcer relationship from customer-supplier to 
partners, in order to foster an entrepreneurial spirit and generate more innovation. They supported these 
claims with pathos appeals to iSourcers’ desire for enhanced job satisfaction, and their desire to be 
recognized for their innovation contributions. This is demonstrated in the WIIFM training presentation 
that illustrates the benefits of the SAP expert community: 
‘When [iSourcers] had difficulty with a SAP project at a customer environment they could find an expert 
to solve a problem in about 45 minutes, so ‘the benefit for the user to participate is that they have 
a platform where they can ask their question and get support in a timely manner when needed.  
On the other hand it is also about sharing their knowledge, views & insights to help other 
[iSource] SAP colleagues. Our expectation is that this becomes a community that will support 
itself, that is fun to use and that will improve [iSource’s] performance by helping each other. The 
goal we want to achieve to is to help connecting those who need to know with those who know 
and as such help each other in gain quicker access to SAP Expertise & reduce time to resolution’ 
(WIIFM Training Presentation) 
Another goal of the redesigned WIIFM training programme was to foster an entrepreneurial spirit 
amongst shop floor iSourcers. They did this by creating opportunities for iSourcers to collaborate with 
senior leaders and different teams of iSourcers to come up with their own orangeESN use patterns. In 
this spirit, change managers also introduced several gamification initiatives to enable iSourcers to 
develop an entrepreneurial spirit, and to take the first steps to becoming orangeESN leaders.  
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The first of these initiatives was the “orange hero” initiative. Shop floor employees could become 
orange heroes by leading the change to dramatically reducing their email use and driving traffic to 
orangeESN. For instance, in a similar manner to how champions encouraged engagement from 
consultants, the majority of orange heroes set an automatic email reply explaining that they would only 
be communicating via orangeESN or in person, and not via email. Additionally, these criteria were also 
measured through orangeESN profile metrics such as having a certain number of user generated 
endorsements for orangeESN activity skills such as contributor, reader, and leader. Employees that 
satisfied these criteria were rewarded with special badges on their orangeESN profiles and personal 
workspaces, and an invitation to the secret “orange garden” community where they could collaborate 
and learn from other orange heroes. Orange heroes who were also community leaders were additionally 
rewarded with membership to an ’orange travelers’ community (Appendix B6) where they had the 
opportunity to directly shape no-email strategy with senior leaders such as the CEO.  
Change managers reported that they justified the orange hero initiative as a way for shop floor iSourcers 
to play an integral role in the steering team on a strategic business transformation initiative. They were 
also keen to highlight that those shop floor employees who took action to reduce email misuse, and use 
orangeESN in new ways would significantly enhance their reputation and upward mobility in iSource. 
Accordingly, they convinced iSourcers by employing primarily pathos appeals to their desire to help 
lead a strategic initiative and “belong” to a highly respected community. The following excerpt from 
the orange travelers community purpose statement illustrates these justifications: 
‘It’s a big challenge, but together we can make it work and you are invited to join the no-email journey 
with us… A [Orange Hero] is someone who took this decision and support the strategic [no-email] target, 
knowing that the world is watching us. A growing number of colleagues support this initiative. You will 
recognize them with the badge in their orangeESN profile picture and their out of office reply in Outlook. 
They stopped the unnecessary internal email. Are you one of the people who also will be mentioned as 
creator of success?’ 
Change managers’ justifications around these initiatives remained customer focused and driven by the 
theme “working smarter” throughout 2014, but declined in frequency at the start of 2015. Change 
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managers did not specifically outline what working smarter meant in their communications but instead 
focused on motivating iSourcers to work in a more entrepreneurial way.  
6.6.3 Diffusion Outcomes 
Like the previous infusions, the goal of this infusion was also to increase iSourcers awareness of the 
need to adopt and engage with ESN, and build their desire to actively appropriate orangeESN according 
to customer –focused “professional” objectives. The change team, and eventually orange heroes and 
tribe leaders did this by mobilizing concerted pathos appeals to create new meanings across three 
legitimating phases. 
In “rationale framing”, change managers’ intention was to ensure that all employees, regardless of their 
position or role in the company, knew the importance of having a more customer focused view in their 
day-today work, and understood the meaning and significance of “working smarter”. In “value 
advertising” their intention was to build interest for, and highlight the value of using orangeESN to 
“working smarter” towards customer satisfaction. They specifically highlighted that iSourcers who 
used orangeESN to work smarter could increase their collective intelligence, innovation, and 
entrepreneurial and leadership skills. In “motivating engagement” their intention was to encourage shop 
floor iSourcers to proactively build on the orangeESN usage patterns of other iSourcers, and 
appropriate orangeESN in ways that would put them in better positions to deliver more innovative 
solutions to customers. Justifications across these phases gradually generated collective meaning-
making across consultants, business technologists, and senior managers, around the common theme or 
intra-organisational theorization of appropriating ESN to “work smarter together”.   
Champions constructed this theorization and the justifications around it by building on previous 
infusions’ business cases, success stories, failures, ESN features and functions, and supporting 
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organisational structures and procedures. These consolidated justifications proved to be very effective, 
as illustrated in the following quote: 
Within a month these initiatives and justifications were already motivating significant amounts of local 
leadership among shop floor employees. The orange hero community grew virally and exponentially with 
every passing week as orange heroes reported that ‘iSourcers were asking us what are these badges and 
how can I get one, and what are you guys doing in this secret community, how do I join?’ (Technical 
consultant, orange hero).  
As orange hero numbers grew to about 10,000 members around the world by mid 2014, the change 
team’s surveys showed a 65%reduction in emails per inbox (as compared to levels surveyed in 2011). 
The Head of Collaboration summarized these technological and cultural change successes in the 
following quote: 
We have significantly progressed to becoming a truly collaborative and social business with our expert 
communities. Right now, ‘We moved from a traditional hierarchy based organisation to a collaborative, 
community led organisation. Without the limitations of country borders or business unit silos, we are 
bringing together very diverse teams to unlock our creative and innovation power for a successful future 
business. In this continuity, we are simplifying our leadership model to become more agile, customers 
communities oriented, fully networked and Digital compatible organisation; mainly because high number 
of our knowledge workers are moving from a traditional pyramidal model to a collaborative networked 
community model with less complexity and more crowd collaboration’ 
Along with these successes, surveys showed that there were over 10, 500 primarily competency based, 
client centric and client integrated communities, where about 100,000 technologists, consultants and 
senior managers were signed up and about 40% of sign ups were actively engaged asking questions, 
offering suggestions and solving customer problems.  
6.7 Summary of Analysis 
I introduced this section by explaining my intention to use the case of ESN evolution outlined in the 
chapter 5 to illustrate how the spread of ESN within iSource was a process of internal diffusion, which 
was shaped by historically constructed organisational complexity on one hand and mutually reinforcing 
rhetorical justifications on the other. Organisational complexity at iSource is particularly evidenced by 
its composition of complex hierarchies of highly institutionalized communities of actors, who were 
brought together through a host of organisational mergers. iSourcers tended to balance the concerns of 
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competing professional, market and community logics in their everyday work and decision making. 
These logics are manifested in iSourcers’ common organising principles, identities, behavioural 
assumptions and material and symbolic structures and practices. However, key events along iSource’s 
ESN journey caused distinct logics to become consistently more salient to how specific communities 
of iSourcers understood and interpreted ESN’s usefulness and importance over time. As the salience 
of these logics shifted, different communities of iSourcers mobilized competing rhetorical arguments 
or justifications to legitimate distinctly different ideas for appropriating ESN.  
However, managers or institutional entrepreneurs in each of these communities constructed and 
mobilized their legitimating arguments according to a consistent pattern of pragmatic rationale 
framing”, “value advertising”, and “motivating engagement” phases. In the “rationale framing” phase, 
movement entrepreneurs employed justifications with the aim of constructing, framing and promoting 
widespread understanding for the business case behind their ESN appropriation ideas. This business 
case basically explained why the audience needed to support and engage with ESN. In the next phase, 
movement entrepreneurs’ aim was to demonstrate and convince the audience of the value of 
appropriating ESN according to their outlined business case. The “advertised value” essentially 
highlighted benefits, with the strategic aim of demonstrating what the intended change or appropriation 
looks like in practice, and thus providing some guidance on how to appropriate ESN. Finally, after 
priming the audience for the change, managers encouraged them to actually engage with material ESN 
features, and integrate the resulting practices into their day-to-day activities, in ways that were 
responsive to the “whys” of the framed business case and the “hows” of the advertised value.  
These phases were instrumental to enabling the intra-community meaning- making or theorizing that 
was instrumental to managers justifications and diffusion outcomes across scientific community, 
business technologist and consultant orangeESN infusions. These phases were also crucial to the inter-
community meaning making that eventually generated widespread internal ESN diffusion. In each 
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infusion, I observed that while institutional entrepreneurs engaged in meaning making among 
themselves (particularly during rational framing), they spent the majority of their time fostering 
meaning making among members of the immediate audience. These meaning-making processes relied 
on key strategic grafting and co-opting processes. Strategically grafting, or building on the earlier 
rhetorical justifications and related communications, and co-opting like-minded academic researchers, 
success stories, and other forms of data helped entrepreneurs to effectively and focus their current 
rhetorical justifications on gaining pragmatic legitimacy, and facilitating meaning making, according 
to specific interests and objectives.  
Over time, these combined processes were instrumental in facilitating meaning-making across the key 
stakeholder groups, in order to generate wider internal ESN diffusion. In chapter 7, I will continue to 
explore the nature of internal ESN diffusion in light of these rhetorical legitimation and  institutional 
dynamics, and will focus more on how rhetorical legitimation and institutional complexity shape 
internal diffusion dynamics and outcomes. 
!  
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7 DISCUSSION 
 
My key contribution in this research is to develop a conceptual model of how new IT innovations 
diffuse within organisations (Figure 7.1). I illustrate this phenomenon using the case of ESN diffusion 
within iSource to highlight the specific mechanisms and processes by which innovations adopted at an 
organisational level, are justified, legitimated and diffused at the micro-level of everyday work within 
the organisation, as well as the enabling and precipitating dynamics that condition and trigger these 
mechanisms. 
In this section I will discuss the ways in which this conceptual model advances theory in a number of 
IS research domains, namely its role in explaining how new IT innovations and their related macro-
level organising visions are translated into intra-organisational theorizations and front- line practices.  
I specifically show how top-down rhetorical legitimation during intra-organisational theorizing drives 
the process of legitimating new IT ontologies, and de-legitimating competing technologies, by 
respectively narrowing and widening multi-dimensional technical, cultural and political product-
organisation institutional gaps (infusion variance). Further, by conceptualizing legitimation as a process 
that is embedded in wider, often competing institutional logics, my findings also illuminate how 
organisational actors proactively navigate institutional complexity and conflict at the micro-level 
(Pache and Santos, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011). 
7.1 Internal Diffusion Model 
The primary goal of my conceptual model of internal IT diffusion is to illuminate the process of how 
field and organisational level conceptualizations of new IT innovations are transformed into front- line 
188!
practice (Figure 7.1).  In pursuing this goal, I importantly add to the underserved area of research into 
top- down attempts to facilitate this IT translation process by illuminating the role of managers 
rhetorical legitimation actions (Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell, 2014; Reay et al., 2013). 
This model extends several areas of organisational and IS research. Following the linguistic turn in the 
study of IT evolution phenomena (Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell, 2014; Scarbrough, Robertson and 
Swan, 2015; Hsu, Huang and Galliers, 2014), this model demonstrates that the examination of 
rhetorical legitimation accounts around a digital innovation is well suited to understanding how digital 
innovations are appropriated and evolve over development, implementation and use in complex 
organisational settings. Internal diffusion therefore offers an “extended design” view that is able to 
capture how digital innovations like ESN are shaped over time and across multiple contexts (Pollock 
and Williams, 2010; Karasti, Baker and Millerand, 2010). This “extended design” view is consistent 
with Leonardi’s (2009)  broader call for “synchronous” IS studies that empirically and theoretically 
illustrate how technology co-evolves with organisational structures, or how socio-technical activities 
over technology development create the interpretive conditions that shape the activities within 
implementation or use. Leonardi (2009) particularly states that, 
‘As the perceptions held by actors, their appropriations, and their interaction patterns change to create 
a new sociocultural matrix in which the interaction of new groups now seems appropriate, negotiations 
take on new meanings, closure occurs for different reasons, and momentum of a particular technological 
design or use strategy is justified.’ 
Similar to these propositions, the internal diffusion model conceptualizes technological evolution as a 
process where material technological features are shaped by stakeholder negotiations, values and 
practices, and vice versa. The model is specifically rooted in the view that multiple, simultaneous 
technical, political and cultural misalignments are critical barriers to the standardization and scaling of 
IT innovations in complex settings.  It further extends these roots by illustrating that discursive micro-
processes such as rhetorical legitimation actions can gradually achieve the alignment and collective 
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meaning making that is necessary for the successful diffusion of new IT innovations (Vaast and 
Walsham, 2005; Leonardi, 2007; Orlikowski, 1996).  
By exploring how ESN gradually diffused across different communities of actors at iSource, I was able 
to show how the rhetorical justifications inherent in the communications of managers facilitated 
meaning making and internal diffusion through a cumulative and iterative process of de-legitimation 
and legitimation. 
 
!
Figure 7. 1 Model of Internal IT Diffusion 
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The de-legitimation infusion is consistent with Garud and Karnøe (2001) discussion of the need to 
“disembed”, “unlearn” or “discredit” existing ways of working in order to effectively mobilize support 
for new ways of working and technological innovation. Similar to Garud and Karnøe (2001), I observed 
that managers firstly engaged in intra-organisational theorizing to de-legitimate the technology and 
practices that were in competition with ESN, which in iSource’s case, was email misuse. The model 
extends Garud and Karnøe’s (2001) propositions by illustrating how and what information is 
communicated to effectively encourage the process of disembedding. The de-legitimating process 
unfolded in similar phases to legitimation, and was a key part of the cumulative process to legitimate 
ESN, as managers strategically grafted and co-opted email de-legitimating theorizations and success 
stories.  
The legitimation process is consistent with Zilber (2006) view that the translation of an object is a 
process where higher level artefact ontologies (form and meaning) are iteratively modified and refined 
as they become more local. Over these iterations, managers importantly helped to connect the macro-
level theorization of ESN functionality and usefulness to the intra-organisational level of iSourcers 
day-to-day work. This intra-organisational theorizing is similar to Swanson and Ramiller’s (1997) 
theory of an organising vision for IS innovation, which is central to enabling the interpretation, 
legitimation, and mobilization of resources necessary for the wider diffusion of the IS innovation.  
However, intra-organisational theorizing was an ongoing process of modifying and refining the 
organisational level vision for ESN to suit front- line employees in their immediate contexts. It therefore 
importantly shaped the standardization and scaling of the diffusing innovation’s IT ontology (form 
(meaning) and function (material features), as the innovation was appropriated by different 
communities of actors. It is also locally focused and gradually constructed to suit the immediate needs 
of diverse communities of organisational stakeholders. 
191!
Managers interpreted ESNs macro-level vision to micro-level theorizations by employing justifications 
to legitimate ESNs ontology in relation to salient local concerns. In conceptualizing these shifting local 
concerns and their related theorizing in relation to distinct institutional logics, my model shows that 
this process unfolded in the following distinct infusions: (1) Legitimating ESN use to “work smarter 
together by eradicating email misuse” (email de-legitimation) (2) Legitimating ESN use to “openly 
share expertise and knowledge”, (3) Legitimating ESN use to “find the right information at the right 
time” and (4) Legitimating ESN use to “work smarter together by focusing on customer needs”.  
The intra-organisational theorizing in each of these infusions additionally unfolded in three cumulative 
and relatively sequential legitimation phases: (1) rationale framing (2) value advertising, and (3) 
motivating engagement. Over these phases, there was comingling and overlap among prevailing 
institutional logics and ESN infusions, as managers strategically grafted on other intra-organisational 
theorizations and co-opted people, ESN functions, and practices from other infusions, to reinforce their 
own justifications and interpretations of ESN. Strategically grafting, or building on the earlier 
infusions’ business cases, and co-opting earlier ESN ontologies and like-minded academic researchers 
helped managers to effectively focus their arguments’ warrants, claims and data on gaining pragmatic 
legitimacy and facilitating meaning making across heterogeneous communities of iSourcers.  
Over time, these legitimation processes helped to consolidate the gains from distinct IT infusions across 
the organisation, while helping to drive continuing organisational and technological change efforts. In 
the following sections, I provide more detail on managers’ communications in each of these phases and 
and highlight more specific contributions to IS diffusion and legitimation literature. My “extended 
design” view also addresses the need for more studies of how IT frames co-evolve with technology and 
organisational change (Karasti, Baker and Millerand, 2010). By extension, my model importantly 
confirms and extends translation researchers view that on-going framing practices play a crucial role 
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in resolving technical, cultural and political misalignments that emerge between diffusing innovations 
and organisational stakeholders. 
7.1.1 Rationale Framing and Strategic Grafting 
My analysis revealed that the rationale framing phase was especially crucial for directly promoting 
political alignment, and indirectly, technical and cultural alignment during internal IT diffusion. 
Political misalignments emerge when stakeholders use symbolic actions like rhetorical framing to 
mobilize resources and support for their self-interested ideas for appropriating the diffusing innovation 
(IT idea) (Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen and Van de Ven, 2009; Yoo, Lyytinen and Berente, 2007; Ansari, 
Fiss and Zajac, 2010). Stakeholders’ rhetorical legitimation actions in the rationale framing phase 
particularly confirm Ansari, Fiss and Zajac’s (2010) hypothesis that actors’ on-going and dynamic 
discursive framing of IT ideas foreground competing values and objectives for appropriating the IT 
innovation (counter- mobilizing). In turn, political counter-mobilizing helps to secure the resources and 
support needed for subsequent technical and cultural alignment.  
In this phase, managers took the first step to theorizing the new practice in relation to their local 
circumstances by justifying and explaining their business case for ESN in ways that addressed their 
targeted audiences most immediate and salient values, objectives and needs. These justifications also 
helped to create a sense of urgency for the proposed business case and related ESN ontologies. Within 
distinct infusions, this business case was the root of intra-organisational theorizing, as it was 
consistently reflected and reinforced in the justifications of subsequent value advertising and 
motivating engagement phases. Across infusions however, the business case was the center of the 
counter-mobilizing discursive contestation and negotiation processes, and thus, enabled political 
alignment (Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 2010).  
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Over time, intra-organisational theorizing generated collective meaning and engagement from a smaller 
subset of employees around distinct business cases. For example, business technologists collectively 
engaged around an ESN business case that helped them to “openly share expertise and knowledge”, 
consultants engaged around an ESN business case that helped them to “find the right information at the 
right time”, and all key stakeholder groups, including senior management collectively engaged around 
a business case that helped them to “work smarter together”.  
As the ESN ontologies related to these earlier business cases became more well- known and taken for 
granted, institutional entrepreneurs strategically grafted on the rhetorical justifications used to justify 
the business case with another audience, in order to pragmatically legitimate newer business cases and 
ontologies with different communities of actors. Strategic grafting therefore enabled managers to direct 
mutual organisational and technological change during internal IT diffusion. Strategic grafting built on 
earlier infusions with somewhat similar aims and means (institutional logics) but very different 
business cases to legitimate alternative ESN ontologies with different organisational communities. For 
instance, middle managers that were recruited to the steering team in subsequent infusions, gained 
pragmatic legitimacy for their business cases by strategically grafting on the “professional” business 
cases of working smarter and eradicating email misuse, as well as their interpretation of ESNs wider 
organising vision. 
Strategic grafting primarily had the effect of helping to legitimate business cases that aligned to the 
objectives and practices of specific communities of actors. After grafting on early business cases, 
managers locally reframed these professional justifications to advance business cases and ontologies 
that effectively appealed to the “community” and “market” needs that were salient to different iSourcers 
at different points in time. As managers continually encouraged iSourcers to view the existing ESN 
ontology through the lens of these new business cases, iSourcers gradually became more receptive to 
the idea of appropriating ESN according to professional-community and professional-market logics. 
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With this, they also gradually came to view co-mingled professional-community and professional- 
market values and objectives as important and legitimate. For instance, managers grafted on ESNs 
external organising vision when the referenced the third whitepaper’s research on the use of enterprise 
social networks to advance professional ESN business cases and ontologies within iSource. 
Strategic grafting on earlier business cases also had a de-legitimating effect. In grafting on the business 
case that was used to initially de-legitimate email, managers in each subsequent infusion continued to 
de-legitimate email by explaining that their business case was sensitive to the professional objective of 
using email to work smarter by eradicating email misuse. Managers also directly eroded legitimacy for 
the business cases that they strategically grafted on, by explaining how the communications and ESN 
appropriations related to these earlier business cases did not fit the objectives and needs of the current 
business case and the immediate audience. For instance, strategic grafting by CSPs during the business 
technologist infusion helped to de-legitimate solely professional aims and means and promoted a new 
loosely coupled professional-community business case and ESN ontology.  
Both effects of strategic grating are consistent with translation researchers assertion that entrepreneurs 
may drive cultural and technical alignment by framing change as necessary for reinforcing existing 
ways of working (Azad and Faraj, 2011; Orlikowski and Gash, 1994; Swan et al., 2010). Although, 
these researchers were studying IT innovations at a field and organisational level, I similarly observed 
that strategic grafting and reframing enabled entrepreneurs to tailor the  cultural conformity pressures 
that tended to restrict technical and cultural alignment, to favour their business cases and ESN 
appropriations. Moreover, re-framing and de-legitimating strategically grafted business cases in new 
infusions confirm Ansari, Fiss and Zajac’s (2010) hypothesis that entrepreneurs can create 
opportunities for technical and cultural alignment during internal diffusion by directly contesting 
competing frames and IT ontologies.  
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In creating these opportunities over time, these rhetorical actions also confirm Ansari, Fiss and Zajac’s 
(2010) hypothesis regarding the role of counter- mobilization in the standardization of internally 
diffusing innovations. The rhetorical legitimation actions around strategic grafting in this phase 
gradually created margins of negotiation that enabled heterogeneous stakeholder communities to 
compromise on an IT ontology that best satisfied each of their needs.  Specifically, the cumulative 
effect of strategic grafting along with the consistent co-mingling of market and community concerns 
with professional concerns gradually dampened the contestation that was limiting standardization. As 
a result, although each infusion had very different business cases, ESN was eventually appropriated 
with some “professional” commonalities in form and function.  
This is best illustrated in the final infusion’s (“wider diffusion”) rhetorical legitimation practices. Here, 
managers strategically grafted and re-framed professional (email de-legitimation), professional-market 
and professional- community logics, to nudge heterogeneous communities of iSourcers to collectively 
agree that the previous infusions’ business cases and ontologies were not fit for purpose. In turn, 
iSourcers within these communities gradually became more receptive to the rationale that using ESN 
to “work smarter together to satisfy customer needs” was in their best interests.  
7.1.2 Value Advertising 
The value advertising phase was important for reinforcing the constructed business case and supporting 
technical alignment during internal IT diffusion. Knowledge- based translation perspectives 
demonstrate that knowledge gained from earlier experiences with the diffusion IT innovation or related 
technologies, plays a crucial role in how actors adapt internally diffusing IT innovations (technical 
alignment) to drive meaning making, standardization and scaling (Kohli and Kettinger, 2004; Strang 
and Macy, 2001; Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 2010). Stakeholders’ rhetorical legitimation actions in this 
phase importantly add to this literature by illustrating how actors make sense of vicarious knowledge 
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and experiences, and how this knowledge is filtered and framed during internal diffusion (Volkoff, 
Strong and Elmes, 2007; Scarbrough, Robertson and Swan, 2015; Hsu, Huang and Galliers, 2014).  
In this phase, managers built on the urgency generated from the rationale framing phase and reinforced 
the business case by justifying the potential benefits or losses that would come with appropriating the 
innovation according to the business case. Over time, justifying these benefits helped managers to 
reduce uncertainty and spread knowledge of how ESN should be appropriated to best satisfy the needs 
of the immediate audience.  Co-optation processes were particularly instrumental in focusing these 
justifications on reducing technical misalignment, and consequently, driving mutual organisational and 
technological adaptation. 
Managers co-opted the help of like-minded and influential external and internal actors to help 
communicate and reinforce their justifications to pragmatically legitimate business cases with 
particular audiences. Co-opting external actors at iSource involved the straightforward task of inviting 
respected industrial and academic researchers to help reinforce how the ESN business case and 
ontology is responsive to the substantive needs of immediate communities of actors. Co-opting internal 
actors to produce the same effect was however less straightforward since it involved having to recruit 
CSPs and champions from the target audience onto the steering team and offering them some amount 
of decision- making rights.  
Co-opting internal actors was also managerially more problematic since offering decision-making 
rights to CSPs and champions that were closely related to particular audiences resulted in goal 
displacement. Moreover, the co-mingling of logics that was generated from strategic grafting actions, 
also created more opportunities for goal displacement (Selznick, 1949; Rao, Morrill and Zald, 2000). 
For instance, CSPs and champions respectively advanced community and market objectives that had 
the potential to radically shift ESN appropriation away from the scientific community’s intended 
purpose of “working smarter”. However, the continued communication of business cases that grafted 
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on professional objectives ensured that managers also communicated ESNs professional value 
alongside more local community and market values. Strategic grafting was therefore crucial for 
avoiding goal displacement during co-optation. 
In concert with continual communication of grafted business cases, managers also co-opted success 
stories and surveys from earlier infusions to pragmatically legitimate their own business cases and 
ontologies, and failures and surveys to similarly de-legitimate existing ESN ontologies. This kind of 
co-opting was crucial for constructing justifications that effectively gained pragmatic legitimacy since 
it provided the data to support managers rhetorical claims about ESNs value. Managers specifically co-
opted data that was related to the business cases that they grafted. As a result, their justifications of 
ESNs value promoted the replication of earlier successes that were responsive to the immediate needs 
of the receiving audience. Justifications also opposed the replication of ESN features that were more 
or less universally considered to be less successful. This enabled them to not only frame these features 
as inappropriate for iSource as an organisation, but also enabled them to communicate that less 
successful features and their related business cases and ontologies were counter to the needs of the 
immediate local audiences.  
Along with strategic grafting, co-optation was also a vehicle for standardizing the ESN ontology across 
heterogeneous communities of actors, since it enabled the cumulative generation of meaning around 
the the diffusing ESN. As the ESN scaled, the business case and ontology that eventually gained wider 
audience acceptance was rooted in the rationale, practices and material features of common successes 
and failures. For instance, in the last stage of wider diffusion, managers promoted and successfully 
gained support for the professional objective of  “working smarter to satisfy customer needs” by co-
opting success stories and survey data from business technologist’s SAP community, consultant’s 
customer- focused communities, and the scientific community’s yammer mash-up. In highlighting 
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ESNs value in relation to these successes, managers also explained the rationale behind these earlier 
business cases and spread knowledge of how to appropriate ESN to gain similar benefits. 
The value advertising phase accordingly illustrates a similar process to that observed by Francalanci 
and Morabito’s (2008) field level findings, and hypothesized as relevant to internal diffusion by Ansari, 
Fiss and Zajac (2010), where cumulative knowledge transfers from earlier to later adopters drives 
standardization in pluralistic settings. The pragmatic and co-mingled rhetorical justifications around 
co-optation specifically adds to calls for more research into how vicarious knowledge around internally 
diffusion IT innovations is filtered and framed over time (Scarbrough, Robertson and Swan, 2015; Hsu, 
Huang and Galliers, 2014).  
Over time, co-optation effected a form of managed coercion towards remaking new IT innovations in 
the image of “working smarter” despite the push back to conform to local audiences’ community and 
market needs. This is similar to coercion strategies advanced by legitimacy researchers as a way to 
enhance cognitive legitimacy for new field level innovations in pluralistic settings (Tolbert and Zucker, 
1983; Barley and Tolbert, 1997). However, coercion in this internal context was more inclusive, as the 
coercive justifications accommodated and built on competing business cases and ESN ontologies. 
7.1.3 Motivating Engagement 
The motivating engagement phase was crucial for ensuring that ESN appropriation was in line with the 
advertised value, and supporting cultural alignment. The translation literature highlights that cultural 
misalignments during internal diffusion are inevitable since pre-existing cultural security mechanisms 
or values, objectives and practices color organisational actors’ interpretations of what IT appropriations 
are important and acceptable (Wang and Swanson, 2007; Henfridsson and Yoo, 2013; Garud, Hardy 
and Maguire, 2007). The rhetorical legitimation actions in this phase importantly add to this literature 
by illustrating how institutional entrepreneurs helped to resolve cultural misalignments by effecting a 
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context-dependent balance of organisational and technological adaptation (Nielsen, Mathiassen and 
Newell, 2014; Smets, T. Morris and Greenwood, 2012; Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 2010). 
In each infusion, managers looked to stabilize the organisational and technological changes that 
strategic grafting and co-opting had planted in the minds of the receiving audience, by encouraging 
iSourcers to use ESN features that were specially adapted to fit particular business cases and deliver 
advertised value. Accordingly, these rhetorical justifications gradually promoted mutual organisational 
and technological adaptation and collective meaning making, as they did not solely adapt ESN to the 
culture of the receiving audience, but rather adapted ESN to grafted business cases, and co-opted 
interpretations of ESNs value. In this way, these rhetorical justifications directly helped to construct an 
ESN ontology that was culturally responsive to the needs of all groups by gradually transforming the 
logics associated with the technology, and the logics guiding the activities of key communities of 
actors, to be more “professionally” focused on innovation and customer satisfaction. 
Unlike the other phases of intra-organisational theorizing that were in some way focused on de-
legitimating competing ESN ontologies, this phase was solely focused on de-legitimating competing 
ESN technologies, specifically email, and legitimating new ESN ontologies. This focus seemed to be 
a critical step to facilitating bottom-up collective meaning making and scaling of ESN. My analysis 
identifies two main ways that managers encouraged iSourcers to engage with ESN:   by justifying the 
co-location of members of the target audience in common ESN communities, and communicating how 
ESN delivers context-centric benefits in training sessions.  
By consistently justifying new ESN behaviours in each infusion, I saw that managers were cognizant 
of the role that continually articulating a technology’s rationale and reality plays in enhancing its 
embeddedness and comprehensibility within a local context (Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell, 2014). 
As a result, managers also attempted to disembed the email-centric behaviors that were inhibiting the 
receiving audience’s ability to make sense of ESN. As managers pro-actively encouraged iSourcers to 
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use ESN, they were nudging them to actualize their mindfully constructed business case and value 
propositions by performing new ESN- centric behaviours.  
This focus on encouraging iSourcers to perform new behaviours around material ESN features helped 
to achieve three key purposes. Firstly, it facilitated the unlearning and disembedding of competing 
technological practices in a way that simply explaining the business case and benefits of moving away 
from these practices could not. By justifying new ESN behaviours in each infusion with respect to the 
professional aim of improving the quality of products and services, and supporting this with new 
organisational structures and processes such as the email free certification programme and email 
reduction targets,  managers consistently communicated that email was not fit for purpose. 
Second, individual iSourcers comprehensibility of ESNs business case, value and overall ontology 
increased as they appropriated ESN in their everyday work. Established sensemaking theory suggests 
that in this case, individuals, and communities of actors with different cultures are likely to enact new 
behaviours in different ways (Weick, 1995). This was a problem for the project leaders since they knew 
their aim was to encourage standardized and distributed ESN use as a permanent alternative to email. 
This was crucial to both their strategic employee satisfaction engagement objective, and to the viability 
of their ESN service and product offering. It was therefore very important for managers to foster 
collective meaning making around ESN features and behaviours in order to construct a standardized 
and scalable ESN ontology.  
Managers facilitated this process in each infusion by encouraging iSourcers to appropriate ESN 
according to the business cases and value propositions that they developed in the previous phases. In 
doing so, managers directly helped to foster collective meaning making within distinct communities of 
actors and across different communities by respectively, using justifications to re- connect these front- 
line ESN features, behaviours and supporting structures back to larger, strategic departmental 
(community and market) objectives, and larger organisational objectives (professional). This enabled 
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emergent micro-level ESN behaviours to become somewhat established with senior management, and 
in turn, also re-established at a more macro-organisational level through the creation of formal 
organisational structures and procedures.  
For instance, managers encouraged business technologists to have open discussions with each other 
and CSPs in open and un-moderated ESN communities like the social ideation space and departmental 
spaces. They supported these features with appropriate organisational structures like ESN management 
communities for middle managers, and business processes like community approval processes. These 
features and structures reflected professional-community logics since they were simultaneously 
responsive to technologists “community” need for open knowledge sharing, and the change team’s 
“professional” need to ensure that communities had clear objectives and management.    Managers 
employed similar justifications with consultants whose activities were guided by a “market” logic,  but 
advocated for more “professional- market” client-centric spaces, and supported them with more 
“market” focused organisational structures and practices such as ESN and email usage KPIs and targets, 
and incentive schemes. In this way, the front- line behavioural transformation resulting from gradual 
diffusion possibly disturbed and shifted broader organisational and group values and objectives towards 
being more “professional” (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). 
Accordingly, in the final stage of diffusion (H4), managers consolidated the ESN successes, failures, 
and organisational structures and procedures from previous infusions to construct and generate wider 
diffusion around “professional” customer satisfaction and innovation aims.. Managers were able to 
successfully standardize ESN with a wider audience around this consolidated focus since it was 
constructed from the cumulative micro-level activities of different groups, and was thus more aligned 
to the immediate requirements and needs to the key communities of actors. This finding is somewhat 
consistent with Ansari, Fiss and Zajac’s (2010) hypothesis that wider standardization requires early 
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cultural alignment (H1,H2, H3), but suggests that successful standardization requires gradual and 
cumulative cultural alignment across key stakeholder groups. 
Finally, consolidating technological and organisational features over infusions may have helped to 
position the no-email change initiative as one that was designed by operational employees themselves, 
thus, enabling a degree of bottom-up institutional change (Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell, 2014; Reay 
et al., 2013). As consolidations were made across these infusions, strategic grafting and co-opting 
helped to facilitate compromises, and ensured that these compromises were aligned to wider objectives 
and local contexts. As demonstrated in the final diffusion stage successful internal diffusion, may be 
achieved by re-framing consolidated technological and organisational features as bottom-up, and 
supporting these justifications with context- centric material features, such as user driven community- 
centric features and local leadership teams.  
This usefully suggests that top- down, contextual organisational and technological adaptation (Nielsen, 
Mathiassen and Newell, 2014; Reay et al., 2013) is likely to be successful when managers employ 
rhetorical justifications to re-frame adaptations as bottom-up change, and support these justifications 
with organisational and technological features that reflect this bottom-up focus. 
7.1.4 De-legitimation and Legitimation of Technological Ontologies 
The phases discussed so far in this chapter were vital to the internal diffusion of ESN, as they played a 
crucial role in driving cumulative processes of de-legitimating competing, established technologies and 
legitimating or aligning new innovations with the receiving audience. Whereas legitimation is 
inextricably linked to institutionalization or the generation of comprehensibility, de-legitimation is a 
core part of de-institutionalization (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). 
The institutional diffusion literature has established that de-institutionalizing (Lawrence and Suddaby, 
2006), disembedding (Garud, Hardy and Maguire, 2007), or unlearning (Becker, 2010) established 
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technologies that are similar to the new innovation is a crucial step for institutionalizing or generating 
comprehensibility for a new technology. Importantly, established technologies inhibit actors 
willingness and ability to create new meanings around new technologies by directly competing for 
audiences’ cognitive attention. Despite this, the IS literature has yet to explicitly examine the process 
of technology de-legitimation, and particularly, whether and how this process can be managed from 
the top- down (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Garud and Karnøe, 2001).  
My internal IT diffusion findings address these gaps by illuminating the process and content of 
managers efforts to de-institutionalize email at iSource. At iSource, managers’ efforts to legitimate 
ESN were initiated and actively shaped by an explicit focus on de-legitimating email and its misuse. 
Consistent with institutional diffusion research (C. Oliver, 1992; Garud and Karnøe, 2001), managers 
did this by claiming that email use was ineffective and inefficient, incompatible with local values and 
objectives, and that shifting to ESN-driven practices could deliver significant potential value. Managers 
successfully directed this process from the top, and encouraged iSourcers to develop particular 
meanings around these claims by employing rhetorical justifications to pragmatic legitimacy in similar 
rationale framing, value advertising and motivating engagement phases. They specifically initiated 
their intra-organisational theorizing around the business case of using ESN to “work smarter by 
eradicating email misuse”, strategically grafting on practitioner and academic rhetorical justifications 
on the negative effects of email overload, co-opting academic researchers and surveys to highlight the 
value of reducing email overload and misuse, and consolidating managers’ experiences with the smart 
inbox and yammer mashups to motivate iSourcers to try alternative, ESN-driven practices.  
The process of email de-legitimation also unfolded in parallel with ESN legitimation, and importantly 
helped to construct and reinforce ESN legitimation processes as managers in each subsequent infusion 
used strategically grafted and co-opted data from the email de-legitimation infusion to frame their 
locally focused justifications as a wider professional imperative of “working smarter”. A consistent 
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focus on professional objectives was crucial to eventually generating collective meanings across 
different communities of iSourcers. Whereas IT legitimation is aimed at increasing IT-organisation 
alignment (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005), IT de-institutionalization is a process of rhetorical 
legitimation, aimed at increasing the degree of political, cultural and technical misalignments between 
established technologies and the target audience. Over time these justifications gradually promoted 
meaning making that not only transformed the receiving audiences view of what were important means 
and aims to pursue (logic), but also prompted them to view email and its inscribed institutional logic 
as inappropriate and dissonant from their prevailing logic. 
Another interesting observation with regard to the process and content of email de-institutionalization 
justifications was the consistent use of primarily logos appeals and secondary pathos appeals to 
pragmatic legitimacy across each of the legitimation phases. Accordingly, along with appeals to the the 
audiences local circumstance, managers were able to successfully increase email’s misalignment by 
focusing their justifications on highlighting how elements of email’s ontology were not in the 
audience’s efficiency and effectiveness interests. They primarily gained pragmatic legitimacy by 
detailing email’s track record of generating unfavourable local outcomes such as email overload and 
employee dissatisfaction (exchange legitimacy) (Suchman, 1995). These findings are consistent with 
Green’s (2004) legitimation sequence where ‘pathos appeals help direct behavior away from the status 
quo [then] logos appeals link new actions and behaviors to effective outcomes’ (p.661). However, my 
findings illustrate that in the case of de-legitimation, actors simultaneously employed logos and pathos 
appeals, and foregrounded logos appeals.  
On the other hand, although email de-legitimation was intimately linked and helped to shape 
subsequent ESN legitimation efforts, the rhetorical justifications used to legitimate ESN followed a 
different pattern. Managers gradually employed primarily pathos appeals and secondary logos appeals 
to pragmatic legitimacy across each of the legitimation phases following email de-legitimation. With 
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this, managers generated alignment for ESN by locally focusing their justifications on showing how 
ESN was in the immediate audience’s interests. They primarily gained pragmatic legitimacy through 
direct exchanges as with de-legitimation but also consistently highlighted and advocated for the 
involvement of local, front-line iSourcers in the ESN steering structure (influence legitimacy) 
(Suchman, 1995). These findings indicate that ESN legitimation unfolds with simultaneous logos and 
pathos appeals to email de-legitimation. Unlike de-legitimation processes however, ESN legitimation 
justifications foreground pathos appeals. This is especially evident in the wider diffusion stage where 
managers’ rhetorical justifications solely employed pathos appeals. The sole use of pathos appeals was 
also indicative of the simplification of rhetorical arguments, which suggested that ESN was becoming 
more comprehensible towards the end of my research period (Czarniawska, 2009). 
Another inconsistency between the IS legitimation literature and these findings was the absence of 
ethos appeals to moral legitimacy. For instance, Green (2004) proposed that following the use of pathos 
and logos appeals, ‘Ethos appeals lock in new behaviors and hinder movement from the new 
equilibrium’ (p. 661). Similarly, studies suggest that field level theorizations of change such as 
organising visions help to simultaneously gain pragmatic legitimacy by positioning the new innovation 
as a solution to salient organisational failings, and moral legitimacy by aligning abstract system features 
with prevailing normative prescriptions (Strang and Meyer, 1993; Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). As 
discussed in chapter 4, my data analysis revealed that although managers did not make explicit appeals 
to moral legitimacy in their surface communications, some managers believed that their overall 
justification efforts over time, had the effect of indirectly gaining moral legitimacy. This suggests that 
moral legitimacy grew slowly and indirectly as a consequence of continuous attempts to construct 
pragmatic justifications that were aligned to the immediate audiences’ values and objectives. 
Accordingly, although the core process of intra-organisational IT theorizing departs from the 
established theory of field- level “theorizations of change” in numerous ways, both theories embrace 
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the view that simultaneous appeals to pragmatic and moral legitimacy help to enhance the micro-
organisational comprehensibility of internally diffusing innovations. 
However, since moral legitimation helps to stabilize and embed new innovations, the lack of explicit 
attention to moral legitimacy during internal diffusion was beneficial to the generation of collective 
meaning making across competing communities of actors. By not attempting to fully embed and 
stabilize the ESN ontologies that emerged from distinct infusions, managers left ample margins of 
negotiation for strategically grafting, co-opting and consolidating ESN ontologies across infusions.  
7.2 Summary of Discussion 
My discussion of the internal diffusion model shows that managers can use rhetorical legitimation 
practices to influence how ESN’s related practices and organising visions are integrated into the front- 
line activities and behaviors of organisational actors. Similar to Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings’ 
(2002) and Swanson and Ramiller’s (1997) findings that linguistic theorizations such as organising 
visions are important for the successful diffusion of technological practices on an organisational level, 
I found that intra-organisational theorizing was the core driver of ESN’s internal diffusion process. 
Unlike organisation level theorizations, intra-organisational theorizing was an ongoing process of 
rhetorically elaborating and refining the organisational level theorization associated with ESN, with the 
interests and front- line practices of key communities of actors. In this way, managers used this 
theorizing process to standardize and scale the diffusing innovation’s ontology (form and function) in 
particular ways, as they rhetorically justified different ESN appropriations with different communities 
of actors (infusions). Intra-organisational theorizing unfolded in three relatively sequential and 
cumulative phases of legitimation within each infusion: (1) rationale framing (2) value advertising, 
and (3) motivating engagement.  
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In rationale framing, managers initiated political alignment by strategically grafting on the intra-
organisational theorizations of competing infusions in order to construct and rhetorically justify the 
business case for ESN with their immediate audience. In value advertising, managers co-opted 
powerful internal and external individuals, and success stories, failures, and survey data from other 
infusions in order to justify ESNs value and facilitate the transfer of knowledge on how to use ESN to 
reap these benefits. This phase was therefore primarily focused on technical alignment.  
Along with strategically grafting theorizations and co-opting resources across infusions, managers 
gradually encouraged collective meaning making across different communities of actors by motivating 
engagement for consolidated ESN ontologies, and supporting organisational structures and procedures. 
In motivating engagement, manager reinforced and  encouraged cultural alignment by encouraging the 
target audience to use features according to co-mingled logics that embraced both their local interests 
and wider organisational interests. As different audiences used the features according to these co-
mingled logics their interests shifted to be more uniform, and managers were able to employ a uniform 
set of justifications to encourage wider participation and diffusion. Managers employed specific types 
of rhetoric in each of these phases to widen (de-legitimate) or narrow (legitimate) the political, technical 
and cultural institutional misalignments between specific technological features and the logics guiding 
the interests and activities of distinct communities of actors. 
Although de-legitimation and legitimation processes unfolded in parallel, managers initiated their ESN 
legitimation efforts by employing rhetoric to de-legitimate email. In de-legitimating email, managers 
primarily employed logos appeals to pragmatic legitimacy to disembed actors from their existing email 
driven activities and behaviours. These appeals prioritized highlighting and explaining how reducing 
email misuse would help iSourcers to be more efficient and effective at the work activities. In directly 
legitimating ESN, managers employed primarily pathos (emotional) appeals to pragmatic legitimacy 
to highlight and explain how using ESN would help actors to achieve their personal and professional 
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ambitions. Over time, concurrent de-legitimation and legitimation efforts had the effect of motivating 
actors not to replicate activities and behaviors associated with email in their ESN usage behaviours, 
and enabling them to better rationalize and make sense of ESN. 
Overall, these findings have substantive implications for both academic and practitioner fields. The 
effect of the justifications across intra-organisational theorizing phases particularly confirm Ansari, 
Fiss and Zajac’s (2010) hypothesis regarding the role of technical, cultural and political alignment on 
enabling collective making around IT ontologies within and across infusions. The way in which 
different communications were employed across different infusions answer calls by Scarbrough and 
Swan (2015) and Hsu, Huang and Galliers (2014) to clarify how the vicarious knowledge necessary for 
effective institutional alignment is filtered and framed over time. The variations in rhetorical types 
between de-legitimation and legitimation infusions has implications for institutional diffusion research 
that has so far not focused on the dynamics of IT de-legitimation (Mignerat and Rivard, 2009; Nielsen, 
Mathiassen and Newell, 2014; Becker, 2010), and has only addressed field and organisational 
examinations of IT legitimation (Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell, 2014; Mignerat and Rivard, 2009). 
These findings also have important implications for the study and practice of developing, implementing 
and using digital innovations, such as ESN (Leonardi, 2009; Orlikowski, 1996; Monteiro et al., 2012; 
Brynjolfsson and A. Saunders, 2010).  In the next and final chapter, I will these implications of my 
conceptual model in more detail. 
!  
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Chapter 8 Implications and Contributions 
 
In this thesis I have developed a theoretical model of internal diffusion for understanding how newly- 
introduced digital innovations adopted at an organisational level are translated and integrated into 
organisational actors’ front- line activities and behavior, how this process unfolds in a pluralistic 
setting, and how it may be managed from the top of the organisation. My model importantly does this 
by tracing the processes of de-legitimation and legitimation that respectively widen and narrow the 
institutional misalignments that inevitably emerge when new innovations enter pluralistic settings. In 
this chapter I discuss the implications of the model developed through my investigation of ESN 
adoption at a technology services firm, iSource. I will consider the implication of this model for 
managers interested in shaping the appropriation of new digital innovations to achieve desirable 
outcomes. Finally, I will explain the contributions of my research to information systems and 
organisational research, and discuss possible directions for future enquiry. 
8.1 Managerial Implications- Looking Back at Practice and iSource 
I first learned of iSource’s ESN adoption efforts at a forum on the digital work, where participants from 
fortune 500 companies as well as a number of established SMEs around the world and in various 
industries, would meet regularly to exchange knowledge on digital work. Over a 4 year period, the key 
point of discussion at this forum was adoption strategies for enterprise social network systems. What 
was most striking about early discussions at this workshop, was the disproportional amount of technical 
focus on adapting different features, and the uniformity of views on ESN benefits, the adoption 
strategies, and the challenges faced, across large, established firms as well as less established SMEs. 
Consistent with my review of ESN in chapter 1, participants consistently spoke about using organic 
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ESN growth strategies to enhance collaboration, knowledge sharing and employee satisfaction, and 
complained about a lack of resources, and support from senior management and key stakeholder groups 
because of uncertainty about ESNs value.  
Consistent with my review of the institutional diffusion literature where I highlighted that innovations 
may be simultaneously aligned with the culture of some groups and misaligned with others, participants 
reported that with the organic adoption approach, ESN participation was clearly more intense in certain 
departments than others. It was reported that support groups like human resources, and internal 
communications that had a more “collaborative” culture identified with ESNs “open” ways of working 
and readily appropriated ESN to support their work. While other operational groups like sales, risk 
management, and finance that were more profit and efficiency focused, resisted ESN ideology of 
openness by completely rejecting or loosely coupling ESN in their activities.  
The few exceptions to this rule were smaller firms and SMEs who reported widespread participation 
from organic growth strategies. Larger firms recognized the value of these tactics for driving more 
durable, intrinsic ESN use, but often expressed concerns about the negative consequences of 
technological drift. Those larger firms that tried organic growth strategies reported that they needed to 
have more control over the trajectory of ESNs use in order to accurately measure ESNs value and gain 
buy in from senior staff and key stakeholders.  Often times these profit- focused groups exhibited more 
political power to shift wider support and resources away from ESN, which would ultimately lead to 
ESN failure. With this, later discussions at the forum were much less technology focused, and instead 
focused on the success of agile adoption approaches, and communication strategies to strategically 
frame ESN in more convincing ways.  
Similar to my discussion of rhetorically legitimating ESN in chapter 3, participants prioritized 
discussions on how to justify ESN to key stakeholders and senior management and communicate ESN’s 
value throughout the organisation, in order to manage employees’ perception of ESN’s desirability and 
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appropriateness. Even the few technical discussions that still occurred were about how to measure and 
track various aspects of ESN use to support the latter aims. Along with this, participants also discussed 
using ESN to pursue more sophisticated objectives such as transforming stagnant corporate cultures, 
and enhancing employee engagement and productivity. In accordance with these new insights, 
participants recognized and tried to model their ESN growth strategies around the few top- down, agile 
successes that they encountered. However, these discussions revealed a key disconnect where it was 
not clear how communication campaigns support or keep up with the iterative and agile adoption 
approaches that were proving to be more effective for ESN adoption. 
iSource was often one of the most discussed examples of successful synergy between communication 
campaign and agile approach. However, the company would rarely go into detail on specific tactics 
since their intention was to sell ESN implementation services. In Chapter 5, I examined iSource’s 
adoption journey over 3-4 years and detailed specific ESN features and tactics employed over adoption 
in three main stakeholder groups- business technologists responsible for supporting back end 
applications and designing new systems, consultants who were directly responsible for engaging with 
clients to assess their needs, and delivering profitable and efficient services, and senior staff responsible 
for managing profitability, employee turnover and exploring new avenues for improving the quality 
and breath of iSource’s service. As illustrated in chapter 6, these competing objectives posed different 
challenges, required different communications, and manifested distinctly different ESN configurations 
over time. However, in chapter 7, I outlined the cumulative, iterative and inter-related process of 
rhetorical legitimation and intra-organisational theorizing that eventually generated wide participation 
around ESN. 
My model of top-down internal diffusion offers a useful guide for those managers that are increasingly 
grappling with how to generate durable and intrinsic motivation around ESN or similar digital 
innovations without falling victim to the negative consequences of technology drift. The internal 
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diffusion model is ideally suited for supporting rapid cycle agile development, implementation and use 
approaches since it fittingly outlines a mindful, iterative and phased approach for communicating and 
justifying technological outcomes. At iSource, managers’ ESN communications campaigns with the 
main stakeholder groups covered three main elements: framing the business case (rationale framing) 
for the new IT innovation, advertising the potential value for the new IT innovation, and motivating 
engagement around specific features.  
Early justifications at iSource were importantly focused on de-legitimating email since it was clearly 
competing with ESN as a communication and collaboration tool, while later efforts were focused on 
legitimating ESN.  De-legitimating these technologies is especially important for ensuring that 
organisational actors do not replicate unwanted practices associated with email to the newly-incoming 
innovation, and enabling them to dedicate more cognitive effort to rationalizing and making sense of 
the newly- incoming innovation. This is consistent with my discussion of the legitimating (ESN) effect 
of de-legitimating email in chapter 6, as managers intention was never to completely phase out email, 
but they instead theorized about “working smarter by reducing email misuse” as a way to create a 
lasting sense of urgency for ESN driven change.  
Managers’ at iSource primarily used logos (rational) appeals to pragmatic legitimacy to successfully 
justify the business case against email misuse, and pathos (emotional) appeals to justify ESN. 
Combining de-legitimation efforts with parallel efforts to directly legitimate ESN enabled iSourcers to 
gradually dedicate more and more cognitive resources to making sense of the new innovation. This 
communication approach is consistent with agile approaches of producing quick, phased, practical 
outcomes to test and show value, since it is focused on explaining and highlighting the immediate 
economic, efficiency and social exchanges that the innovation offers. Proponents of agile credit this 
approach with facilitating tight alignment between the technology and the needs of the target audience 
(Sarker and Sarker, 2009; Conboy, 2009). However, critics counter that its iterative and phased cycles 
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are not appropriate for enterprise systems and digital innovations since these cycles do not allow for 
collective-meaning making across functions or departments, and may even cause technological drift in 
top-down projects (Highsmith, 2009; Fitzgerald, Hartnett and Conboy, 2006).  
Similarly, communications at iSource were also primarily focused on facilitating close alignment 
between technology features and the needs of distinct subsets of iSourcers (infusions). However, in 
each subsequent infusion, managers enabled collective meaning making across these different groups 
by integrating the business cases of previous infusions to help justify new business cases. They also 
co-opted respected internal and external individuals, stories of positive outcomes, negative outcomes, 
and survey data from previous infusions to help advertise the possible value of ESN, and show target 
audiences how they should use ESN features to reap advertised benefits.  
Managers at iSource particularly made a concerted effort to co-opt respected middle managers and 
front- line staff from the target audience to be members of the steering team and help drive 
justifications. This was an especially effective way of generating intrinsic motivation without 
technological drift, since it ensured that the ESN was responsive to overall organisational objectives, 
and, at the least, also gave iSourcers the impression that ESN was responsive to their needs, and at the 
most, was indeed responsive to their needs. Over time, these communications also helped to drive more 
inclusive agile cycles, as the development and implementation of new features was informed by 
consolidating, adapting and reframing features and related organisational structures, which were 
successfully deployed in other infusions. In this way, they also enabled a delicate balance of top-down 
control and bottom-up motivation. 
Overall, since the discussed intra-organisational theorization strategies are likely to generate different 
responses in different contexts, I am not proposing that the model of internal diffusion offers a 
definitive way to ensure that newly- introduced digital innovations will be effective. What I am 
proposing however, is that managers who reflect on the detailed contextual information and dynamics 
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discussed in this thesis, may be able to find contextual similarities to their own situations, and make 
mindful choices about the content of their technology-organisation alignment and communication 
strategies. My thesis provides a structure for thinking about this content, and deciding what is the best 
way to frame, advertise and motivate engagement, and integrate isolated, emergent implementations.  
8.2 Contributions to IS Research 
This research contributes to our understanding of technology evolution by focusing on the mutually 
reinforcing processes of technological and organisational change involved in technology appropriation 
within organisations (Leonardi, 2009; Orlikowski, 1996; Arnold, 2003). My study examined the spread 
of an enterprise social network system across business technologists, consultants, and senior managers, 
working in a global technology services provider. Research in the IS and CSCW community have 
primarily analyzed technology appropriation as discontinuous processes of development, 
implementation and use, and processes of IS diffusion and institutionalization at a field and 
organisational level. This research has also typically conducted this analysis on established, 
transactional information systems that have evolved over the years to become more aligned with the 
needs of contemporary organisations. My research here adds to our understanding of how newly- 
introduced, non-transactional digital innovations adopted at an organisational level are initially 
misaligned with front- line organisational activities and behaviours, and provides insights into how 
managers can gradually align these innovations through internal diffusion processes. 
By applying the rhetorical legitimation analytical device, I shed light on the role of rhetorical 
legitimation in the communicative practices of IS steering team members. This analysis contributes to 
the recent work by Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell (2014) and Hsu, Huang and Galliers (2014) who 
explored the role of communicative practices in the diffusion of novel IT ideas within pluralistic field 
and organisational settings. Understanding how especially novel technologies are aligned as they 
215!
evolve at an intra-organisational level has substantial implications for the development, implementation 
and use of especially uncertain and flexible digital innovations that are extending across organisational 
departments and practices. For example, extant institutional diffusion studies still hold that managers 
help to institutionalize newly- introduced technologies by employing organising visions early to 
generate meaning making, legitimation and the mobilization of resources around the new innovation 
(Swanson and Ramiller, 1997; Wang and Swanson, 2007; Mark, 2007b; Currie, 2004). In this regard, 
Ansari, Fiss and Zajac (2010) also hypothesize that the standardization and scaling of new innovations 
within organisations may be hindered by technical, cultural and political technology- organisation 
misalignments that emerge as a result of organisational complexity. 
My observations add to this by showing that in pluralistic contexts, the overarching organisational-
level organising vision is elaborated and eventually refined through an iterative process of intra-
organisational theorizing across competing stakeholder groups or what I refer to as infusions. Managers 
can influence this process to standardize and scale technology in particular ways by employing 
justifications in three relatively cumulative and sequential legitimation phases- rationale framing, value 
advertising and motivating engagement. These strategies respectively help managers to influence the 
political, technical and cultural misalignments that emerge among the competing logics that guide 
front- line practices and the institutional logic associated with the newly incoming innovation. During 
these alignment processes, managers can enable collective meaning making to effectively standardize 
the technology across competing groups by strategically grafting on other intra-organisational 
theorizations, and co-opting key people, ESN functions, and practices from other infusions.  
Previous field and organisational level studies also suggested that early pragmatic pathos and logos 
justifications help to dis-embed actors from their existing ways of working and legitimate new 
technology, while later moral ethos appeals help to reinforce the changes that are triggered by the new 
technology (Nielsen, Mathiassen and Newell, 2014; Barrett, Heracleous and Walsham, 2013; Hsu, 
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Huang and Galliers, 2014). My observations resonate with these findings for the most part, but my 
findings show that logos appeals were primarily used to disembed actors from their existing ways of 
working, while primarily pathos appeals were used to legitimate the newly incoming innovation. In 
contrast to existing studies however, my observations indicate that managers employed a 
disproportional amount of pragmatic appeals to justify the new innovation.  
My findings also make a significant contribution to existing research that has so far not explored 
processes of de-legitimation in detail, other than to suggest that pathos and logos appeals are used to 
dis-embed actors from their existing ways of working (Mignerat and Rivard, 2009; Nielsen, Mathiassen 
and Newell, 2014; Becker, 2010). In this regard, I observed that managers followed a similar intra-
organisational theorization process of using logos pragmatic justifications to widen the technical, 
political and cultural misalignments between the existing, competing technologies (email) and front- 
line employee activities and behaviours. Since intra-organisational theorizing was a cumulative and 
iterative process, these de-legitimating justifications were consistently and uniformly employed in 
parallel with justifications to legitimate the new innovation with distinct target audiences.  
Finally, my findings generally shed light on how especially novel and misaligned digital innovations 
and infrastructures can be effectively managed within organisations. IS and CSCW studies have made 
significant strides in understanding that unlike traditional enterprise systems, new digital innovations 
like ESN present significantly different challenges and effect significantly deeper changes in the way 
organisations develop, implement and use technology (Yoo et al., 2010; Tilson, Lyytinen and Sørensen, 
2010). In particular, since ESN’s “ideology of openness” runs against the grain of organisational 
rationality, its evolution is significantly influenced internal visibility- invisibility, sharing- control and 
engagement-disengagement tensions (Gibbs, Rozaidi and Eisenberg, 2013). Accordingly, these studies 
have so far focused on how digital innovations change and grow in size and scope within organisations 
over time. Research in this area shows that because of the interpretively flexible and generative nature 
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of these systems (Zittrain, 2008), their appropriation needs to be managed in a way that simultaneously 
allows for bottom-up and top-down evolution (Monteiro et al., 2012; Brynjolfsson and A. Saunders, 
2010).  
In my observations of the internal diffusion of ESN, managers did this by co-opting middle-managers 
and  front-line employees from key communities of actors onto the steering team, and giving them the 
autonomy to develop and justify ESN in ways that were aligned to the immediate needs of the audience. 
They managed to reduce the technological drift that comes with this autonomy by continually refining 
justifications to reflect how wider organisational structures and procedures around ESN were connected 
and emerged from local, front- line needs.  
8.3 Limitations and Future Directions 
There are a number of avenues for future research based on the findings of this study. iSource offers a 
fruitful avenue for generalizing findings since its operations in professional technology services and 
institutional makeup of professional, community and market logics, are typical of contemporary 
organisations. However, since the locally emergent nature of these institutions make them unique in 
many ways to iSource, it would still be fruitful to continue building on the theory developed here by 
examining ESN evolution in similar professional services  settings. A crucial but necessary limitation 
of my research approach has been its intensive focus on the details of a single site of success, at the 
expense of equally unique dynamics in broader settings. This limitation could be overcome by looking 
at equally unique cases of top-down ESN success. It would also be fruitful to build on this model 
through comparisons with contrasting cases of top-down failure, bottom-up success, and cases where 
success was possible without de-legitimating competing technologies. For instance, my pilot study of 
ESN adoption at a financial services firm could itself be considered an extreme case of bottom-up 
success because of the likely possibility of deeper institutional misalignments and steeper cultural 
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challenges. Similarly, more focused, bottom-up examinations may reveal whether and how the 
pragmatic appeals illustrated here, generate moral legitimacy over time. In attempting to build a theory 
of top-down internal diffusion I tied ESN success solely to managerial intervention. However, even in 
this case, bottom-up dynamics were important to ESN success, and thus, warrant closer examination.  
The data that I collected also represents a broad overview of managerial action at different locations 
across the world. It would be interesting to examine and compare the data from each country in detail 
to see the effect of societal institutional pressures on ESN’s trajectory. This is especially salient to 
collaborative technologies like ESN, since many countries have strict legislations that shape the degree 
of managerial intervention that is possible around ESN adoption. For example, the German legislation 
prevented managers at these iSource sites from tracking ESN activity. I also observed that the level of 
ESN engagement at iSource’s main European HQ was consistently tracked as the lowest among its 
geographical locations.  
My dissertation has only scratched the surface of the implications of my analysis and findings for the 
development, implementation and use of novel digital innovations. It would be useful to add to the 
internal diffusion model by further exploring how specific affordances of ESN facilitated its 
interpretation, enactment and change within receiving organisations. Similarly, I have not explicitly 
connected the concepts developed here to similar socio-materiality work on mutual technological and 
organisational change, although this work provided the motivation for my approach. There could be 
substantive connections between the institutional origins of my work and socio-material research, 
particularly in relation to the identification of regularities across time and different contexts. 
Finally, my intention is that my work will be used as a platform for exploring rhetorical legitimation as 
new approach to technology and specifically digital innovation adoption strategy development 
(Monteiro et al., 2012; Tilson, Lyytinen and Sørensen, 2010). The notion of internal diffusion 
developed here focuses primarily on the iterative and strategic communication and justification of 
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various technological features with different groups over time, and as I pointed out in section 7.1, this 
approach is well suited to supporting and enhancing agile development, implementation and use 
approaches.   
8.4 Closing Thoughts 
My thesis has focused shedding light on how newly- introduced digital innovations adopted at an 
organisational level are translated and integrated into organisational actors’ front- line activities and 
behavior, how this unfolds in the face of multiple, simultaneous institutional misalignments, and how 
it may be managed through managers’ rhetorical practices. These findings are in line with IS and 
organisational studies that are increasingly recognizing the important role that linguistic practices play 
in shaping organisational and technological change.  
Understanding actors rhetorical practices in technological evolution necessarily means understanding 
the salient interests that influence how they make sense of technological change, and judge whether it 
is desirable, appropriate, or legitimate. In this thesis I have illustrated how different communities of 
actors’ perceptions of legitimacy influenced how they negotiated specific system features, and 
supporting organisational structures and procedures, and in turn, eventually came to a compromise on 
system and organisational features that were based on new, refined, salient interests. Looking back on 
my experiences as part of a forum on digital work forum described in section 7.1, I see how this 
rhetorical approach to legitimating technology change can be useful to the huge number of non-
technical managers that are grappling with how to develop a communication campaign that is coherent, 
convincing and importantly facilitates negotiation and compromise within ESNs increasingly diverse 
audience.  
It is my hope that my research will help these practitioners to develop more mindful technology 
communication campaigns that will benefit them and their colleagues in the long run, and help to 
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relieve the uncertainty of how to prove and communicate the value of these unconventional 
technologies in increasingly complex settings. I also hope that practitioners and researchers will come 
to recognize that technology diffusion does not just occur within organisational fields, but continues 
beyond the boundaries of the organisational, as different communities of organisational actors 
communicate, negotiate and compromise their technological and organisational change interests into 
reality. 
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